

EAST EUROPE

Monthly Review of East European Affairs

MEMORIES OF A VACATION
EASTERN EUROPE LOOKS AT CHINA
TODOR ZHIVKOV IMPROVISES
PEASANTS IN EASTERN EUROPE
THE BOOK TRADE

BRIEFS

"Those Who Admire Picasso..."
The Moscow Conference

MARCH 1960

35 CENTS

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EAST EUROPE

Formerly NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

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THE MONTH IN REVIEW

MOSCOW MEETING

IT WAS, certainly, a very odd affair. Almost everything about it was a touch unfocused, blurred in a shimmer of unreality. From the beginning, with the bald announcements that the highest level delegations from the Soviet orbit would meet to discuss agriculture, the puzzling mist set in; agriculture, surely, is a splendid topic, a compelling topic, a vital topic, but was it exactly the topic to bring together in Moscow the very power-pinnacles of each Satellite country, the First Party Secretaries and Premiers, the Gomulkas and Kadaras and Novotnys? Only, it seemed to many observers, if some drastic new line were to be taken, some sharp switch in policy with profound political and economic ramifications. But in the event (as far as the event was made public), in the communique on the agricultural meeting, there was absolutely nothing of the sort. The statement was as unstartling, as bland, as innocent of mention of the real agricultural problems in the area as the devoutest apostle of togetherness could want; it approved of increased agricultural production, it approved of collectivization (but without demanding "great leaps forward"), it approved of the progress made so far, it said that the future would see more progress, and that this would be nice. Of the decline in Czechoslovak agriculture, for example, or the fact that the Polish farmer stubbornly remains almost completely uncollectivized and the Polish regime does not seem willing or able to do anything about it, nothing was said. On this last point, a post-meeting statement from Radio Moscow, February 10, gave the measure of the curious unreality of the occasion: after announcing the various collectivization percentages achieved in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania, the broadcast said, "The idea of the superiority of the collective forms of labor is ever more deeply penetrating the consciousness of working peasants in the Polish People's Republic." This was broadcast in Polish, to people who know it to be an egregious untruth, and it was quite in keeping with the make-believe spirit of the Moscow agricultural session.



WARSAW PACT DECLARATION

And then, the unannounced other half of the bill, the meeting of the dignitaries in their capacity as representatives of the Warsaw Pact countries. Here the mist took a somewhat different quality. The long declaration produced by the meeting was a summation of current Soviet foreign policy as it looks toward a Summit Meeting: although West Germany was bitterly assailed and the threat was made of a separate peace with East Germany over the Berlin issue, nevertheless coexistence was the watchword, universal disarmament was preached and the strong possibility was held out that the United States might be considered almost as sincere and eager a protagonist for peace as the Soviet Union. In this regard it was a thoroughly undoc-trinaire and unorthodox document, based indeed upon the realities of life in the nuclear sixties rather than the petrified and immutable antagonisms of classic "Marxism-Leninism." But there was another voice raised in Moscow, the voice of Communist China, and in the speech of the Chinese observer Kang Sheng all the old fear and mistrust rang loud. In direct contradiction to the tone and spirit of the declaration he cried that talk of peace is merely an insidious weapon in the hands of the American imperialists, that "the actions of the United States clearly prove that the imperialist nature cannot be changed," that "American imperialism is still the enemy of world peace." At this voice the years rolled back and all the paranoiac nightmares of Stalin rang in the world.

We do not know whether there was any discussion, any argument, between the representatives of raw fundamentalist Chinese Communism and Khrushchev and his European Satellites. We do know that weeks after the Moscow meeting, when all the East European leaders were back in their capitals, no word of the Chinese contradiction had yet appeared in the press of the Soviet bloc. Perhaps, indeed, silence was the only feasible public response to this sudden glimpse of a chasm behind the mists.

POLISH CHURCH AND STATE


A distinct step seems to have been made to halt the widening breach between Gomulka's regime in Poland and the Polish Catholic Church headed by Cardinal Wyszynski. Since the high-water mark of Church-State cooperation, the elections of January 1957, when the Church was granted wide areas of freedom in exchange for at least its tacit support of the men and policies of the "Polish October", the regime has encroached upon these freedoms and threatened to do worse, charging that the Church has violated its pledge to refrain from political interference. One of the focal points of the tension has been Bishop Kaczmarek of Kielce; accused of outright attacks on the regime, he had been deprived by the State of the right to perform his functions and was reportedly under house arrest. In answer to regime demands that he be replaced, the Church has said that only the Vatican had power to do so. Now, after a widely reported meeting between First Secretary Gomulka and Cardinal Wyszynski, a compromise solution seems to have been reached. Bishop Kaczmarek has left Kielce on "sick leave" to go to the resort of Krynica where, an aide was reported to have said, he will stay a "long, long time." A Bishop Coadjutor has been appointed to assume his functions. Further reports state that the punitive tax and fiscal policies threatened against Church schools will be withdrawn or modified.

HUNGARIAN COLLECTIVIZATION

One of the realities ignored by the Moscow communique on agriculture was the situation in Hungary. On February 12 the Hungarian Party Central Committee issued a Resolution formally bringing to a close the current drive for agricultural collectivization. It proclaimed the great success of that drive—70 percent of all arable land collectivized, six counties completely collectivized, etc.—and announced that now all effort must be bent toward "consolidation" of the new collectives and toward increases in productivity. This marks the end of a remarkable chapter in the history of Communism's struggle with the peasant in Eastern Europe. The Hungarian farmer has made very clear his distaste for the collective; the precipitate departure from the kolkhozes of over half of the collectivized peasants during Imre Nagy's short-lived 1953-4 New Course was as complete a repudiation of Communist agricultural dogma as Eastern Europe has seen (except, perhaps, the complete collapse of the Polish collectives in 1956—but Polish collectivization has never attained anything like the scope of the Hungarian). What, then, permitted the regime to claim such impressive collectivization successes? The methods used are quite well known: the coercion by economic pressures of tax and social security laws, the coercion through relatives working in factories or other State-owned establishments who were told not to return to their jobs until their parents or uncles had joined a collective, the coercion through incessant arguments of Party agitators, the coercion through direct threats of physical force, the coercion through administrative fiat, in which it was simply announced that whole villages "were collectivized."

These methods worked, and Hungary now has three times as much collectivization as it has ever had. But in the Central Committee's plea for "consolidation," for greater productivity and in numerous official and unofficial reports coming out of Hungary, are visible the further results of these methods. Tens of thousands of peasants are collectivized in name and in law, but in case after case the name is an empty pretense and the law is no more than paper which the peasant does his best to ignore. In thousands of other cases peasant resentment expresses itself in refusal to do more than the absolute minimum of work, in mutinous evasion of his "collective duties," in devious adherence to the concept of personal ownership of the land, whatever the forms.

(Continued on page 25)



"Workers at the Shih-chingshan Iron and Steel Works in Peiping . . . write wall newspapers pledging to fulfill their 1959 target ahead of time."

Photo and caption from *China Reconstructs* (Peiping), November 1959

EASTERN EUROPE LOOKS AT CHINA

IMAGINE A THEATER in which the curtain is never lifted on the action, the actors do not read the lines of the play but rather a glowing review written by the playwright's uncle, and the orchestra half-drowns everything with a ceaseless repetition of an old marching song. This is in some sort an image of the difficulties and frustrations of the international audience when it attempts to understand the shifts and drifts of the Communist world's internal power politics. Yet there are moments when the curtain grows translucent, the orchestra sinks into a *pianissimo* and the actors' lines suddenly seem to have meaning. Such a moment came at the recent Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries; there the lines of internal struggle rang out clear in the vivid juxtaposition of two documents, the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact members which followed the "Khrushchev line" in describing the excellent possibilities for peaceful coexistence and world disarmament, on the one hand, and the speech of the Communist Chinese observer on the other, which reverberated with the classic Communist distrust of "imperialist nations" and implicitly but clearly denied the Khrushchev theses on the possibility of peace. (See *Current Developments* for a discussion of the Moscow meeting and *Texts and Documents* for

the Declaration and the Chinese speech.)

There are, if infrequently, other such occasions. One of them was the celebration of the Chinese National Day in October 1959, in which all the European Soviet bloc countries participated. Here the divisions within the Communist world were less dramatic but more extensively articulated. There were made clear not only Sino-Soviet disagreements but a whole spectrum of differences in policy and stress within the theoretically monolithic Soviet bloc. On a number of topics where there has been Sino-Soviet divergence, the Satellites' response was not necessarily simple agreement with "the first Socialist State," but rather a more complex resultant of such forces as internal economic conditions, political relations with the West, personal biases of regime hierarchies, etc.

Increasingly, Communist China seems to be polarized as the prophet of "fundamentalist Communism" in contrast to the more sophisticated, more supple and less doctrinaire stance of the Soviet Union. The reactions of the various Satellites to this polarization shed much light on the actualities of the Sino-Soviet differences and reveal a great deal about the regimes' attitudes towards their own problems.

VOICES AT THE CELEBRATION

THE CELEBRATION of Chinese National Day in October 1959, marking the tenth anniversary of the Mao regime's rule, which drew to Peiping Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev direct from his US tour and leaders of all the Communist regimes of Europe and Asia, provided a synoptic view of Satellite positions on certain key points of divergence in Soviet and Red Chinese propaganda lines. These differences, and the Satellite attitudes, were exposed obliquely, through variations in emphases and tone. The statements made (and not made) by East European regime delegates in China, speaking mainly at a September 28 rally in Peiping; by officials presiding at local National Day observances in the East European capitals, and by the Soviet bloc press, revealed the placement of these regimes in the gap between the Moscow and Peiping standpoints on (1) foreign policy (2) the Chinese communes, (3) the "great leap forward" and China's economic progress, and (4) the relevance of Chinese Communist doctrine and practice for other countries.

In general, the Satellite regimes leaned toward whichever trends approximated, and seemed to justify, their own internal policies. While all the East European Communist regimes derive their "legitimacy" from Moscow, not Peiping, the dialectic of post-Stalin political developments has put some of them in the position of being more coercive and uncompromising than the Soviet regime. Their attitudes toward the West, toward methods and goals of collectivization, etc., are now closer to the Chinese than the Soviet.

Thus, the regimes of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which have never wholeheartedly accepted "de-Stalinization" and liberalization as prescribed by Khrushchev, show the most sympathy for Chinese claims and positions. East Germany, in a seeming effort to discredit or at least to distort and deflect some of Khrushchev's programs, has gone the furthest in support and apotheosis of Mao.*

Bulgaria, while equally unreconstructed politically, and closest of all the East European Satellites to the Chinese economic model (it is the only one to have used the terms "great leap forward" and even "commune" in reference to its own activities), is at the same time more subject to direct and massive Soviet pressure than are the more westerly Satellites. This led to considerable ambivalence in Bulgarian positions during the National Day period.

The Kadar regime in Hungary tendered due filial support to the Soviet Union. Albania and Romania hewed most literally of all to the Moscow line.

Poland inclined toward the Soviet position, not because of its origin but because of its relative liberality; but, while attacking Chinese Communist harshness and fanaticism, Polish spokesmen approved of Chinese differences from the Soviet model as implementing the thesis of "independent roads to Socialism."

*For example, at the Chinese Embassy's National Day reception in East Berlin on October 1, Party leader Walter Ulbricht said that, in visiting the United States, Khrushchev "was acting under the Marxist finding" of Mao Tse-tung, elaborated in 1949, on the relations between Communism and imperialism. And an article in the East German organ *Einheit*, October 1959, found ideological authority in a 1919 Lenin statement for Mao policies which went beyond even the Chinese claims for their doctrinal orthodoxy.

Foreign Policy

On the question of relations with the West, the Mao regime has maintained a truculent and aggressive posture, based on the doctrine that "imperialism" is compulsively war-oriented and that Western moves towards peace are suspect. The issue of Taiwan (Formosa) is cited as proof of the provocative tendencies of the United States. The Soviet Union holds that both Communist and non-Communist nations recognize and support the need to reduce international tensions and "coexist" peacefully. Soviet propaganda sidesteps the issue of Taiwan and hammers hard on China's record of "promoting peace" in an apparent effort to muffle the shriller note struck by Peiping.

Czechoslovakia's Antonin Novotny was the only East European Party First Secretary, and thus the highest ranking delegate from the area, to attend the National Day functions in Peiping. He was the only delegation leader to proclaim that his private talks with Mao (no official communiqué on any of Mao's bilateral talks with the delegates—including Khrushchev—was released) had indicated a complete accord on foreign policy. At a reception in Wuhan, Novotny said: "In meetings with leading representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, it was again demonstrated that a firm ideological unity exists between us . . . both on questions of Socialism and opinions regarding the solution of important international problems." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], October 5.) Almost identical phraseology was used by another Czechoslovak delegate, Politburo member Jiri Hendrych, in a speech in Shanghai. (Radio Prague, October 5.) At a National Day rally in Prague on September 30, Vice Premier Otakar Simunek, while commending steps toward East-West negotiation, emphasized the irreconcilability of reactionary imperialist forces, citing West German militarism in Europe and those who, in Asia, "follow the policy of non-recognition of China."

While none of these speakers mentioned Taiwan, the Czechoslovak State-Party congratulatory telegram sent to Peiping pledged (according to the New China News Agency, October 1) "full support for the Chinese people's struggle against the illegal occupation of China's territory of Taiwan by US imperialism."

However, the impression of Czechoslovak endorsement of China's reservations regarding international *detente* was moderated by Novotny's statements at the September 28 Peiping rally. Here, Novotny stressed the 20th CPSU (Soviet Party) Congress thesis on prevention of war between the two opposing systems, and maintained that the Communist camp's doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" had won the support of world public opinion "whose pressure the capitalist world leaders can no longer fail to recognize."

Hungarian propaganda during this period echoed the Soviet line on relaxation and coexistence. As in Czechoslovakia, the only Hungarian mention of Taiwan was in the official Party-State telegram to Peiping; and this reference was deleted from the Radio Budapest summary of the telegram on September 30. The New China News Agency on October 1 said that the telegram "expressed full support for the peaceful policy which [Peiping] had always followed, fully supported China's struggle for the libera-



A Soviet technician (left) shakes the hand of a Chinese steelworker as they celebrate the opening of a new blast furnace in Paotow in Inner Mongolia.

China Reconstructs (Peiping), February 1960

tion of Taiwan and the offshore islands, and called for China's admission to the UN."

Albania gave a perfunctory bow both ways: Premier Mehmet Shehu's speech at the Peiping rally pledged support on the one hand to Khrushchev's policy of international relaxation, and on the other to China's admission to the UN and hegemony over Taiwan.

Bulgarian statements gave unequivocal backing to the Soviet position on foreign policy. There was token acknowledgement of China's claims to Taiwan and UN representation, but Bulgarian spokesmen gave much greater weight to the importance of Khrushchev's visit to the US. Bulgarian Premier Anton Yugov, speaking at a celebration at the Chinese Embassy in Sofia, declared: "We note with pleasure the first hopeful signs of an improved international atmosphere. . . . Khrushchev's visit to the United States is considered by all to be one of the most important political events in the postwar period, and has influenced and will continue favorably to influence the barometer of international events."

Poland, in line with the position embodied in its own Rapacki Plan, endorsed the policy of East-West negotiation. At the Peiping rally, Polish Deputy Premier Alexander Zawadzki said that Poland supports China's right to "unification" of all its territories, including Taiwan, and deplored the barring of China from the UN as "lamentable proof of the political shortsightedness of certain imperialist circles striving to sustain tension in Asia." But Zawadzki—and also Politburo member Stefan Jedrychowski speaking in Warsaw on September 30—urged Communist China's recognition by the West not as a right earned by the Peiping regime but as a necessary means for preserving and strengthening world peace. Thus, speaking of the recent talks between heads of government, Zawadzki said that "the voice of People's China must be taken

into account, and the sooner it is, the better for the growth of international cooperation and . . . peace." Jedrychowski declared that China's admission to the UN and general acceptance of its role as a major power would further the atmosphere for "detente and negotiations, a sign of which was the recent visit of Khrushchev to the United States." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], September 29; October 1.)

Romanian spokesmen proclaimed Soviet views almost line for line, including pointed references to China as a champion of world peace. Taiwan was mentioned only casually, with no reference to the U.S. in a speech in Bucharest by Deputy Premier Stefan Voitec (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], October 1.) Premier Chivu Stoica, speaking at the Chinese Embassy in Bucharest on October 1; Politburo member Emil Bodnarus, in a speech at the September 28 Peiping rally; Foreign Minister Avram Bunaciu's telegram to the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, all praised China's efforts for "the peaceful solution of international problems" and the liquidation of the cold war. Bodnarus called "consolidation of peace" the main issue of the times and one which could be fully resolved in the present period. (*Scinteia*, September 30.)

The Chinese Communes

The communes set up in China in 1958 are a sensitive point of friction between the Soviet and Chinese Communist leadership. Soviet propaganda organs evade mention of the communes where possible; what little comment has been publicized tends to be derogatory. In his July

17, 1959, speech in Poznan, Khrushchev, describing the failure of the post-Civil War communes in the Soviet Union, strongly intimated that the commune principle was totally unsuited to a society in transition from "Socialism" to "Communism" (*Trybuna Ludu*, July 21); and his private jibes at the Chinese communes to foreign visitors, while never officially published, were widely reported.

During the National Day celebrations, Soviet speakers and press boycotted the subject. An article in the October 1959 Moscow *Kommunist* charted the course of rural organization by the Mao regime up to 1957, stopping short at the beginning of the commune movement.

Chinese Party propaganda, currently campaigning against "right-wing" opposition in the Chinese Party, complains that Party critics of the communes cite the failure of the Soviet communes to back their arguments. The Mao "line" is that the early Soviet and contemporary Chinese communes are not comparable, and that the Chinese People's Republic is not obliged to follow the Soviet Union in all modes of "Socialist construction." Chief of State Liu Shao-chi has stated that the commune is not only suitable for the transition period but would also be a viable form of social organization when "Communism" is eventually achieved. (*Problems of Peace and Socialism* [Prague], October 1959.)

In official Satellite appraisal of the Chinese communes, Czechoslovak statements were the most favorable, citing them as a major accomplishment of the Chinese Party and an example to be followed by other countries with conditions similar to China's. The Bratislava *Pravda*, September 19, said that the agricultural and industrial successes of 1958 and 1959 in China are "inseparably connected with the creation of the people's communes." First Secretary Novotny's remarks at the Peiping rally, and a speech by Party Secretary Pavel David at a National Day rally in Bratislava, praised the communes as evidence of the progress of the Chinese peasants in raising agricultural output and "building Socialist production relations."

By contrast, Hungarian, Albanian and Romanian leaders did not refer at all to the role of the communes in Chinese progress. At the National Day rally in Budapest, Hungarian Premier Ferenc Munnich referred to Chinese changes in organization of the countryside only as "land reform." (MTI [Budapest], September 30.)

Bulgarian leaders appeared particularly loath to call the communes by name. Chief of State Dimitur Ganev, speaking at the Peiping rally, referred to "Chinese reconstruction of agriculture on a collective basis," and "ways and forms of the movement toward Socialism under the concrete conditions prevailing in China." These circumlocutions could be the effect of the contretemps of late 1958 in Bulgaria, when a newspaper reported that 15 collective farms were being merged "along the lines of the Chinese communes" and the new amalgamations would in fact be given the name of "commune." (*Zemedel'sko Zname*, November 12, 1958). This was almost instantly repudiated by the Bulgarian regime, and the word appears since to be a hot potato in Bulgarian mouths. On the other hand, an article in *Kooperativno Selo* (Sofia),



Chinese workers diverting the waters of the Taoho River to an area needing irrigation. In 1958, the irrigated area was expanded by 79 million acres. China Reconstructs (Peiping), August 1959



Young Chinese workers, mobilized by the Communist Youth League, building a railroad in the province of Heilungkiang near the Soviet border.

China Reconstructs (Peiping), August 1959

October 1, 1959, wholly devoted to the Chinese commune, called it the "most appropriate form for the transition from collective to national ownership" (i.e., from "Socialism" to "Communism") in China and added that it would also be "the basic unit for China in the future Communist society."

Only the Polish speakers did not shy at the word commune: Jedrychowski discussed the communes extensively at the National Day Rally in Warsaw, acknowledging their successes but scoring their extremisms (distribution of goods according to need rather than work; administrative overcentralization, etc.) *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (Warsaw), October 1, wrote with tacit approval of the action taken by the Chinese Party's Sixth Plenum to curb the "hotheads" in the commune cadres. An obvious reason why the Poles alone felt able to speak freely of the commune is that it has no possible relevance to the overwhelmingly uncollectivized Polish agriculture in the proximate future; for the other countries of the area, more or less thoroughly collectivized, the commune is a feasible next stage.

"The Great Leap Forward"

Communist China's rate of economic growth, and the factors contributing to it, are subject to varying interpretations within as well as outside the bloc. From some quarters there is more than a hint that China has equalled or surpassed the Soviet achievements, which previously had been the model and measure of the "Socialist" economic stride.

Both Chinese and Soviet spokesmen refrain from making direct comparisons between the two growth rates. Chinese propaganda attributes China's economic successes mainly to the communes and "the great leap forward" of 1958, both identified with Mao and his employment of mass move-

ments as a catalytic force. Soviet propaganda, on the other hand, credits much of China's economic development to Soviet aid, and—particularly during the period of National Day celebrations—speaks broadly of Chinese progress over the entire past decade, downplaying "the great leap."

Of the Satellites, East Germany and Czechoslovakia made the most far-reaching claims for Chinese growth. At the Peiping rally, Czechoslovak leader Novotny said that "the unprecedented pace of economic development in China, characterized by your Party as 'the great leap,' confirms undreamt-of possibilities of Socialism in securing the rapid development of a country's productive forces." Similarly Deputy Premier Simunek said that the gains made by the Chinese "exceed anything that could be, or was, used as a standard of the past."

Hungarian propaganda, on this point, also conveyed awe of Chinese achievements. The Party-State telegram to Peiping said that the Hungarian people were "fascinated" by the "great leap forward" of 1958 (Radio Budapest, September 30.) The Party organ *Nepszabadsag*, October 1, wrote: "Since the Socialist camp came into existence, the world has seen an entirely new and unprecedented development in the history of mankind. But China's development, which surpasses all that went before, astonishes even the members of the Socialist camp with its dynamism and tremendous results."

Poland tended to minimize the significance of Chinese growth rates. Jedrychowski said at the rally in Warsaw: "We realize that for the Chinese people this unusual rate of industrial development is a vital historical need resulting from the original low starting point." And Zawadzki in Peiping said that the ten-year efforts of Communist China, and the special exertion of the "great leap" in 1958, had laid "strong foundations of Socialist industrialization"

in China. (The Chinese Communists, of course, claim that they completed the "foundations of Socialist industrialization" in China in 1957, before the start of the "great leap.")

Bulgaria, Albania and Romania followed the Soviet lead in treating Chinese economic progress in terms of the entire decade, and making virtually no reference to "the great leap" or the year 1958.

Ideological Implications

Whether Chinese successes and innovations challenge the Soviet Communist leadership's position as the sole ideological fount of world Communism is an issue which underlies all these divergencies. The question resolves itself thus: are Maoist theories and techniques, such as the use of "mass movements," original contributions to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, ergo, models to be adopted elsewhere; or are they merely local applications of general Communist principles already established in and by the first "Socialist" State?

Soviet propaganda speaks of Chinese "Socialist" achievements as an inspiration to emerging Afro-Asian countries to take the "Socialist" path, but does not say that these countries should copy the particular features of Chinese "Socialism." The Soviet line is that the Chinese Party is "creatively applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism, as elaborated in the course of Socialist construction in the USSR, to the specific conditions in China"—thus discounting the relevance of Chinese experience to other countries within as well as outside the bloc.

Chinese propaganda makes far greater claims for the originality and universality of Mao's theoretical "discoveries" and practical innovations. The technique of organizing mass movements is held to be a major ideological innovation particularly applicable to other countries with an undeveloped technological base (see Liu Shao-Chi in *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, October 1959).

In the statements made during the Chinese National Day celebrations, no Soviet bloc representative suggested that specific Chinese models or theories were appropriate to his own or other countries of the bloc. There was some variation in the assessment of the validity of Maoist ideological theories for the Communist camp as a whole. In Bulgaria, an editorial in *Narodna Armiya* (Sofia), October 1, declared that "the merits of the Chinese Communist Party are immense not only for the Chinese but for all peoples throughout the world. . . . The contribution of the Party to Marxism-Leninism has an enormous salutary influence, not only on the liberation struggle of the oppressed nations but also on . . . the unaltered development of the countries of the Socialist camp." But an editorial the same day in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) corrected the angle of this steep pro-Chinese incline by reciting only the Soviet thesis that the Chinese regime has "creatively applied Lenin's teaching on the construction of Socialism to the specific historical conditions created in China." At the rally in Peiping, Bulgarian leader Ganev called Mao "an outstanding Marxist-Leninist," but did not enumerate any of his theories as constituting universal Communist truths.

And on October 4, *Rabotnichesko Delo* came out heavily in support of Soviet ideological authority. In reference to Khrushchev's statements during his US visit, the paper said: "A number of Marxist-Leninist formulas on international relations are defined and elaborated in these speeches. It now becomes even more evident that one who does not learn from the historic experience of the Soviet Union in the construction of Socialism and Communism, the consolidation of peace, and the creative development of Marxism-Leninism by the Soviet Communist Party, cannot be a consistent Marxist-Leninist."

The Czechoslovak spokesmen were, on this issue, unusually noncommittal, stressing "unity" of ideological views in the "Socialist" camp. Polish spokesmen, undoubtedly mindful of their country's claim and hopes for a "Polish road to Socialism," stressed the significance of specifically Chinese innovations as justification of independent national routes to "Socialism." Jedrychowski said in connection with "the great leap": "Every country sets the rate of its development and industrialization according to its own estimates of its needs and resources . . . and the political and economic tasks which it sets for itself." The Poles took little heed of Mao's personal role as an ideologist. *Sztandar Mlodych* (Warsaw), October 1, called him, a little coolly, under the circumstances, "an acknowledged poet and one of the most outstanding Marxist theoreticians."

Hungarian, Albanian and Romanian comment clearly spelled out Chinese Communist ideological subordination to the Soviet Union. At Peiping, Albanian Premier Shehu spoke of the Chinese Party as "guided by its Leninist Central Committee, tempered in the fire of the struggle led by Mao Tse-tung, and applying the universal experience of the glorious Soviet Party." And Albania's Deputy Premier Kellezi, speaking in Tirana on September 29, said that the Chinese People's Republic and Albania "are jointly struggling for peace and Socialism under the guidance of the Soviet Union."

ON STALIN

A TELLING footnote to the National Day propaganda, in which the Stalinist-anti-Stalinist cast of the differences between the Soviet Union and China showed in sharp relief, was the Soviet bloc commentary on the 80th anniversary of Stalin's birthday, last December 21. While the Soviet organ *Pravda* inveighed against Stalin's "errors" and their baneful effects on the Soviet Party and nation, the Chinese *Jenmin Jihpao* praised his achievements and teachings, and their continuing validity. The Czechoslovak press also emphasized Stalin's stature as a leader, as did Albania. Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary leaned toward the Soviet view, although their criticism was milder both in tone and substance. Poland published the *Pravda* article in full, and abstained from comment altogether. (See *East Europe*, February 1960, p. 44.)

Current Trends in East European Agriculture

AGRICULTURE HAS ALWAYS been the weakest element in Communist economic planning. Stalin's policies put industrialization first, using the collective farms as a means of controlling the peasantry—who were the great majority of the Soviet population—and as a kind of siphon for drawing an economic surplus out of the countryside. When Khrushchev consolidated his power he addressed himself to the obvious stagnation in Soviet agriculture (the production of grain in 1953, he pointed out, was still at the level it had been in 1910-14), with the thesis that the peasant should be regarded as a working partner of the State rather than an enemy. This has meant giving the peasant a slightly better standard of living, coupled with inducements to produce more in the hope of improving that standard.

These policies have, of course, been applied in Eastern Europe as well. One difference is that the Satellites, except for Bulgaria, have not yet collectivized all of their peasantry; in consequence the East European Communists are faced with a struggle on two fronts: to raise agricultural output and at the same time to collectivize it. Whatever Khrushchev may say about "incentives for the peasantry," there is no more orthodox apostle of collective farming than he, and total collectivization—whether the peasants like it or not—is now one of the chief ends of Satellite policy.

Poland

The Gomulka regime has pursued the

most liberal and pragmatic agricultural policy in the Communist world. In Poland only 15 percent of the arable land belongs to the "Socialist sector" and only about one percent of this is cultivated by collective farms, the rest belonging to State farms. On his return to power in October 1956, Gomulka saw no other alternative than to allow the Polish peasant to dissolve more than 8,000 collective farms (out of a total of over 10,000). The buying and selling of privately-owned land was permitted, and 400,000 hectares of State land, largely in the Western territories, were put up for sale or lease to the peasantry. Land previously lying fallow or only half-cultivated by collectives and State farms was once again brought under the plough. Heavy pressure for collectivization ceased, and instead a pragmatic policy of raising agricultural production was inaugurated.

After the Third Congress of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party in March 1959, the regime began a campaign to organize peasants through the agricultural circles, a traditional form of peasant cooperation. The number of circles increased, but this was not accompanied by the peasant participation which had characterized the Polish agricultural circle previously. During 1959 over 5,000 circles were "organized," made up largely of villagers who are not land-owning peasants.

To encourage the peasants to use machinery, the Polish regime introduced the so-called Agricultural Development Fund in which the government declared itself ready to plough its revenues from agriculture back into the agricultural

circles for the purpose of mechanization. The circles were to contribute 25 percent (15 percent in the Western territories) of the price of the machinery, and the machines would then be collectively owned by the circles. The kind of small agricultural machines most desired by the private peasants were not being offered, but instead machines more suitable for extensive cultivation, machines which could not be used economically on the average-size Polish farm.

The peasant's answer to this program was simple: non-participation. In return, the regime has compromised on its original stand that the Fund was to be used mainly for machinery. First, peasants were offered lower prices on the machines provided they agreed to cultivate jointly land offered them from the State Land Fund. And recently the State made another concession to the peasants: 25 percent of the total fund for agricultural development may be used for purposes other than mechanization. Nevertheless, the peasant is still not participating.

The peasant is obviously waiting for more concessions in the direction that he considers most important. These would include supplies of cheap fertilizers, as well as ordinary articles like pitchforks and lumber for wagon beds, and a speedup in the sale of land to private peasants able and willing to buy from the State land fund. But most of all, the peasants are awaiting the complete abolition of compulsory deliveries and convincing government support for private property (which would enable the peasants to expand small plots into

viable small farms).

These basic demands are, of course, a far cry from the course Gomulka is prepared to follow in Poland at the present time, but his regime cannot afford to ignore these demands entirely since its whole program for the countryside since 1956—despite the addition of the agricultural circle program and the Agricultural Development Fund—has been predicated on the private peasant farm.

Last year the rural sector in Poland was affected by a drought and by the vagaries and indecision of State agricultural policy. The drought hit sugar beets and the perennially insufficient fodder crops hard. The latter crops were further affected by a contradictory State purchase policy on potatoes which made it more profitable for the peasants to sell them to State distilleries rather than feed them to pigs. The result: an intensification of the chronic fodder shortage and early deliveries of pork to the market, causing a meat crisis in the summer. This crisis bred a veritable avalanche of commentaries on the dire shortcomings of agriculture which, it was said, could only be cured by drastic measures. Nevertheless, drastic measures were not applied to the agrarian sector where the regime immediately restored the profitability of hog breeding, but to the economy as a whole. Using the meat crisis and certain inflationary tendencies as an excuse, former Polish Communist leaders identified with the "past" period, i.e., Stalinism, moved back into power. A crackdown on "cultural deviation" also ensued, a fact which reportedly caused Jerzy Morawski, till then in charge of cultural affairs in the Politburo and Secretariat, to resign in protest. Church-State relations also came to a head. All this followed upon an alleged economic crisis which had started with "shortcomings" in agriculture.

It now appears that, except for a lower production of sugar beets and a crisis in the distribution of fodder, the agricultural "shortcomings" had been largely in meat supplies (and this not to the extent first envisaged). With the publication of the year's harvest results, the tone of articles assessing the year 1959 is becoming more and more favorable. In the most important sector, that of bread grain production, Polish agriculture registered a 500,000 ton increase over 1958. Party publicists assessing the agrarian policy of the last few years are now saying that this policy has proved itself both economically and politically.

Does the Polish regime's pragmatism mean that it has given up the goal of collectivization? Not at all. It means that the regime is reluctant to undertake a program to which the peasants are implacably opposed, and which would present the Party with tasks which it cannot fulfill. The choice between production and collectivization in Poland has been answered by the Polish Communist leadership with a compromise.

Hungary

In Hungary the Kadar regime is pursuing policies almost the opposite of those in Poland. Until 1958, Hungary also had few collective farms and a State and Party policy which ostentatiously favored the private farmers. But this policy lasted only until the regime of Janos Kadar had consolidated its position in the industrial sector and had reduced the Imre Nagy faction in the Party to either silence or grudging acquiescence. At the now-famous Central Committee plenum in December 1958, the Party leadership came finally to grips with both the left- and right-wing factions of the Party and declared a "centrist" policy of dualism in agriculture: a rise in agricultural production with a simultaneous program of collectivization. Those in the Party who advocated a cautious policy of gradualism were accused of opposing a vigorous campaign of "persuasion" in the countryside under the guiding hand of the Party. Many polemical articles denounced the theory of "spontaneity" in the growth of collective farms. On the other hand, the "centrist" leadership of the Party deplored the unimaginative approach of the "dogmatists" and "sectarians" who wanted to force the collectivization of agriculture at all costs. This "two-fronted" fight within the Party was, of course, most effective against the "gradualists," who were completely silenced during the ensuing campaign.

Although the Party deplored so-called "isolated excesses" in the campaign for collectivization in Hungary during 1959, it was all too plain that the leadership was both surprised and gratified with the results. In the first three months of 1959, the "Socialist sector" was increased from around 36 percent to over 50 percent of the arable land. At present, more than 66 percent of the agricultural land belongs to the Socialist sector, and this year's campaign is just ending.

How did the Hungarian regime achieve such a remarkable organizational showing in such a short period of time?

Before the 1956 Revolt similar methods were employed, only to meet the solid resistance of the Hungarian peasantry. The keys to the present development appear to be: good organization, shrewd tactics, peasant passivity, and heavy State subsidies to new collective farms. In its 1959 drive, instead of inaugurating a national campaign and dispersing its forces, the Party adopted a method which has been used to a limited extent in East Germany. It concentrated its agitators and propaganda on a single area: the Transdanubian region. Both official and unofficial reports have admitted that force was used when necessary, perhaps not the brute force of earlier years but an all-pervasive pressure amounting to force.

The peasantry apparently felt that after the failure of the 1956 Revolt there was little point in offering head-on resistance as in previous years. The pattern soon emerged. When the leading peasant in a village had succumbed to a marathon "persuasion" session with Party agitators, other peasants soon followed. Apparently working on the theory that in numbers there is strength, the new members often became "agitators" for the collectives among the remaining members of the village. In addition to the general mood of indifference and hopelessness prevailing in the countryside, financial incentives also helped. However, there is an increasing body of evidence that the new collectives exist largely on paper, and that "collective" work in them is proceeding very slowly if at all. The new collectives are also beset with subjective difficulties. Tensions between former land owners and "poor peasants," traditional village rivalries, and the officious behavior of "unreconstructed Stalinists" in the local and collective farm leadership have frequently been cited in the Communist press. (See the candid account reprinted on pages 11—14.) The full impact of these organizational problems will not be felt until later.

In 1959, the Hungarian regime was able to proclaim its collectivization program a success and to claim that its dual aim of collectivization with a simultaneous increase in production had been achieved. A 6 percent increase in total agricultural production was asserted. It is noteworthy, however, that the Hungarians were not able to show the spectacular successes of non-collectivized Yugoslavia, although they enjoyed the same favorable weather conditions. Another helpful factor was a doubling

(Continued on page 32)

*How is life in Hungary's new collective farms? A Budapest literary magazine, *Elet és Irodalom*, ran the following description in its issue of January 15. The Communist author, Erzsebet Galgoczi, takes a look at the collective farms in her native county of Győr, where the big collectivization drive at the beginning of 1959 swallowed about two-thirds of the arable land. Another drive took place this winter.*



A peasant planting potatoes on his small farm.

JOVENDONK (Budapest), May 10, 1959

"At the Time of Accounting"

MY OWN VILLAGE of Menfocsanak is typical of most villages. This is especially true in the case of collective farming, because the collectives formed last spring in the county of Győr were neither the best nor the worst. In the village of Himrod, 15 *forint* are paid for each unit of work (if it is paid), and at Kunsziget 52. The New Life collective at Menfocsanak originally planned to pay 42, and about 35 will actually be distributed. (According to Lajos Feher's speech at the Party Congress, the national average is 34.)

The amalgamation of many small plots of land into one single large farm covering 3,500 cadastral holds [about 5,000 acres.—Ed.] was a manifold and complicated task, and it is not my purpose to describe it here. The task was solved by peasants whose previous organizational experience had been with no more than 15 holds. Where once they counted in thousands, now they count in hundreds of thousands, even in millions. I consider it a big accomplishment that the leadership of the new collectives—except for ten or twenty villages, an insignificant number in the county—has brilliantly held its own. This proves something else. It proves that the idea and practice of collective farming are not alien to our peasantry, no matter how deeply rooted their instincts of private property.

Naturally the degree of development differs from one village to another, and also within each farm. But a considerable number of the members prefer life in the collectives to that of private farmers. This is primarily true of the management, of the people operating the machines, and of the women and the young people. Of course this must not be overemphasized, since even those who admit to it do so with a certain reserve. The complaints are much louder.

There were many objective, inevitable reasons why the first year could not have been more successful than it has.

Today it is hardly necessary to mention them, because they have lost their validity. Next year's main task will be the moral and political education of the members.

Our peasants did not start their "new life" with exaggerated hope. Their attitude was roughly this: if we work hard, we can earn our bread in the collective too. Since for ten years they had heard nothing but how much better a collective farm would be compared to their former way of life, some of this stuck in their heads even if they did not believe it all. Although our propaganda sometimes mentioned that extensive farming has good possibilities, it failed to point out that it is no panacea. Now people were shocked to discover that the soil does not automatically produce more when the boundaries between private holdings have been eliminated. On top of that, last year the boundaries were left unchanged because the fall ploughing had already been done when the peasants joined the collective, and so the large fields could not be formed until this fall. This meant that hardly any of the work was done with tractors during the first year, and most of the work was done by hand as previously. So the net result depended on whether people worked as hard as they had when they were still independent peasants. In the village of Bogyoszo nothing extraordinary was accomplished, except that all the work was done in time, and 42 *forint* will be distributed for each work unit. But there are some villages where the membership has loafed and lost hundreds of thousands of *forint*.

WAITING FOR THE AMERICANS

There was a revolution in Győr County last spring. Then followed more humdrum days—the difficulties, one might say—and some people were embittered. The enemy had time to recover. I don't like to generalize, but this is based in reality. It is enough just to turn over the pages

of a work book to see how people's mood changed. Istvan Pecs from Tenyo worked 30 units in March and only two in April. I asked his chairman, was he sick? Not at all. He was keeping out of sight, waiting for the Americans to come. Such cases are extreme. A larger number of people were influenced by the news that the collectivization drive will continue for five years longer. Why should they have been the first? Voices could be heard at harvest time saying: If nobody works, if everybody sabotages, then they will let us break up the collective. More intelligent people tried in vain to explain that those who were first were fortunate, because in five years they would be working in a flourishing large-scale farm, while others would only be getting money for seed grain. But the "power of custom" is still too strong.

It is not just the power of custom either. Most of the medium peasants have money hidden away, from 20 to 100 thousand *forint*, either in the savings bank or in their mattresses. A man like this does not want to work in the company of his former hired hands. All the more so, since he still has several other sources of income. He has his household plot, from which he extracts a larger income than he is entitled to. He rents his horses—there is not yet a collective stable—for ploughing and carting on other household plots. He works in the so-called "private sector" of the economy. And all the time he sighs: My God, will it ever again be like last year, when I produced 750 kilos of sugar beet? (This does not mean that he was satisfied last year.) Every small peasant used to dream of becoming a medium peasant, and every medium peasant wanted to become a kulak.

Such desires—and such a morality—are not easily erased from people's souls. One collective farm chairman said: If we were to give them the entire village they still would not be satisfied. And he told of one medium peasant who, though he did not need to, harvested the grapes on the

land which he had given to the collective in the spring. Naturally the management of the collective took his wine away, but what else were they to do? The district council tells the management to be patient, to create a public spirit which will condemn thieves and loafers. So far as I know, no administrative measures were taken in the whole county.

"NOTHING BELONGS TO ME"

Such patience, in my opinion, is incorrect and simply encourages the formation of the opposite public spirit. A bad example is always imitated, especially if people see that no harm comes to the thief. And thousands upon thousands of opportunities for theft arise. Those engaged in harvesting potatoes or corn carry their lunch with them in a bag, and in the evening they take home ten kilos of potatoes or corn. (The watchman in the fields is timid, and besides, there are 100 holds of potatoes on 80 different plots, and he cannot be everywhere.) The wagon driver does the same, but on a larger scale because there is more room in a wagon than in a bag. Nothing can be controlled because there is no central storehouse, and the harvest is kept in more than a hundred places scattered through the village. All summer long the collectives had to supply fodder for the cattle in the household plots. They were generous with the fodder, as one always is with something that does not belong to him. The peasant's cow consumed one-third of this fodder, and the remaining two-thirds was taken by the peasant to his attic, where he dried it. In two or three months he was able to "save" quite a nice amount. Only then did the management notice that something was wrong. It was rumored in the village that the attics would be inspected, but they never were.

All you have to do is walk through the barns and take a look at the sheds. In most of them there is so much fodder, corn and cornstalks that one cannot believe it was all collected from a one-hold household plot. Of course, not everybody steals. There are several collectives where theft never occurs. In small villages far from towns, where everybody knows everybody, morals are better. But in many places the public spirit is still: nothing belongs to me except what I have at home.

The wife of a brigade leader complained to her husband: You see, if you were not a leader we could steal like the others.

I visited the collective farm at Tenyo and did not find the chairman in his office. He was not at home either. But a wagon driver offered to help me find him. On the way, we talked.

"How are things going?"

"Ah, not at all. Bad."

"How much was distributed to you?"

"Nothing, almost nothing. I did not even get the per capita allowance."

A LOOK AT THE BOOK

Later, when I found the chairman, I mentioned this man to him. The man's name was Jozsef Horvath Zsibrik,



The management of the "March 15" collective in Bonyhad. JOVENDONK (Budapest), March 29, 1959

wagon driver. We looked at the record book. He was credited with 310 work units up to the end of October, and for these he received the following in advance: 530 kilos of wheat, 390 kilos of rye (about the allowance for four persons), 480 kilos of barley, 10 quintals of hay, 11 quintals of sugar beets and 2,300 *forint*. In this collective they had planned on 42 *forint* in the final accounting, and had been able to pay 35.

The chairman said to the driver, "Well, Joska, you also have your household plot. How much did that produce?"

My peasant burst out: "None of your business!"

In Menfocsanak I looked at the new stable for 100 head of cattle. This is the biggest building in every village. They have some annoying shortcomings: the road leading to the stable is bad, there is no electricity, and there are no fodder carts rolling on the tracks because the money for them has already been spent. The automatic water fountain, on the other hand, is operating perfectly. What is more important: the stable is full; there are 96 cows in it, and two horses as well. For no particular reason, I remarked that I liked it. One of the caretakers looked at me.

"My stable held only four head of cattle, but I liked it better," he said bitterly.

"Why?" I asked.

He shrugged his shoulders. "Because it was mine."

What is the matter with this man? The proverb says, one milks the cow through the mouth as well. Let us look at his income.

His name is Mihaly Horvath, and he brought five holds into the collective. Since May he has taken care of the animals. He has 450 work units to his credit up to December 1, and will have 50 more at the final accounting. He has received so far 9 quintals of bread grain, 4 quintals of barley, 9 quintals of corn, 9 quintals of potatoes, 6 quintals of sugar beets and an advance of 4,000 *forint*. He also gets sugar and enough money to round off the working unit to 35 *forint*. (Or to 40, one cannot yet tell for sure. I am careful, that is why I count only 35.) In addition he has a household plot of one hold, which produces potatoes, corn, grapes, raspberries and many garden vegetables. In June he delivered three fattened pigs and received more than 4,000 *forint* for them. He bought kitchen furniture this year, had a new floor in his room, bought enough bedding for ten years, a new bicycle in addition to the old one, and made various smaller investments. His income last year could not have been higher.

NOBODY LIKES TO BE ORDERED AROUND

In general, the same situation holds with the other collective members, speaking only of those who worked regularly. Everyone who reported for work had it continuously. There are wagon drivers who have 510 work units, and women in vegetable growing who have less than 200. Generally speaking, one might say that the income of the small peasants is as high or almost as high as last year's, and only the income of the medium peasants



One of the new cow barns. The fodder is carried in tip-carts.

JOVENDONK (Budapest), August 16, 1959

has substantially decreased. But it is not only the medium peasants who complain. I suspect that it has simply become the fashion to complain, and that to be satisfied with the new situation would be regarded as shameful.

But that is not the only problem. Everybody used to be "chairman" of his own farm. In the fall he prepared a plan, a budget. He organized his work flexibly, adapting himself to the prevailing weather, and easily enough because he worked alone or at the most with his wife or his son. In the fall he made his "final accounting." He worked harder than his horse, but he was compensated for this brutal way of life by the illusion, existing mainly in his own head, that his individual property meant independence. He had to occupy himself with 10 or 20 different crops and 4 or 5 kinds of animals. Each of them required its own sort of work or technique; there are different ways to hoe corn, potatoes, beets, strawberries, peas, etc. But now the brigade leader tells him where to go every day and what work to do. He goes there and does that work.

Nobody likes to be given a command, much less to be ordered around, particularly if one is not accustomed to this. According to law, the highest authority in the collective farm is the general assembly. So far this has been the actuality, insofar as the general assembly really elected the management. But there are collectives where no general assembly has met since they were formed. At most, meetings of "delegates" were held, with the delegates not chosen by the membership but appointed by the management—sometimes on the basis of their docility. The leaders themselves are inexperienced; where would they have obtained the experience of working with the masses?

There is no question of a cleavage between management and membership. On the contrary, relations are close. The chairman knows everything. One chairman told me, "If at six o'clock in the evening something special happens at the other end of the village, or even outside the village, I know it by quarter past six. By half past six I have heard it from ten people." The difficulty is that this is not true the other way around. The managers know everything, but very often the ordinary member is unaware of the most

important matters. Most of all, he feels, he has no say in the more important decisions. Because of this, there may be controversies between the manager and his "employees."

THE KNIFERS OF TENYO

In the village of Tenyo there was an unfortunate brawl which led to two fatalities. The county paper reported it under the appropriate headline of "Wine and Arrogance." It seems that a brigade leader had asked the son of a medium peasant where he was taking a cartload of corn. The boy was on his way to the right place—i.e., to the collective barn—so he gave a rude answer. At this, the brigade leader slapped him twice in the face. "Can't you behave more decently?" he asked. The boy went home and told his father what had happened. Because it was evening, the father was full of wine—there is a bad, sour, strong wine at Tenyo—and he ran over to the brigade leader saying that he would not tolerate such manners even from the Lord Himself. Several others got into the brawl; as a result one man was killed, another was taken to the hospital in the ambulance, and a third hanged himself.

That is an extreme case, I know. To this day they are called "the knifers of Tenyo." But this antagonism is latent in every village. It is fed not by envy for the managers—they have enough troubles, nobody wants to change places with them—but by nostalgia for the old way of life. By all their accumulated knowledge and ability for which they suddenly have no use. They cannot occupy themselves in any other way, because there has not been time enough for them to acquire other interests, let us say in culture.

What makes for a new life in the "New Life" collective? The simplest answer is: the outlook. What one sees already in well-managed State farms and those collectives which have been in existence for ten years. Machines which make work easier for the working man. Well-irrigated gardens and meadows. Clean nurseries and clean communal kitchens. Peasant homes with bathrooms. Highways and halls of culture—I stop listing them because a list conveys so little. Even if this is the simplest answer, it is still the truest.

I have written that in every village the biggest building is the new cow stable, capable of accommodating 100 head of cattle. Everywhere they are on the outskirts, far from the village. When the location of the stable was selected, the experts intended to rid the village of vermin. To rid it of animals, manure heaps, flies. To transform the village into a garden city. Because of this, many people are criticizing the stables, saying that they are too far away, that the road is bad, that electricity is more expensive at such a distance, etc.—the defects I have already mentioned. One county official said, "We are not yet in a position to think of such luxuries as sanitation."

But it is not a luxury, quite the contrary. It is our duty to think in terms of decades when we consider such investments. In the long run, these collectives represent the future and cannot be regarded as temporary. In this way, we won't have to start all over again at a later date.

In the Village of Mezotur

I WITNESSED an unpleasant scene, in which a brigade leader almost came to blows with one of his brigadiers; the fellow had declared that during the next few days, because of other engagements, he would not report for work, although it was urgent that the harvesting be completed. I asked the brigade leader how he accounted for such lack of discipline. He replied that the brigade members had learned that the distribution of collective income would be lower than expected, and therefore they were looking for work elsewhere. I talked to the brigade member in question, who gave me the same reply.

"If you look for work elsewhere," I tried to argue, "your income from the collective farm will be even less." He made a rather cynical reply: "It won't be as low as all that, because the State is careful to see that the collective farmers don't go hungry." . . .

"According to the statutes of the collective farm, every member has the right to control the leadership and to have a say in planning, finances and the organization of work. It is very difficult to carry this out in practice. It is not so easy to have a say in the management of a farm of several thousand *holds* to begin with, and it is difficult even for a person who may have something intelligent and significant to say. The members get an insight into the affairs of the whole collective only when the annual plan or final accounts are reviewed. I attended the general meeting of a collective at which storms raged furiously and members threw their hats on the floor. The situation was aggravated by mutual accusations and personal remarks, and the whole meeting almost degenerated into a mass quarrel. To my great surprise, however, at the end of the debate the local leaders and a higher official said that this had been a good meeting. The higher official rubbed his hands in good spirits, and when he saw my dubious face he told me not to be alarmed when the peasant shouted because this was his nature; it showed that he was taking a part in the management of public affairs.

"I was quite alarmed by this remark and tried to explain to him that the peasant can speak in a normal tone of voice if he knows what is going on, but that in this case everyone had seemed to be at a loss. If we measure the peasant's devotion to the community by the noise he makes, what should we say about another general meeting at which, after the speaker had sat down, you could have heard a pin drop. People stared at the floor and shuffled their feet. When I asked them afterward why they had not contributed, they asked in surprise: 'Contribute to what?'

"I replied, 'To what you have heard.'

"'Oh,' they said, 'it is just as well. The management will settle it. They know what it is all about.'"

Kortars (Budapest), November 1959

"THOSE WHO ADMIRE PICASSO . . ."

The endless war of Communist orthodoxy with the creative imagination flared up again recently in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia. Trudging through three exhibitions by Slovak painters late in December, the art critic for *Kulturny Zivot*, the organ of the Slovak Writers' Union, found distinct signs of "bourgeois decadence." What was worse, some of the painters were quite respectable men who belonged to the Communist Party and had been honored by the State. "No one seems to be keen to touch the subject," wrote the critic bravely, "but just because of the fact that Party members are involved we must not permit the matter to pass unnoticed." Loading his Marxist cannon, he fired at the "Group of August 29" (date of the Slovak Uprising in 1944) which included Ladislav Guderna, Vincent Hložník and Ferdinand Hložík.

"One thing may be stated with absolute certainty, namely that a lack of ideological background combined with bourgeois tendencies is being introduced into the stream of our artistic advance, that a genre of painting is being revived which some of our artists adhered to many years ago and to which they are now returning. At the same time they attempt, by the use of 'revolutionary' slogans, to distract attention from their introduction of formalistic tendencies into the contemporary struggle for Socialist realism. Those who admire Picasso not for his political stand and for his talent but for the formalistic aspect of his work, those who want modernism at any price even if it is just an expression of the decadence of a declining society, those who cannot discern signs of decline, who see modernity in everything that is different from our own artistic creation have, to say the least, an ideological chaos in their heads."

The critic was particularly annoyed by the catalogue



of the exhibition, which contained an account of the group's esthetic ideas couched in the standard jargon of Socialist realism, e.g., "The people, because of its greatness, understands great progressive art."

Who is 'the people' mentioned in the catalogue? What is meant by the words 'close unity with the people'? For whom was this ideological maze written? Where are the signs of the materialistic philosophy of Marx, Engels and Lenin? . . . Why do the theoreticians of art not defend the decisions of Party organs, and why do they zigzag between the bourgeois and the Communist ideology, bringing confusion and supporting bourgeois tendencies in art, all of which does not help in the cultural revolution—in fact, hampers it?

"Against whom and against what is aimed this 'revolution' and this 'modernism'? Against all the progressive, democratic and humanistic traditions of our national art, against all the traditions of realism and popularity in art." (*Kulturny Zivot* [Bratislava], January 2, 1960.)

The Group of August 29 won similar attention from the art critic of *Pravda* (Bratislava), who declared on December 30 that they were copying Western surrealism and cubism. "It is typical that it is just these tendencies for which some of the artists gained 'recognition' from the bourgeois critics in capitalist countries (for example, Hložník in Vienna, Guderna in Italy, etc.)." He added that these tendencies had led the painters to "a separation from life, a narrowing of subject matter, a negation of Socialist realism, whatever else may have been declared in the artists' program."

Below: Three sketches by Ladislav Guderna for murals in the Czechoslovak Pavilion at the Brussels fair in 1958.





In a Polish village on a winter night, lots of time to read.

Nova Wies (Warsaw), No. 51-52, 1959

THE BOOK TRADE

AT THE SAME time that Albert Camus' works are leading best-sellers in Warsaw, they cannot be bought in any bookstore in Prague or Bucharest. In Hungary they are banned—in part as an expression of the regime's displeasure at Camus' contribution from his 1957 Nobel Prize winnings to a fund for financial assistance to the families of Hungarian writers imprisoned by Kadar.

The range of books available to readers in Eastern Europe varies widely according to place and time. But there is an underlying unity of principle as well as organization in the Communist-controlled book trade.

Book publishing in the West is a somewhat schizophrenic enterprise in which the interests of culture and commerce combine, and sometimes collide, in a common endeavor. Book publishing in the Soviet bloc is more single-minded: its objective is to advance the interests of the Communist State.

Administration and planning are centered in a government ministry, generally the Ministry of Education and Culture, which holds the two main levers of control: allotment of materials (paper, etc.) and authority over personnel. Books are put out by State publishing houses and by a variety of organizations (all Party-controlled) such as the Writers' Union, Trade Union, Youth League, which specialize in the kind of literature appropriate to their activity.*

* There are some 30 publishing houses in Czechoslovakia, 24 in Hungary, more than 40 in Poland.

Under the model system—now somewhat revised—the publishers' function is confined to the selection (within the framework of the overall Plan) and publication of books. Distribution is handled by a central State wholesale monopoly which buys the entire output of the publishing houses and relays it to the retail outlets. Under this system, the publisher has no economic function or responsibility.

Upon assuming total control over book publishing, the Communists undertook a coordinated program which encompassed centralization and expansion of publishing and distribution on the one hand, and, on the other, through the literacy drives in each country, the creation of a mass book-reading public. There is little doubt that this public exists, potentially or actually. However, the ability to read is not equivalent to, nor does it necessarily inspire, the habit of reading. The press of life—the lack of privacy and leisure—which seems to be the universal hallmark of societies mobilized for "building Socialism" militates against book reading, just as do the less purposeful distractions of Western city life.

Book Production

The outstanding literary achievement of Communist rule in Eastern Europe appears by all counts to be quantitative. The number of printed books has soared. Poland now claims a leading place in world per capita book out-

put, three times higher than that of France or Britain.* Bulgaria produces four times as many printed copies as in 1939 (from six and a half to over 22 million, according to *Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], May 17, 1959). The number of titles published in Hungary has reportedly risen from a prewar 8,000 to 15,000 a year; the number of copies from 17 to 47 million. In Romania, the average circulation per book has advanced from 3,000 copies before the war to 30-50,000 today (Agerpress [Bucharest], July 25, 1959.)

These figures, while to some extent falsely inflated by their inclusion of printed works with a questionable claim to full book stature,** are impressive. The rise in the number of book copies is due primarily to the launching, by the Communists, of mass popular-priced paperback series of classical literature, of textbooks, and above all, of the Communist classics—Marx, Lenin, and sometimes Stalin***—the latter issued in enormous editions in the early 1950's. In Bulgaria, under the 15-year regime of the Communists, some 3,000 editions of the Marxist-Leninist classics have been published in six and a half million copies;**** in Hungary, 437 Marxist-Leninist works in one million copies; in Czechoslovakia, over 5 million copies have been printed of the so-called "popular library" of Marxism-Leninism.

However, the initial "great leap" in book output rather overshot the mark. Surplus stocks began to pile up in the warehouses at an alarming rate. The "crisis of overproduction" afflicted most of all those very books whose contents were devoted to arguing against such a possibility in a "Socialist" economy. A recently issued catalogue of surplus (remaindered) books in Bulgaria revealed that the bulk are "political and socio-economic works": of the seven-volume works of Marx and Engels, published in 1950-53 in 6,000 copies per title, almost half are in the storehouse, accompanied by comparable remains of a 200,000-copy edition of Lenin, the collected works of Georgi Dimitrov, etc.

The book surplus in Poland was valued at 373 million *zloty* in 1950; at the end of 1958, it had risen to 1 billion 84 million *zloty*. *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), May 20, 1959, reported that the largest surplus is in "socio-political" books; the smallest in literary classics.

* In 1955, Poland was ninth, following the USSR, Japan, Great Britain, West Germany, the US, France, Italy and Holland. (*Zycie Warszawy* [Warsaw], May 6, 1959.)

** For example, out of the announced figure of 62 million books printed in Hungary in 1950, 40 million were political brochures of less than 64 pages.

*** No mention is now made of Stalin's works on linguistics, economics, science, etc. which were given compulsory mass circulation in Eastern Europe between 1949 and 1953. In the middle of the 20th Soviet Party Congress, which launched "de-Stalinization" in February 1956, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) ran what was to be the last announcement in Czechoslovakia of publication of a book by Stalin, a collection of his writings on the Chinese Revolution.

**** The average circulation of one of these books is about 15,000 copies, according to *Rabotnichesko Delo*, November 2, 1958. Some, notably Lenin's works, are published in much larger editions: thus: "What Is To Be Done"—78,000 copies; "State and Revolution"—105,000; "Compiled Works of Lenin," 35 volumes and 700,000 copies.

The obsession with quantity in Communist book publishing is not confined to the Marxist-Leninist classics. Publishers in Romania have lately started to imprint the number of copies per edition in the back of each book. Similarly "in order to impress the public with the proportions reached by the printed word in our time"—wrote a critic in *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), March 9, 1958—the press book sections publish detailed figures on the size of printings.

This critic, Boriz Buzila, inveighed against the arbitrary system of publishing all books, without distinction, in editions of equal and massive size. For example, every play produced in Romania, regardless of its success or failure, is published as a book. The level usually reached by prose works is from 10-20,000 copies even though many of the books printed in such quantities "have been unanimously condemned by critics or public as totally worthless."

"A quick visit to the bookstores, a short talk with the salesmen, readily discloses the existence of books for which no one has ever asked since the day they were published," Buzila concluded.

Distribution and Promotion

Applying the same principle of rapid expansion as in production, the Communist regimes have built up the book distribution network. Not only have regular bookstores and lending libraries multiplied,* but outlets new and, at present, unique to the Communist States, have been developed. Books are distributed by mail, by "bookmobiles", from street kiosks, and from stands set up inside plants and offices. Distribution in the rural districts, still the weak link in the circuit, is being stressed.

This far-flung apparatus for distribution is animated by a Communist technique of promotion and selling which in some respects far outdoes the Western "hard sell." As in the West, the most important medium for book publicity is the book review sections of the press. *Trybuna*

* Bookstores are State-owned; books are also stocked (especially in rural communities) by the general stores of the retail "cooperative" system.



From a book advertisement in *Contemporanul* (Bucharest), October 30, 1959.

Ludu (Warsaw), February 4, 1959, stressed their role by complaining of their deficiencies from the regime's point of view: "It is simply impossible to understand why a book which interests few people will merit exhaustive reviews . . . while another, which may be truly worthy of popularization, is subjected to a virtual holy conspiracy of silence. . . ." (This, it seems, had been the fate of a new book on the 40th anniversary of the Polish Communist Party.) Bookstore shelves, claimed the paper, "are lined with interesting volumes about which nothing is written and nothing is known." Straight advertisements, formerly only occasional, are appearing more frequently in the Soviet bloc press, though not on a scale comparable to Western book advertising.

Book Days, Weeks and Months are periodically launched to promote books, with book fairs (stalls in tents) set up in cities and rural centers. (During last year's Book Week in Hungary, approximately one out of five families in the country bought books, on an average of two books per family, according to *Elet és Irodalom* [Budapest], June 19, 1959.) Publishers also feature book lotteries, prize contests, etc., to stimulate interest.

Books are promoted and sold not only by professional tradesmen,* but by Party workers, trade union functionaries, youth organization members, authors themselves, as part of their organizational tasks.

A Communist innovation is the dispensing of books direct to employees on the job. Individual distributors are recruited, either on a "volunteer" or commission basis, to sell books to their fellow-workers. (This is in

addition to plant and farm lending libraries). The Bucharest paper *Contemporarul* described the book "blitz" in Romania:


"To bring a book close to the lathe-operators, tractor drivers and threshers, crane operators and concrete-pourers, is a challenging task. The book-seller tries to introduce his book anywhere he thinks he might find readers: over 60 percent of Bucharest's books are sold [direct]. The bookstore in its oldtime role is obsolescent. In Bucharest there are about 100 bookstores, but there are more than 650 places of work where books are distributed. More than 1,700 people, including hundreds of UTM (Youth League) teams, are engaged in volunteer book promotion and distribution."

Prices and Costs

PRICE is primarily a lever for manipulating book circulation. In general, book prices are low in relation to other consumer goods; but they are "adjusted" according to the regime's purposes, giving it a flexibility of control over the book market extending beyond outright suppression or forced consumption. Thus in Hungary, the prices of adventure and mystery novels are considerably higher than those of other novels. In explanation of the high price of Agatha Christie's novels (which are popular throughout the Soviet bloc), a regime spokesman said: "We do this deliberately, because we believe we must use our price policy to support what is really valuable." (*Belpolitikai Szemle* [Budapest], February 1959.) A 200-page book containing the collected speeches and statements of Nikita Khrushchev on his US visit is currently selling in Hungary for the equivalent of 50 cents (seven *forint*).

* A well-known training school for booksellers in Prague with a prewar reputation for giving salesmen a good grounding in literature as well as commercial methods was closed by the Communists. *Prace* (Prague), May 20, 1956, announced its re-opening after ten years, during which period, according to the paper, "salesladies had turned up about whose literary knowledge a number of anecdotes are in circulation."

Czechoslovak art books are internationally famous. The photos below are from *Artia-Kunstbuecher*, a German-language brochure.



Book prices in Poland were raised about 50 percent across the board in 1957. But even with this increase, books in Poland today "are many times cheaper than anywhere in Western Europe and even in some Socialist countries," said *Zycie Warszawy*, May 16, 1959. The average price of a book (before the increase) was 8.19 *zloty*, according to this account. This average includes textbooks, selling at 3.41 *zloty*; "socio-political" works—5.10 *zloty*; children's books—5.59 *zloty*; fiction—12.13 *zloty*.

The paper compared these with the prices of other consumer goods, such as foodstuffs, and said they were "strikingly low." A school textbook could be obtained for the price of two eggs, a copy of a literary work for two pounds of sugar. These low prices were possible because, until 1957, publishers bought all their materials at below-cost. There were cases, *Zycie Warszawy* said, in which the prices of certain books, such as the literary classics in the Press Library Series selling at 2.40 *zloty* a copy, were less than the value of the paper they were printed on. Publishers, at that time free from all financial considerations, "enjoyed a veritable heyday," said the paper.

Under the system introduced in 1956 in Czechoslovakia, prices are calculated according to a fixed graded (depending on the kind of book) rate per printing sheet,* multiplied by the number of sheets.

Publishing costs are admittedly high compared to those in the West. In Poland a new book reportedly must sell 20,000 copies to meet its expenses. *Zycie Warszawy* called this situation "absurd, since it is well known that in the West a printing of only two or three thousand copies is profitable." The newspaper, however, dismissed as "just another myth" the apparently widespread suspicion that high costs are due to administrative and editorial overhead. The paper asserted that in the breakdown of average costs of one novel, publication costs are no more than 14 percent ("[which is] less than in the capitalist countries"); the balance consisting of: royalties, 17-22 percent; paper and other materials, 20 percent; printing, 16-18 percent; sales commission, 32 percent.

In most of the Soviet bloc countries, there is a drive to put book publishing (like the theater and other media of "mass culture") on a more rational economic basis, with some connection made between costs and income. At the same time that book prices were raised in Poland, the functional relationship between publisher and distributor was altered, giving the publisher more autonomy but at the same time more financial responsibility. The publisher now pays the expenses of his books out of his own budget and sells them directly to the retail network; or the State wholesale distributor, formerly a monopoly, may sell them for the publisher on a commission basis.

However, in the countries where fiscal soundness is being stressed (Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia), the regimes—apparently fearful that new economic pressures on publishers may lead them to sacrifice cultural and

ideological considerations—remind them emphatically that it is not the primary function of book publishing to make money—nor even, necessarily, to meet costs. It is of the very essence of Communist State cultural policy to be ready to cover the deficits of books which the State wishes to promote, and to discourage the issue of books which do not further regime objectives, no matter how profitable their sale might be. This policy, the Communists firmly maintain, constitutes the basis of their superiority over the rapacious commercialism of Western book publishing. However—in the course of justifying their own policy of calculated losses—the Poles, at least, have conceded that book publishers outside the Communist pale sometimes forego profits for the sake of other values. *Zycie Warszawy*, May 16, 1959, pointed out that certain kinds of books (e.g., poetry), and publishers, must by their very nature lose money, and "this is neither some sort of 'Polish inefficiency,' nor 'Socialist chaos,' but a situation common in countries throughout the world."

At the beginning of the year, a national association of individual book publishers was formed in Czechoslovakia, primarily to handle book distribution, as well as to coordinate other publishers' activities such as book promotion schemes, expositions, contacts with foreign publishers. It is further meant to serve as the book editors' counterpart of professional-political organizations such as the Journalists' Association, Writers' Union, etc. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], January 23, 1960).

Royalties

Authors receive a fixed payment per printing sheet, scaled according to the author's standing (with the regime), the kind of book, etc. Payment by sheet is standard in all the Soviet bloc countries—and has, inevitably, extended the obsession with quantity to writing itself (see box). Hungarian writers receive a percentage (15-20 percent) of sales in addition.

The much-touted material security and well-being guaranteed writers by the Communist State appears to be more valid for the Soviet Union than for Eastern Europe. During the "thaw" it was revealed that in Poland only a writer who had published at least five books in several editions could subsist on his literary earnings; others were obliged to supplement their income with journalistic and other kinds of work. (Financial pressure on writers by depriving them of their odd jobs is one of the ways in which the Gomulka regime is currently trying to bring them into line.) Writers' "norms" (a fixed rate of so many letters per sheet) were imposed in Hungary in 1949 and raised three times, progressively cutting writers' earnings. In the period after Stalin's death, Hungarian writers, championed by the now-imprisoned Gyula Hay, demanded financial equalizations and improvements which were granted by the regime.

According to *Nowa Kultura* (Warsaw), November 15, 1959, average monthly earnings of fiction writers in Poland are: for writers of the lowest category, 1,250-

* A printing sheet is equivalent to about 22 typewritten pages, according to *Zycie Warszawy*, November 22-23, 1959.

1,650 *zloty* (average factory wage: 1,800 *zloty*); for leading writers, 3,750-5,000 *zloty*.

Authors of light fiction do considerably better than serious writers, because of their greater output. According to this account, the rates paid for poetry, much higher than those for prose, account for the striking fact that "15 percent of all literature in Poland is written in verse."

Authors' Rights

While nominally all the Eastern European countries (not the USSR) are members of the International (Berne) Copyright Convention, the Communist regimes' observance of it has been highly casual.

Probably in the interests of its trade relations with the West, Czechoslovakia most closely follows Western business practices in this field. It is the first and so far the only Soviet bloc country to subscribe, in October 1959, to the new UNESCO-sponsored international copyright agreement.

Poland has been paying royalties to Western authors as a matter of policy since 1956. Though many of these are token payments, they constitute a drain on Poland's much-squeezed foreign exchange reserve; and Polish publishers are seeking to arrange to pay Western authors in Polish currency.

A law passed in Poland by the Stalinist regime (July 10, 1952) reduced the period of posthumous copyright protection on printed works from the generally observed 50 years to 20. Although heavily attacked in Poland as detrimental to the interests of Polish books published abroad, this decree is still in force.

Compensation for Western books published in the rest of the bloc depends on regime whim. The Communist-ruled countries have contractual publishing and reprint agreements only with each other, and make individual royalty agreements with Party writers outside the bloc. The Bulgarian, Romanian or Hungarian regime may simply ignore the claims of other foreign writers, or may give them "short weight" by contracting to publish a minimum number of copies and in fact producing far more.

Soviet Bloc Books Abroad


The visual appearance of books produced in Eastern Europe—notoriously substandard during the Stalinist period—is considerably brighter today. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and especially Poland, produce books of striking quality in jacket design, typography, illustrations and bindings. The revival of bookmaking as a craft coincided with the entrance (beginning in about 1955) of the Soviet bloc countries into the international book trade. Bulgaria was the only Soviet bloc country which did not exhibit at the 1959 Frankfurt-am-Main Book Fair, a major event of the international book trade, in which publishers from 34 countries, predominantly non-Communist, participated. Czechoslovakia won first prize at the Frankfurt Fair in 1957, in competition with 1,300 publishers, according to the CTK Bulletin (Prague), October 8, 1959. Hungarian and Czechoslovak books won major prizes at the 1958 Brussels World's Fair.

Hungary has two publishing houses specializing in books for the foreign market: Helikon, which produces

Bookmobiles now visit Hungarian villages without libraries.
Ország Világ (Budapest), June 17, 1959



Young Hungarian readers in the village library at Jaszksier.
Jövendőnk (Budapest), November 29, 1959



deluxe editions of classics for collectors abroad, and Corvina, which publishes Hungarian works in foreign languages. Czechoslovakia publishes books in 16 foreign languages. While most of the books exported from Soviet bloc countries (including some titles not available to the domestic population) go to their emigres in the West, these books are also sold on the general market throughout Europe and North America. According to the Czechoslovak press, foreign countries are interested mainly in technical and scientific books from Eastern Europe. (The export value of scientific and technical books put out by the Hungarian "Academia" publishers has increased 35 times in the past four years, reported *Figyelo* [Budapest], August 18, 1959.)


THE BOOK MARKET

THE KINDS OF books published and circulated in the Soviet bloc in the past ten years are more a political than a literary barometer of the climate in Eastern Europe. The size, absolute and proportional, of the various book genres—fiction, children's books, popular science, reference works, foreign translations—are determined by specific allocations of paper worked out by the regime authorities. Thus the make-up, the changing emphases, of the book lists is a sort of thumbnail index to the preoccupations and strengths and weaknesses of the Communist regimes: the early militance of the Party upon accession to the State power expressed in the flood of Marxist-Leninist classics and propaganda brochures; the intellectual obscurantism of the Stalinist era reflected in the conspicuous absence from lists not only of Western but of much native and even Russian classical literature; the loosening of regime controls and the rising effective power of public demand reflected in the increase in the amount of fiction (thus in Hungary in 1957, 40 percent of the paper allocation for publishing was used for fiction, as against only 12 percent in 1952) and even more in the variety, especially in literature from abroad.

The Current Market

The books in preparation by Hungarian publishers during the "thaw" year of 1956 were brought out as scheduled, after the suppression of the Revolt, with the result that the 1957 list was the largest and most varied since the Communist takeover in 1949. Publication of belles-lettres (novels, plays, poetry), about equally divided between contemporary and classic works, reached an all-time peak.* But the flowering of new Hungarian literature, stimulated by the pre-Revolt ferment, was crushed by the suppression of the Revolt, and the subsequent imprisonment of Hungary's leading writers

* In 1938, 1,129 fiction titles were published in six and a half million copies; in 1958, 757 fiction titles in eight and a half million copies. This was only 67 percent of the 1938 output of titles, but almost 30 percent more copies.



At Poland's trade fair in Poznan in 1955, the publishing and printing industries had their first export exhibit.

Polish Foreign Trade (Warsaw), 1955

(notably Tibor Dery), whose works are now banned. The Kadar regime has insistently but vainly tried to re-spark literary activity, but the writers replied with silence; it is generally acknowledged that no work of distinction has been done since 1956.

Book publishing will be stepped up under the next Five Year Plan (1961-65), according to *Elet és Irodalom*, September 10, 1959. Larger paper allocations will be provided by the State, and the number of titles increased 10-15 percent, the number of copies 35-40 percent. The average printing of a new book is now about 3,000 copies.

About 4,700 titles in 50 million copies (a ratio of three to four books per capita) were published in Czechoslovakia in 1958. Belles-lettres made up the largest proportion, with 882 titles. Textbooks were second, "socio-political literature" third. The average printing per title was 10,539 copies (*Rude Pravo*, February 11, 1959).

The 1959 publishing plan in Bulgaria called for 2,831 titles in 24 million copies (a slight increase over 1958). The plan was under heavy fire for failing to provide sufficient paper allotments for "rural economic literature" to back up the current agricultural production and collectivization drive (*Narodna Kultura*, January 3, 1959).

No plans were published by the Romanian regime.

In Poland, book output has steadily—in some categories, sharply—dropped since the October 1956 upheaval. It appears that there were 10 percent fewer book titles published in 1957 than in 1955 and 1956. The 1959 plan called for 4,856 (fewer were actually published) and the 1960 plan for 4,742 titles. (*Kurier Polski* [Warsaw], September 29, 1959.) Belles-lettres account for about 20 percent of the overall book list; this year they include 899 titles (including reprints): among them Polish classics—126; contemporary Polish literature—412; foreign literature—361.*

The Polish publishing "recession" in 1958 and 1959 was mainly in new novels and poetry, whose average

* In 1959, 14,876 general book titles (new and reprints) were published in the United States, and 20,690 in Great Britain. (*New York Times*, January 31, 1960.) About one-sixth of the US output is fiction.

printing per title dipped from 19,000 copies in 1956 to 13,800 in 1958, and will be further cut in 1960. (According to *Nowa Kultura*, November 15, 1959, the average circulation of belles-lettres is 10,000 copies for prose; 5,000 for poetry.)

In Poland (unlike the other Soviet bloc countries) the size of printings is determined mainly on the basis of tentative pre-publication orders from booksellers. Thus the reduction in copies printed is the result of a decline in public demand, a development which has been the subject of much controversy in the Polish press. According to some accounts, this falling off in demand applies only to fiction, not to books in general. These claim that reader interest has shifted from fiction to non-fiction, particularly to popular science, encyclopedias and dictionaries, which were not put on the Polish market on any significant scale until 1957. *Zycie Warszawy*, May 6, 1959, cited the tremendous demand for the just-published Small General Encyclopedia and pointed out that the sale of this one book would absorb an estimated 100 million *zloty* out of the book market, at the expense of the sale of other books.

Other students of the book market attribute the decline in fiction sales to the rise in book prices, the competition of other kinds of entertainment (television, jazz) not available before 1956, a levelling off in the building of personal and communal libraries. And critics have not been slow to indict Polish fiction itself for failure to attract readership. Writer-editor Andrzej Braun, in the May 24, 1959 issue of *Nowa Kultura*, ascribed the switch in reading habits to the "moral and psychological vacuum" of current Polish fiction which leads readers to turn to factual literature to help them to deal with modern life.

The general official criticism of new Polish literature is that it is polarized between the extremes of avant-garde obscurity and cheap trivia. *Polityka* (Warsaw), February 21, 1959, warned that while young intellectuals may read contemporary literature, readership polls show that the workers have "a negative attitude" toward it. According to a recent poll, 66 percent of the industrial workers in Lodz, 57 percent in Nowa Huta, are regular or occasional book readers. "If we compare these with American figures, where no more than 25 percent of all adults read books, we must be impressed with Polish readership," said *Polityka*. But, said the paper, among the books mentioned by the workers, there are virtually no contemporary writers. (Only Maria Dabrowska was mentioned in Lodz.)

Readers' Choice

Surveys on book readership appearing in the post-1956 Soviet bloc press show that the books most in demand by readers at libraries and bookstores are the national classics—implying a rather conclusive rejection of postwar writing. Even more significant is that the most favored modern authors are almost entirely non-Communist. Thus, according to Polish opinion polls, the outstanding postwar Polish novel is considered to be Andrzejewski's politically

BOOKS IN THE WORKSHOP

The following enthusiastic account of how books are sold in the factories appeared in Contemporanul (Bucharest), September 25, 1959.

"We are at the front door of the August 23rd plant. The red walls of some of the halls are practically covered with panels, posters, advertisements, glass-covered bulletin boards. The [notices read]: 'Love books'; 'Latest publications'; 'What shall we read?'; 'Complete your personal library with the help of the book-distribution service of your enterprise'; 'To be published,' etc.

"I enter the technology section. There, two workers are taking advantage of the 10 o'clock break to find the necessary books on the shelves. One of them has chosen Voltaire's 'Selected Works' and 'Our First Playwrights' (This is for reading in the evening,' he says to his companion) and the other one has chosen 'The Basis of Marxist Philosophy' and 'Road to the North' by Eugen Barbu. Then they lock the book closet, put the key and the money on the table and leave the room. The book distributor, Comrade Tranca, trusts his customers completely. He will never check the money. Although he started this work only recently, he has acquired over 100 readers in his section.

"In the electricians' department (350 readers), the book closet is in the hall (the same thing is noticed in every section) and one of the workers fills the job of the volunteer book propagator. During work breaks, books are loaded on a cart and carried from man to man, from one lathe to another. Each man chooses what he likes: 'Far From Moscow,' 'Beyond the Highest Tension,' 'Baragan,' 'Physics by Faraday,' 'How We Should Raise Our Children,' etc.

"The efforts of the Party to raise the cultural level of the workers by creating night schools, organizing conferences, etc., can be easily seen on the individual cards of each buyer; there are workers who read in Russian, French, German, Hungarian. This year between September 1-9, 30 volumes in these languages arrived at the August 23rd plant and all of them have been sold. (A comrade from the regional CLDC [State book distributor] once remarked that the foreign-language books were not in demand!) At the August 23rd plant there are 11 book-propagators; they are workers from various sections and they do not have to leave their workshops. During the month of August, books valued at 100,000 lei have been sold. The Party organization of the plant helps the volunteer propagators to have as readers and buyers 100 percent of the plant's employees; and—says Comrade Gusti from the regional CLDC—"a good reader should always owe some money to the bookstand'..."

ambiguous "Ashes and Diamonds," dealing with the struggle between Communist and non-Communist partisans at the close of the war. The most popular novels in Hungary, with a reported circulation of 200,000, are the works of Sigmund Moricz, a prewar writer prominent in the peasant-oriented Populist literary movement which has been constantly at loggerheads with the Communists.

Foreign Fiction

The demand for contemporary Western literature,* when it became available in translation in the Soviet bloc during the "thaw," proved phenomenal. Most popular with the Eastern European readers are French and American novels; English mystery classics (Agatha Christie and Conan Doyle) have a large following. Of the leading American writers, Ernest Hemingway ranks highest, with Steinbeck and Faulkner. Eric-Maria Remarque is also greatly in demand. In 1958, the Warsaw paper *Głos Pracy* said that these had become the most widely read authors in Poland. Hemingway and Albert Camus consistently appear at the top of press book polls.** A Hungarian translation of "The Old Man and the Sea," published in a small (5,000-copy) edition in 1955, reportedly sold out in Budapest in one morning. The Czechoslovak paper *Svobodné Slovo* of September 17, 1958, spoke of a "a wave of Remarque-ism"; *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), September 19, 1958, carried an account of a near-riot among standees in front of a bookstore which had run short of copies of "Arch of Triumph."

Orthodox critics have attacked the publishers for issuing Western novels in such large numbers, to meet the popular demand. A Czechoslovak critic protested the publication of a 40,000-copy edition of "The Old Man and the Sea" and a projected 95,000-copy printing of "A Farewell to Arms," while the average printing of a new Czech novel was only 10,000 copies. However, the critic was forced to acknowledge that novels by the leading regime-approved native writers published in editions of from 3,000 to 20,000 copies had failed to sell. (*Rude Pravo*, December 17, 1957.)

The rage for Western books initially had strong political connotations: they displaced the former overwhelming predominance of Soviet translations. In Poland, books

translated from Soviet originals dropped from about 600 titles in 1956 to less than 300 in 1957 (the number of copies fell from 9.5 million to about 2.8 million in the same period.) On November 21, 1958, *Trybuna Ludu* complained that "indiscriminate translation of weak Soviet literature has been replaced by a categorical demand for any and every Western book."

Foreign translations constitute about one-third of the fiction titles in Polish 1960 publishing plans. French titles (84) lead, followed by Soviet (70), English (48), German (43), American (34). Despite financial and political pressures growing almost daily, Polish publishing policy in regard to foreign books is by far the most liberal in the Soviet bloc. Poland is the only country which has published the poems of Boris Pasternak. Even Eisenhower's "Crusade in Europe" appeared this year in a Polish translation under the imprint of the Polish Ministry of Defense, and received favorable comment in the press.

In Bulgaria on the other hand, half the entire book circulation is in Soviet books, according to *Rabotnicesko Delo*, May 17, 1959. Radio Sofia, September 22, 1959, said that more than 5,000 Russian (classics) and Soviet books have been put out in translation in the past 15 years, while at the same time 21 million Soviet books in the original have been sold in Bulgaria. This is 18 percent of the overall output of books since the war, and 75 percent of all translated books.

French books (in the original as well as translation) are apparently still widely circulated in Romania, despite that country's nearly complete inundation by Soviet influence and control. It was recently reported in the Western press that 635,000 copies of French books were issued in Romania in 1959. They are predominantly classic or semi-classic works—Alexandre Dumas is the most popular, followed by Balzac, Stendhal, and Jules Verne. Concurrently, the flow of Russian printed matter to Romania has not only continued but increased in the post-Stalin era. Also contrary to the post-Stalin trend elsewhere in the bloc, the Romanian Communist regime has not issued a single complete edition of any of the Romanian literary classics (many of which are anti-Czarist Russia).

French fiction is greatly in demand also in Hungary, where Jules Verne, followed by Balzac, are reportedly the most popular of all foreign authors. Among the translated works published in 1958, French was first, with 70 titles, followed by Soviet, 58 titles.

A new trend—whose inspiration is clearly political—in translated literature in the Soviet bloc is away from both East and West. Translations of the literature of the new emerging areas of Africa, Asia and South America are now being introduced. The 1959 publishing plan in Bulgaria provided for translations of Indian, Pakistani, Argentinian, Algerian, Haitian and Guatemalan books. In Czechoslovakia, a spokesman for publishing in Slovakia declared that the time had passed when so-called "world literature" was limited in the eyes of publishers to the major Western countries: "The literature of other

* In regard to scientific and technical books, Soviet policy is immediately to translate each important scientific book published abroad and amalgamate its contents with those of other related works. This composite work is then translated as a Soviet work into the Eastern European languages. It is thus difficult to trace the course of Western scientific books in the Soviet bloc.

** For example, in a poll on the most important novelists published in *Sztandar Młodych*, December 24, 1959, Hemingway ranked first, Camus second, the Soviet novelist Sholokhov third. In a poll of some 450 technical college students in Warsaw, the 19th century Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz was rated first, with Hemingway, Camus, Remarque next. The only contemporary Polish author mentioned in the latter poll was Marek Hlasko. (*Kierunki* [Warsaw], November 29, 1959.) A post-Revolt survey in Hungary (*Nagyvilág* [Budapest]) on favorite foreign writers cited (in order): Hemingway, Graham Greene, Huxley, Mann, Camus. The periodical acidly noted the conspicuous absence of Socialist realist writers of the "People's Democracies."

nations and continents was hidden behind a wall of prejudice and ignorance. . . . Today we are pulling down this wall and discovering the treasures of Chinese, Indian, Indonesian, Arab, Argentinian and Brazilian literature as well as of the Soviet [minority] nationalities. . . ." (*Kulturny Zivot* [Bratislava], September 26, 1959.)

WRITERS PROLONG THE AGONY

The Communist practice of paying book authors according to length of product inevitably leads writers to try to get maximum yardage out of their work. The Bulgarian journal *Narodna Kultura* (Sofia), September 19, 1959, fiercely attacked the results:

"If the great length of a book is due to the use of many words or to poor literary elaboration, its author needs help. If the author, however, increases the length of the book for other (for instance, material) reasons, he should be condemned. The publishing of unjustifiably large books must be eliminated. Every extra page must be cut out by the editor's scissors. . . .

"There are writers—unfortunately, among them some quite talented—who prefer impressive size to impressive expression. . . . Along with Emil Kolarov, who with every new 'revised edition' of the novel 'The Men of September' has also increased the size of the book, S. Dichev is also very wasteful in his novel 'For Freedom.' His book, consisting of two parts and 1,400 pages, is an example of lack of creative discipline. . . .

"There are also over-size books in children's and young people's literature. For instance, Gr. Ugarov's book, 'In the Footsteps of the Exiles': 676 pages. In 1956 this book was published in 375 pages. Now the author declares that book to be the first part of his novel, and adds a second part with approximately as many pages, thus winning the record for the biggest book published in children's literature."

PRESENT TRENDS

THE POLITICAL TIGHTENING, the "ideological offensive" being pressed throughout the Communist-dominated world, is already having an impact on book publishing policy. Basically it means a strengthening of the paramount propaganda function of the "printed word." Its first result will probably be increasing restrictions on the number and kind of books from the West. In domestic books, an increase in the publication of political and economic works and a downplay of fiction is indicated. In fiction itself, the stark outlook is for the return of the formula literature of "Socialist realism."

The Hungarian regime has prescribed an increase in the ratio of political literature in the 1961-65 publishing plans, again enforcing the compulsory purchase of such

works for Party members and people in prominent positions. Production of this kind of literature has apparently already increased: "In 1959, the book dealing with the most important ideological problems—revisionism, nationalism and other bourgeois views—came to the fore," said *Belpolitikai Szemle*, April 1959.

A crackdown on editors and publishers in Czechoslovakia was signalled at a national conference of Party workers in the publishing trade held by the Party Central Committee last May (1959). At this conference, which dealt with the "mission" of book publishing in the Communist indoctrination of the masses, Central Committee Secretary Koucky criticized the ideological waywardness of publishing personnel. He accused them of assessing the composition of the reading public erroneously, regarding it as mainly composed of intellectuals, and disregarding the needs of workers and peasants. He warned against attempts to influence the publication of books by people "who push demands which are either wholly incompatible with the Party's cultural line . . . or who tend to promote the publication of books of a strongly bourgeois ideological bent in disproportionately large editions." Koucky identified these as either inexperienced young people in editorial offices whose knowledge of Marxism-Leninism is superficial and academic (and regarded by them as "just a necessary requirement for employment"), or more cunning individuals for whom "Marxism-Leninism is an empty set of slogans within whose framework it is possible to smuggle into our cultural life works which are socially harmful." Party organizations within the publishing houses have been alerted to block the publication of "anti-Socialist" books. (*Zivot Strany* [Prague], July 1959.)

The administrative head of publishing in Slovakia, Julius Lenk, said in an interview on 1960 publishing plans that their chief objective was to produce books which "come closer to life": for example, there will be a larger number of children's books which "stimulate the materialistic way of thinking" and fewer of the "conventional story books." (*Kulturny Zivot* [Bratislava], September 26, 1959.)

Increased Communist pressure on book publishing is seen most dramatically in Poland, largely because of the wide area of freedom briefly enjoyed; in Romania and Bulgaria, where book publishing has been consistently circumscribed, it is something less than momentous. The "retreat" in regime cultural policy in Poland began in late 1958, as part of the general drive against "revisionism." But at this time the Party's professed intention was to confine its active intervention in literary activity to tighter control over the dissemination of books, leaving writers and publishers a free hand. Party spokesmen stepped up the attack on "gutter literature"—crime novels, romances, etc.—as well as "black literature," whose leading practitioner, novelist Marek Hlasko, had already been denounced by the regime. A year later, at the Writers' Congress in December 1959, the Party abandoned all self-imposed restraints and is now insisting on the writing and publication of books which demonstrably serve to further Party-prescribed "social goals."

A return to "Stalinist" controls in book publishing in Eastern Europe is unlikely in the immediate future. The regimes do not wish to trigger a decampment of the reading public. Such Stalinist measures as banning Western non-Communist literature, for instance, would be incompatible in theory with "competitive coexistence"; in practice, there is also the recognition of the now more sophisticated Communists that an outright ban serves chiefly to stimulate the appetite.

Nevertheless, the theoretical functional integration under "Socialism" of book production and consumption seems still to be only an idea. Soviet bloc publishing has a schizophrenia all its own: the split between the requirements of the State and public demand, in which the publisher plays the hapless role of the servant of two masters.

**On the Polish translation of
To Have and Have Not**

"Some books have a way of disappearing before they ever reach the bookstores. That is what happened, for example, with Ernest Hemingway's novel 'To Have and Have Not,' which was recently published by the Czytelnik publishing house.

"Some 10,000 copies of the book were printed, but I am ready to pay any reader who has seen this book in a bookstore. The book was available only . . . under the counter, to friends."

(*Zolnierz Wolnosci* [Warsaw], March 27, 1959.)

BOOKS SENTENCED TO DEATH

Sztandar Mlodych (Warsaw), June 13, 1958

"A few weeks ago news was circulated by the press that in Rzeszow, books of somewhat frivolous character, those of Hlasko, Brantome and Sagan, were piled and burned; fortunately, this turned out to be just a rumor. . . . But at the same time another scandal was ripening in Rzeszow, and this one was real. . . . A large part of the mobile library belonging to the House of Culture in Rzeszow and containing 35,000 volumes was turned over to paper mills for reprocessing. More than 10,000 books were 'sentenced.' Among these . . . were some volumes of 'The Great Soviet Encyclopedia' . . . a volume of the National Edition of the works of Mickiewicz . . . The Selected Works of Marat, Pushkin, 'The City Folk,' by Gorky, 'The Crisis of Socialist Democracy,' 'The Year 1905,' by Rosa Luxemburg, the anthology of Polish revolutionary poetry, the works of Lenin, those of the great humanist Korolenko, of Serafimowicz, Pujman, Putrament and Ehrenburg. . . .

"Some of the destroyed works were, perhaps, really worthless, but at the same time superb works perished. . . . It is difficult to determine who really bears the responsibility. . . . The matter is in the hands of the Supreme Chamber of Control. . . . The scandal is particularly great because of the fact that those who permitted it to occur bear direct responsibility for the province's cultural affairs. . . ."

THE MONTH IN REVIEW (continued from page 2)

All this means, as the regime well knows, that production and productivity must suffer. Recently, indeed, the Yugoslavs, with quiet malice, rubbed salt in this particular wound and pointed out that their own uncollectivized agriculture had soared upward in production, while Hungarian results had been much less impressive. It is true, of course, that increased production is only the nominal purpose of collectivization; increased political control of the peasantry is the real goal. Nevertheless, even Communists cannot live by political control alone; there must be bread, and this classic contradiction in Communist agricultural policy seems now in Hungary to be pushing toward a new extreme of tension.

Memories of a Vacation

by

MARIA DABROWSKA

Maria Dabrowska is probably the most important living Polish writer. Born in 1889, she wrote her four-volume major novel "Nights and Days" after World War I; it is an epic picture of the life of the remnants of Polish nobility in the period 1863 to 1914. Other of her books are "The Smiles of Childhood," "The People from Over There," "Signs of Life" and "Morning Star." Miss Dabrowska was given a State Prize in 1955; it is most probable that she will be a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature this year.

"Memories of a Vacation" appeared in the Christmas issue of the Warsaw weekly Przegląd Kulturalny, December 17-30, 1959; it gives more than a hint of the qualities of skill and feeling that contribute to her reputation.



Maria Dabrowska

NASZA OJCZYZNA (Warsaw), December 1959

AUGUST 1, 59. — I seldom succumb to the must of 'going some place' for vacation, but this summer I did. The weather being so perfect there was nothing else I could do. Our rooms are rented as of today in the home of a fisherwoman (or rather the widow of a fisherman) in Kuznica, on the Hel peninsula. The purchase of sleeper tickets proved impossible — rail travel is at its peak. We are going by car. Pleasure and comfort at the cost of concealed suffering. I feel like an 'internal emigrant,' because I am not sharing the 'fate of the nation,' tightly compressed into inhumanly crowded railroad coaches, not sleepers. And at the same time I feel the inevitability of my privileges, dependence on my already arranged-for fate, which I cannot and probably would not want to escape. A fate that should and is considered by all as fortunate. Anyway, I'm going, and I guess I'm glad I'm going. Temporary insanity of contradictory emotions. Perhaps the one to understand me best would be thirteen-year-old T., sullen and mysterious — at last, a young person with an anti-cult for 'famous' names and people. She's probably embarrassed to be traveling with me, just as I am embarrassed to be traveling with her dog, a huge Alsatian. I remember when during a certain 'historic moment' I was shocked at the sight of yawning pet dogs behind the windows of escaping cars.

But now is a different historic moment and our problems also are completely different. We forgot to take with us the bag of groats which had been prepared for the dog. Knowing the whimsicality of our store supplies, we fear we may not be able to get the groats in Kuznica. Pultusk, Plonsk, Sztum, Kwidzyn — towns, cities. Some of them are quite neat and show signs of at least superficial concern for modern accents. The plaster jobs on the houses are amateurish, but the colors are tasteful and gay. Perhaps a look through the facades would elicit a howl of melancholy? But maybe not? We stop in all the towns, visit all the collectives — all in vain — no groats today. We finally found them . . . in the delicatessens of Gdynia. We buy six pounds in beautifully wrapped, two-pound packages. And rightly so. In other countries too, standard everyday staples are packaged in lovely wrappings. The point is, however, that they can be bought everywhere and at all times. Obviously the people there have lesser needs, they are incapable of buying everything out all at once. Only we seem to have such a standard of living, such madness for daily shopping! Insofar as needs are concerned, we were too quick to catch up with the capitalist hell. Serves us right!

2. VIII. — Kuznica. Early morning. A pearly mist hovers outside the windows. In the midst of this pale void hangs a black boat and on its edge J. is shaving and washing. He looks as if he were floating in air. I can see that he is walking in the water and not in the sky when he turns to come into the house, towel over his shoulder. The pearly mist is beginning to shimmer with the colors of day. The fishing wharf appears black against the dazzling backdrop of the east — black motor cutters, sharp-edged, flat, each one sprouting the thin, black line of an auxiliary mast. The treenails of the modest palisades framing the bay are also black, as are the two big-bellied chimneys of the smokehouse, strangely reminiscent of the ominous furnaces in Oswiecim [Auschwitz].

When leaving the house yesterday we promised someone that we would 'take advantage of the car' before J. has to go back, and make a side-trip to Zarnow Lake and Dabek or Dabkow. Because people travel and get to see places and we just sit there, not knowing how to live, never seeing anything, not even Zarnow or Dabek.

So we left right after breakfast. The combined age of the three young people, plus the dog, is still less than mine; the weather is lovely — so, we should be gay, but we aren't. Little T. doesn't seem to see any sense in this departure from the seashore and the eagerly awaited swimming, the older younger person is smiling much too sweetly for me not to suspect her of a headache, and the dog — an uncanine-like calm and indifferent animal — took a deep dive to the bottom of the car right at the outset; not one of them believes in the lake. So J. and I are left in charge of the youth and humor department. J. handles the car like a dancing partner, but soon the pavement ends as we turn into very bad side roads, sorely in need of repairs. As far as the eye can see — stubble fields and heat-rusted meadows.

The lake least worthy of visiting I have ever seen in my life. Maybe we approached it from the wrong side. Near

the shore is a small glade surrounded by shrubbery. Not without difficulty we finally find a place to sit down. The field is obviously a watering-place approach for the local cows and sheep. A huge latrine of pies and blobs, fostering the abundance of wild-growing herbs. Airless silence. The motionless depths reflect precisely the landscapes of both earth and sky. The lake is rather oblong, a little like Goplo. If it were not for the motionless water, it would seem like a river. On the other side — woods. On our side — tiny rivulets of yellowish, starchy foam; the water here is turbid, warmed by the hot and humid air and stinks somewhat of decayed weeds, slime and cattle urine. J. stayed with the car to repair the consequences of the fatal drive. We undress and stretch out in the sun. Looking at the brownish and scraggly bottom, I have no desire to go wading, even.

Despite these discouraging conditions, little T. is in the water all the time, diving and trying to swim, finally a bit content, but also a little offended because the dog, always so obedient, refuses to accompany her this time; dragged in for a moment, he soon escapes to lie down as far away from the water as possible. We pretend we don't see this. J. shows up after about an hour. He wades through the shore-line dirt, dives into the deep water and swims far out. The ancient lake wrinkles and moves, as if suddenly awakened to life by his agile youth. . . .

We stop for dinner in Jastrzebia Gora, because I remembered it had many restaurants, cafes and a large hotel standing on a fabulous beach, reached by elevator from the top of a steep hill. Nothing is left of all this except the ruins of the elevator, protruding into the air, a puzzling shape of incomprehensible scaffolds in a jungle of wild greenery. Instead, Jastrzebia Gora has been transformed into a "workers' vacation land" and covered with toy-like summer cottages painted in various colors. Undoubtedly they are occupied by people who never had vacations before. We, therefore, bless this positive achievement and set out in search of dinner. We stop in front of the only (private) restaurant, the "Polesie," and our hope abandons us, just like in front of Dante's gate. Crowds seem to be converging upon it from all sides. A huge truck drives up ahead of us unloading a numberless horde of dinner-starved sailors. We enter with courage born of desperation and suddenly . . . surprise. "Polesie" turns out to be as big as Polesie* itself and very well organized, to boot. We were immediately led to a 'just cleared table' and served — quickly and efficiently — an altogether passable meal. Even the beer was cold and we didn't even have to wait long for the check (moderate prices, too). And they say there are no miracles.

This success went to our heads and, heedless of all the safety regulations, we descended the erstwhile steps — now nothing but precipices torn by water, time and negligence — to the beach and bathed in the towering, thundering waves. And so, somewhere there was wind, blowing in from the sea, shattering the calm of dark waters. The swim induced us to accept the day's destiny as having been fulfilled; we had not overlooked the moment of happiness.

* A former province of Poland, now in the USSR.

At least—on our way back to Kuznica—we behave as if something of the kind had occurred. Soon after, J. left for Sopot, where he is to spend several days with friends.

4. VIII.—Kuznica. Here, we are not by the sea, but practically on the sea. From all sides the roar of water and the “chirping of water birds.” As if at the ends of the earth, or some other part of it. The insignificance of land, expanse of water—flat, silky bay and towering pomegranate of deep seas. Bleached foam and creamy whiteness of shifting sands. Blue grass and silvery dunes. Parched stretch of land and running through its middle a pencil-line of woods, assuming, here and there, the unexpected form of luxurious miniature jungle. Great air, it is enough to take just one breath to feel it surging through the body—from head to toes. A place unlike any Polish landscape, even the seashore. A long time ago, when I visited Hel in 1923, the surrounding shoals—still untouched by human hands—seemed to me like the first day of creation.

More than 300 years ago King Wladyslaw IV and his courtiers undoubtedly stood within this same landscape assigning land plots for “living quarters” for them and selecting the port and city site for the State. These plans were not carried out until the second decade of our century, when a port—actually only a fishing port—and a village, now grown almost to city proportions, were built here and named Wladyslawowo in honor of the king. There have been many changes in Kuznica also. For the last 40 years a new and modern civilization has been marching into the ancient fishing villages. It enters, but cannot settle down in a decisive manner. The Kuznica natives—for centuries only fishermen—began making money on sea-loving vacationers the moment these lands became part of Poland. They built houses, first shanty-like, then solid and better ones. And they are still building them. But they seem to lack the means or the imagination to cover them with stucco and provide some flowers and greenery for the background. Judging by the spotless interiors it's easy to tell they're Kaszubs who remained long under the influence of efficient German economy and that they also have some traditional affiliations with the Dutch. But judging by the nonchalant confusion of the exterior surroundings, including the stinking out-houses, it's easy to tell, unfortunately, that they're also Poles. Only the church grounds are more or less well kept.

Kuznica is mostly reddish-brick, ugly and unfinished and—you could say—not exactly sure how it should put on the finishing touches and for whom. It is a small village that has its faithful summer residents, but not overcrowded because it does not have the facilities which attract large crowds. No means of amusing the public, no suitable occasions for showing off the latest fashions, no orchestras, cafes, dance halls or public address systems. And it's ideal as far as I am concerned. Practical civilization, adorning Kuznica with comforts, lustre and elegance—should leave it that way: a village with a rare and exotic charm, capable of attracting even foreigners (foreign currency), but always and only those people who prefer quiet, nature and uncrowded spots to the noisy amusements of fashionable spas.



LETNIA PRZYGODA

“Summer Adventure”

SZPIŁKI (Warsaw), December 13, 1959

8. VIII.—An asphalt road is being constructed this year (or maybe for many years?); it is to run through the center of the peninsula. The section between Wladyslawowo and Kuznica has been finished and the work is now in progress in the village itself. The work is progressing slowly, but in the middle of the summer season! And there are no detours. The cars sneak by along the bumpy road shoulders, raising huge clouds of dust. The roar of tractors pulling rollers. The smell of heated asphalt. Towering piles of cement slabs for future sidewalks. Once I saw several workers begin the job of laying them in place. But soon they stopped, thought about something for a while, lit cigarettes and left. Maybe they went to get some vodka, or maybe to make some money.

I don't know how to build roads and I don't like to criticize things I wouldn't know how to do myself. But if I were in charge of building the Hel peninsula road and were unable in any way to avoid construction during the height of the vacation season, I would at least have enough common sense to do the job between, and not right smack in the middle of the resorts.

10. VIII.—What a summer! What untiring sunshine from morning till night, on both sides of the peninsula, even in the transparent woods! There are summers during which even the clearest sundown, even a rising barometer, bring nothing but rain. This year, all the weather reports predicting a “change,” all the highs and lows, all the ugly, smeared-over sundowns invariably result in fair weather, heat and tropical dryness. This is perfect weather for the fishermen and vacationers, here on the seashore. And only somewhere, at the bottom of one's consciousness, is there a gnawing feeling that this also means disaster. The present obligatory way of life forbids one to lose sight—even for a moment—of the black and disastrous side of things. The tiniest expression of satisfaction with, or affirmation of,

life, regardless of its ugly aspects—is nothing else but cheap conformity. Especially the thirteen-year-old and nineteen-year-old young people of both sexes rebuke us with sullen looks for every expression of serene good humor. Under the weight of their eyes I feel like the last of the young generation in this world. The young are mad and miserable even at play! This is a dangerous symptom of the times! I am embarrassed that here I feel sometimes as in the young Wierzyński poems. That there is only a winged and naked walk along the edge of land and water . . . swimming; an ardent affair between tanned body and a cold and sudden wave from the open sea—and gentle, caress-like wallowing in the soft and kindly waters of the bay. And finally, there is sleep, pure, unadulterated sleep. There is the morning awakening amidst the great air of the always-open windows, without that familiar feeling that I have awakened long after the accomplished fact of my own funeral. Perhaps I am experiencing here my last “quiet, bright, golden days.”

12. VIII. — We really know only the land of our childhood; in other words, everything among which we were born and brought up. Childhood is not only happiness—not every childhood is happy—it is the only source of infallible knowledge of the world. This period of seeming ignorance is a concealed amassing of absolute knowledge, achieved on the force of complete unification with the first seen, the first heard and the first experienced. That's why I know my own people as if they were with me, and will never learn to know the Kaszubs. I can only make conjectures and ask, after Zerumski, “Kaszub, Kaszub, why is your face sad?”

The guest-traveler will sometimes recount a mechanical story of this or that fisherman's family, but there is no essential co-existence between these two worlds. Here, we are mixed with them like oil and water, or we are to them what plant lice are to ants. The profit they make on the vacationers improves their lot, but not their happiness. They are greedy and can't forgive themselves for renting their rooms two per in May when later the influx of guests indicates they could have squeezed people in three or even four to a room; they try to make up for this in various ingenious ways. When accused of greed, however, they think a while and then answer: “If you only knew how hard it is to live through the winter in this place.” The woman who owns the house where we rent our rooms is called Bernarda and her little son's name is—Ekspedyt. Her mother and family have a large house on the other side of the village which they also rent to vacationers. Her brother comes to see her from there, he is a fisherman and his name is simple—Antoni. Exceptionally pleasant. Discreet and at the same time approachable and good natured. He has much innate dignity. He likes to talk about fish and knows all about them. In my mind I call him Antonio. We handle him like a thread which could lead to the skein. But it won't.

13. VIII. — A long walk in the tepid waters of the bay with an accidentally encountered friend. We talk about industrial design which is giving Poland a chance to shine in the world and make plenty of foreign currency. We

allegedly exhibit creative imagination and high-level artistry in the field. It has been noticed both in Western and Eastern Europe. However, with the realization of this fact come immediate attempts to transform these beautiful designs into cheap mediocrity for “the masses.” By means of which encouragement is given to bad taste, so popular among the higher levels of our society. After all, we can't afford a taste better than the world's best. Even if professionals in a big country say that our taste seems to them to be interesting and good, we immediately deny this with heated fervor. I hear veritable legends about stubborn artists who—for small wages—insist on continuing the young, but already excellent traditions of Polish design, even though they could make good money if they were to give it up. These are not the paper kind, but the authentic positive heroes.

Wading in the water conditions one to approach with good humor even things about which one would normally gnash one's teeth. What is there that is left to the powerless except laughter if they do not plan to lay themselves down immediately on the bottom of the gentle bay? Therefore we exchange venomous jokes and anecdotes—the magic of humor discharges the tensions of irritation. And the bay is silent and innocent. The sun is descending towards the west. The fishing port and the herds of trawlers—black at sunrise—now sparkle with a myriad of glittering hues. In step with our return, the cool water—which had reached my shoulders—becomes shallow and tepid and on the shore it is as warm as bath water. In the west the clouds are forming into an angry, violet chaos in which the sun is sinking like a scarlet scream proclaiming: tomorrow—assured good weather.

14. VIII. — There is a “meat shop” in Kuznica which we saw open only three times. The first time it was being painted. The second time it was being cleaned out after painting. And the third time—in the already ideally clean and empty interior a salesgirl was sleeping, head cradled in arms resting on the counter. There is no need to go to Kuznica to see such sights. They are banal and so characteristic of the landscape that they could be engraved on postage stamps. What is not banal but exceptional in Kuznica is that fish are eaten here, and even various kinds of fish: eel, flounders, mackerel, perch and pike and even sweet-water fish can be had from the bay! On the whole, fish are a rarity in Poland, especially in the seashore localities—unless one is a fisherman. And here—fried, boiled or freshly smoked—you can eat them every day. Or is that an economic crime?

N. came today. So, the station early in the morning and later a pleasant day coupled with renewed ecstasy that we are at last having such a successfully “good time.”

16. VIII. — The letter which I mailed home on August 9th contained the sentences: “The great west wind finally stopped yesterday. At night, the bay yielded only a murmur very much like the rustle of a broom sweeping the gutter.” Today I began reading Graham Greene's “Ministry of Fear,” which N. brought. What a surprise—right at the beginning I found an identical comparison, except that it's reversed. The sound of a broom sweeping glass on a city

street reminded Greene of the interrupted murmur of the calm sea. How often something is written with the conviction that one is "creating" something in its first worldly appearance, sound and feel. And then it turns out that someone had already written it a long time ago. And maybe a hundred others. I believe that even the most gifted writers are not insured against such surprises. So far as I am concerned, I've had it happen to me with Proust, Mann, Chekhov. Only never with Conrad. Probably neither before his time nor after has anyone ever written a Conrad-like sentence.

17. VIII.—Great affairs of the world reach us here as if through a mist, although we read about them every day, on the beach, in a wind-lined newspaper. But one small item suddenly affected us. *Zycie Warszawy* [Warsaw daily] published a short article entitled "Neither Dog, nor Otter, but Causes Damage in the Billions." It discusses the losses among countryside animals caused by "roaming, ownerless mongrel dogs." The author—Mr. Izbicki—probably doesn't know that dogs which have masters also do some "roaming" and that many of these are pedigreed. Namely, let us say, during periods of intensified personal life. Usually at such times they have very little interest in food and return from their escapades as thin as shadows. The only ones which do not roam are those kept on chains and the lap-dogs, whose masters make every effort to curtail their sex life.

I don't know whether we "have" as many as 2 million "masterless" dogs, but every dog even though he may be roaming only temporarily, is exposed to many dangers: forest rangers are permitted to shoot them, dog catchers catch them, dog-rivals lie in waiting, rat-poison, etc. Now there is to be another menace—amateur dog-catching. The article is "constructive." It provides the readers with on-the-spot advice on "caninocide," urges raising the price on dog pelts to one hundred *zloty*. And how can the dog and *zloty* hunters tell right away whether the victim they are chasing is "masterless" and has a rabbit on his conscience? Even man is difficult to catch red-handed! History has taught us that in such situations it is permissible to apply "collective responsibility." Especially, writes the author, "since the matter concerns the lowest grade of the canine kingdom: the countryside mongrel." Such racial discrimination! It is true that mongrels are usually rural and plebeian. The better city species hold them in contempt. But the characteristics for which a dog is loved are by no means alien to mongrels, and some are even more prevalent among them—as among human half-breeds—than among the thoroughbred favorites. Strength, agility, intelligence—mongrel shepherd-dogs and mongrel watch-dogs of human abodes.

Mr. Izbicki is not satisfied with just his concern for the animal-victims of the dogs. He estimates that even if the dogs were to mend their un-virtuous ways and refrain from catching rabbits, then the cost of their food alone—according to very modest tabulations—reaches at least 1½ billion *zloty* annually. Kill the mongrels and we'll help fatten the State budget with a tidy sum! Mr. Izbicki probably doesn't know that the better the dogs are fed, the less apt they are

to chase after rabbits, chickens and the like. Thus, by feeding dogs properly we save the animals—and the deficiency will be somehow equalized. The well-fed and always full fox-terrier stops chasing chickens and runs in the other direction at the sight of a mouse. And no mongrel stands a chance of catching an adult rabbit. It is for this reason that our fathers used to breed special hunting dogs—greyhounds. It's a shame that Mr. Izbicki didn't estimate the losses suffered by the Polish State at the hands of people—and not "masterless" ones, at that. Because I should think that they would out-distance the mongrels by a good fifteen billion *zloty*. Public opinion was correct in branding these anti-canine propositions as an invitation to hooliganism. . . .

18. VIII.—I am still a child of the time and, as it happens, I inherit from this parent all his bad characteristics. I do not know how to relax, to be carefree. In this respect (and maybe several others) I am like the workers who utilize the great achievement of their era—the eight-hour work day—for purposes of working still another eight hours at an additional side job. Here, we also describe it as: inadequacy of official wages (social obligations—the objectively real; the psychological causes don't count), the scarcity of possibilities on which to spend one's free time. But this same phenomenon has been noticed by statisticians in countries with the highest standard of living, for instance, West Germany and the United States. And not only among the workers, but white collar employees as well.

I have yet another trait, characteristic of the people of our times—impatience, which accompanies us both at work and at rest. The atomic age can also be called the age of the impatient ones. I shall be leaving day after tomorrow and for several days already "my" Kuznica has ceased to be heavenly relaxation and has become transformed into expectation. We only just began to regain our strength, renew and rejuvenate ourselves, and already we are urgently awaiting something which will soon also prove to be meaningless, a futile waste of time—or rather having one meaning only—that of waiting for something. "At least I have something to wait for"—so says at times my thirteen-year-old friend T. And when I was her age I, too, used to wait for something. And I still do.

What is it that man is always so feverishly preparing for? What is it he's always waiting for so tensely? Actually, man is waiting for a miracle. The miracle comes—and passes unnoticed—we were waiting for a different one. And when we learn that several empires have already established their bases on the moon, we will still continue waiting impatiently for a miracle. We also wait—and with equal impatience—for the inevitable evil, as if it were that dreamed-of-goodness. For permanence and for change.

In such an atmosphere the bay and the sea were no more magnificent depth and remoteness but changed to rolls of frayed-edge carpets, lying to the side of a dirt littered floor, which only yesterday was no less than a charming beach. The frail, apparition-light ringlet of shoals has become huge and heavy land, tiresome in its monotony; all the inconveniences of our stay, disregarded because of its charm, have become as vexing as unbearable anguish; I even swim

and sun myself as if only out of a sense of duty. During my first days in Kuznica an elderly friend, tanned and rejuvenated into the sister of her daughters and much gayer than they, answered my "What's new?" with: "Oh well, we're trying to endure the vacation nightmare." I smiled then, but now it is I who am counting the days and hours. I am reminded of my brother, who said two years ago: "I became transformed into impatience. I can hardly wait 'til the day is over. I'd use a whip on the hours to make them move faster." He was deathly sick and soon stopped being impatient forever. I repeat after Goethe: "Wait, soon you too will rest." Strange words with which to conclude a vacation.


20. VIII. — I am leaving today. My friends are to remain, but only for a few more days. Because they must return before the final back-to-school rush. Otherwise, once again, the purchase of sleeping-car tickets will prove impossible, and this time there's no auto. On the whole of Hel there's only one Orbis* kiosk—in Jastarnia. Here come all the vacationers from every beach on the peninsula to take part in a complicated ritual which requires cunning endeavor, inhuman wealth of patience, monstrous loss of time and tremendous physical and moral strength. The kiosk is situated on a small, sun-drenched field, devoid of any shade-yielding tree or bush. The temperature —104 degrees in the sun. The miniature kiosk interior is hot enough to boil an egg. For the time being, however, it is boiling the miserable counter-girl. She is furious, unnerved and exhausted, her face glistens with tear-like perspiration. Equally exhausted are the customers who, as a rule, must visit the kiosk twice. Once, to "get on the list" prepared "privately" by the vacationers and then again to

* State travel agency.

join the regular line—this time they must come as early as possible—at dawn, or even before—not to lose their place in the "honorary" queue prepared the day before. And you stand there "dying with emotion," not knowing whether the preceding number on the list won't buy the last available tickets.

This is true reality. We are a little like people who are famous throughout the world for their charm and good qualities, but who—when at home—do not know how to provide even a moment's pleasure to anyone. We build bridges in Afghanistan, sugar refineries in Vietnam and some other kinds of factories in Korea, China, or India; and they say we're doing a good job. We are capable of forecasting Poland's future participation in, for example, interplanetary travel, and I've no doubt we shall translate forecast into fact. But we can never foresee summer or winter, freezing weather or snow, floods or dry spells. We foresee neither periods of intensified demand, nor slackening of interest in this or the other thing. We are never prepared for all that, despite the fact that all these phenomena recur more less regularly, precipitated either by the human or the natural course of events. We can successfully overcome our excessive tendency toward heroism in a struggle for independence, which then proves to be fiction, but we cannot prevent the purchase of a sleeping-car ticket from becoming something akin to heroism. But why do so many people want to travel in sleeping-cars, when it's equally difficult to fall asleep in one's own bed as it is when standing in a crowded rail coach? Of course, people would gladly travel by coach, if these were less crowded, filthy and uncomfortable. But wherefore this desire for more comfort and space when the epoch demands abstinence and asceticism? We do not want to be gay puritans, therefore, let us suffer.

PRZEGLĄD KULTURALNY (Warsaw), July 2, 1959



(Continued from page 10)
in the supply of fertilizers through both production and import.

Czechoslovakia

The two most collectivized countries in Eastern Europe are Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The former has pursued a relentless collectivization campaign since the summer of 1956, which has been a success in that some 65 percent of the arable land is now held by collective farms. If State farms are added, well over 80 percent of the arable land in Czechoslovakia is now "Socialized." Unlike Hungary however, the Czechoslovak regime cannot boast of increases in production. Since 1956, Czechoslovak agriculture has tended to stagnate, and last year total production was 1.4 percent below that of 1958. While the sugar beet and potato crops were affected by drought, performance in other sectors was also bad. The average annual growth in the country's agricultural production has been about one percent since 1956—when the intense collectivization campaign began.

There is another factor in Czechoslovakia's farm problem which is also to be found in other countries of the area: an aging rural labor force. The average age of farmers in Czechoslovakia is over 45. The regime's dogmatic stress on collectivization has killed whatever attractions farming might have for the youth. Young people seem to prefer the more attractive features of urban life to the doubtful joys of the collective farm. Despite these difficulties in agriculture—necessitating large food imports with their inevitable drain on foreign currency reserves—the Czechoslovak Communist leadership has not wavered from its goal of total collectivization by the end of 1960.

Bulgaria

About 95 percent of the arable land in Bulgaria is in the "Socialist sector." In this country, too, the dogmatic stress on collectivization has left its mark on production growth. Since collectivization was inaugurated in earnest in 1951-52, the average annual growth of agricultural production has hovered around 2 percent. In a strenuous effort to correct this situation, the Party last year ventured on a "great leap forward" in economic development and announced that agriculture was to increase its production in 1959 by 100 percent. Although the regime later reduced this target to

around 75 percent, the goal was unrealistic and doomed to failure. At the end of 1959, the regime reported that production had actually increased by 26 percent, although even this figure seemed to reflect some expert work by the statisticians.

Whatever the real progress, it had been achieved only by the forced mobilization of the entire peasantry. Brigades from the factories and offices were brought to the countryside for "volunteer" labor; youth organizations also contributed "voluntary" work in the countryside. It soon became evident that although increases in production could be achieved in certain branches of agriculture, the very unevenness of the increases produced in many cases more disadvantages than advantages. An increase in the number of chick hatcheries, for example, which were able to produce additional thousands of chicks, was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in the poultry facilities of collective farms. Light industry was not able to process all of the burgeoning vegetable production, with the result that much of the crop was wasted.

The Bulgarian press revealed other disturbing phenomena. It appeared that "private initiative," "speculation" and the "kulak mentality" had not been eliminated in totally collectivized Bulgaria. Collective farm chairmen selfishly took advantage of "temporary" shortcomings in distribution, using State transportation to rush their products to the free markets in areas of scarcity, instead of selling them at lower prices to the State purchasing agency. Shoddy and inferior produce was sold to the State, while prime produce went to the free market. These and other features of the Bulgarian economy led First Secretary Zhivkov to lay the lash on Party functionaries at a national meeting in January. Among the things emphasized by Zhivkov were: a lack of revolutionary ardor, a penchant for personal enrichment, and too much bureaucracy in the countryside.

Another noteworthy aspect of collective agriculture may be discerned in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. As collective farming becomes established, there is a progressive loss of the privileges enjoyed by collective farms in their early years. State subsidies slowly disappear, and more and more emphasis is placed on the demands of the State rather than of the collective farmers. Perhaps most important is the tendency to deprive the collective farm member of his last bit of economic freedom:

his private plot. In the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia there have been recent moves in this direction.

Romania

Romania has demonstrated a certain originality in agricultural policy, although aiming at the same goal. About 72 percent of the arable land in Romania is "Socialized." But collective farms comprise only 21 percent of this total and State land reserves and State farms hold another 27 percent. About 24 percent of the land is encompassed in loose "agricultural associations," which are not really collective farms but initial steps toward them. In 1959 the regime increased its efforts to convert these associations into collective farms, and met with some success.

Romania displays the same unevenness in agricultural production that is found elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. While in 1959 there was an almost spectacular success in sugar beets and sunflower seed—1960 targets have already been reached—the total grain crop is not increasing. The Plan anticipated that 15 million tons of grain would be produced in Romania by 1960. Last year's harvest—despite an increase of some 110,000 hectares in arable land—remained on the same level as the bumper year of 1957, around 11 million tons.

East Germany

The East German Communists launched a collectivization drive in 1959 that was similar to the Hungarian campaign, and managed to raise the "Socialist sector" in agriculture from about 30 percent of the arable land at the beginning of the year to more than 50 percent at the end. While agriculture in East Germany has always been more productive than elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, it lags far behind that of West Germany, and the gap has widened in recent years. First Secretary Ulbricht, at a meeting of his Party Central Committee in December, pointed out that West German farmers were producing almost 10 percent more grain per hectare, 36 percent more potatoes and 31 percent more sugar beets than their brothers in the German Democratic Republic. Ulbricht reminded his listeners that the goal for East German agriculture in the current Seven Year Plan (1959-1965) is to "surpass West German agriculture in crop yields and in livestock production per hectare of arable land."

Todor Zhivkov Improvises

Bulgaria has become the first European Communist country to abandon long-term economic planning. The motto seems to be: "Go as fast as you can, and make up your plan afterward." The technique resembles that of Communist China.

THE FIRST SECRETARY of the Bulgarian Communist Party must have many secret admirers among his colleagues in other countries of the Soviet bloc. In the last year-and-a-half Comrade Zhivkov has thumbed his nose at some of the most sacred fetishes in the witchcraft of "scientific Socialism." In a system dedicated to planning, where every political move must be appraised, justified and explained in terms of its effect upon various index numbers, Zhivkov has shown a magnificent scorn for plans and planners alike. Elsewhere in the Soviet bloc the success of a Party leader still depends on his ability to manage the economic house-keeping well enough to avoid easy criticism by his opponents. Marxism is "scientific," and so the leader must have economists and statisticians in his retinue who will enable him to say, "In the coming year the production of our Socialist industry will increase by eight percent," and be certain that events will bear him out. Zhivkov, however, has abandoned any effort to square his performance with his promises; his latest pronouncements show a fine contempt for even the basic rules of arithmetic.

His departure from the traditional style of Communist planning came without warning in the fall of 1958. Only a few months previously he had presided over a tame Party Congress which had approved a Third Five Year Plan (1958-1962) remarkable for its moderation. The Congress had been notable chiefly for the presence of Soviet Premier Khrushchev, who made a speech praising Bulgaria as a shining example of orthodox "Socialism." But in October 1958 Zhivkov announced that the new Five Year Plan, on which so much time and propaganda had been expended, was much too modest. He called for "a great leap forward in which every year will be equivalent to several years of quiet and gradual development." Where the Plan had called for a 35 percent increase in the output of agriculture by 1962, Zhivkov declared that "agriculture in 1959 must double its production as compared to 1958, while agricultural production in 1960 must be three times as high as that of 1958." Other sectors of the economy were also to be speeded up, with the general aim of accomplishing in four years what had been planned for five. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], November 14, 1958.)

This pronouncement evidently fell upon the Party membership like a meteor from outer space. The previous Five Year Plan (1953-1957) had gone largely unfulfilled, and

the new one would not have been much easier. At any rate, the Plan had supposedly been based upon a "profound analysis" of Bulgarian needs and resources. Where was the mistake? Zhivkov's answer was that there had been no mistake. "Only five months ago," he said to a meeting of Party workers, "the Seventh Party Congress assigned directives for the Third Five Year Plan, which is law for everybody. Can it be that the directives and plans are wrong? No, comrades, the decisions and directives of the Seventh Party Congress are correct. . . . What in reality are our economic plans? To us, the economic plan is not something unchangeable and fixed. . . . The masses are changing and improving our State economic plan by calling for the fulfillment of the tasks within shorter time limits. Therefore in the future our planning organs must bear in mind the untamable tendencies of the masses to forge ahead." (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, October 26, 1958.)

The Attack on "Passivity"

Though Zhivkov made the usual obeisance to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as "our glorious teacher," the program he outlined bore a startling resemblance to that of Communist China, which had also embarked on a "great leap forward." Like the Chinese, the Bulgarians had more manpower than jobs. The collectivization of agriculture, completed in 1958, had sent a lot of peasants into the cities where they swelled an army of unemployed that was embarrassingly large for a "People's Democracy." While efforts had been made to reduce the number of surplus hands by shipping them off to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia where labor was needed, there was obviously a patriotic interest in putting them to work at home. Moreover, the traditional habits of the Bulgarian farmers were enough to make an orthodox Marxist shake his head in despair. Zhivkov estimated that by mobilizing the peasants during the winter months, when there were no crops to plant or harvest, and putting them to work digging irrigation ditches and reclaiming fallow land, the economy would gain by "a few hundred million work-days." In addition, white-collar workers in the government and Party apparatus were asked to work in factories and farms for 30 or 40 days a year. Even school children were to be mobilized in youth brigades.

Zhivkov had his way. He overrode doubters in the State Planning Commission with the assertion that "in the present method of planning there is a large dose of passivity." He thundered against his opponents in the top councils of the Party for displaying "lack of confidence in victory and failure to understand the character and essence of the movement for the fulfillment of economic tasks ahead of time." He fired Minister of Trade Boris Taskov for "failure to believe." As if this were not enough for one season, he rammed through a Soviet-style reform of the State administrative system (parcelling the country into 30 "administrative-economic units" and abolishing seven ministries), overhauled the collective farms (amalgamating them into larger ones, abolishing the machine tractor stations, ending compulsory deliveries), promised higher wages and a shorter workweek to the proletariat, and published a scheme for relieving women from the drudgery of housework so they could join their men in the factories and fields.

As the first year of the "big leap" came to an end, there was plenty of evidence to bear out those who had doubted the feasibility of Zhivkov's program. The gulf between promise and fulfillment was large enough to have ended the career of a Gomulka or a Kadar. The 1959 targets had called for an increase in agricultural production of 73.9 percent (scaled down from Zhivkov's original 100 percent) and an increase in total industrial production of 27.8 percent. The statisticians were able to claim that industrial production was not far short of its target (without being very precise), although it was generally admitted that the quality of the goods produced was very low.

But in the agricultural sector, where fantastic accomplishments had been expected, the results could not be presented in a framework of rational discourse. Addressing the National Assembly on December 25, Zhivkov claimed that agricultural production had risen "in terms of current prices, by about 26 percent"—without explaining whether "current prices" applied to all of the items in the equation

Bulgarian Goods in Moscow

A BULGARIAN NEWSPAPER correspondent in Moscow recently cabled his paper that Bulgarian goods were notorious in Moscow for their poor quality. Last October, he reported, shoe depots in four Russian cities had sent back ten thousand pairs of Bulgarian-made shoes as not fit for sale. "Until recently, the Soviet trade centers were very agreeable and did not refuse to accept Bulgarian shoes; they used to keep them so as not to load us with heavy transportation costs. They would accept the defective goods and try to sell them outside Moscow. But not only have Bulgarian shoes not improved—they have even grown worse; for this reason the trade organizations of Azerbaïdzhan, Moldavia, Georgia and the Baltic republics have refused to purchase Bulgarian shoes in the coming year.

Plenty of Shoes

"And there is nothing strange in this. The Soviet Union has long since overcome the post-war lack of various goods, including that of shoes. Today the Soviet market is saturated with good quality shoes of many types. . . . It is clear that our country has very little prospect of doing business with shoes such as those produced by the Peter Chengelov factory in Plovdiv, despite the fact that our goods have sold very profitably in the past."

There were other complaints. The correspondent reported the pathetic story of national artist Mikhail Zharov, who had bought what he thought was a can of Bulgarian strawberries. "When he got home he opened his can of strawberries and found, instead, tomatoes! The next day he went to the shop and told the manager, jokingly: 'Following conscientiously the government's appeal to eat more sweet than bitter things, I bought a can of Bulgarian strawberries to eat with my

children. But in this can, labelled strawberries, our Bulgarian brethren offered me tomatoes. So instead of eating the fruit with my children, I had to buy vodka and eat tomatoes with some friends.'"

The Good Ones on Top

Fresh fruit and vegetables were also in poor repute if they came from Bulgaria. "This year, for the first time, fresh Bulgarian plums were sold on the Soviet market. In many of the shipments . . . as much as 15 percent of the plums were rotten and wormy. The employees of the Soviet trade organizations, charged with handling the shipments, said: 'The fruit is rotten because it was gathered in damp weather, and it is wormy because those who packed the plums did not remove the bad ones.' This is a failure of the producers—the collective farms—and the district trade organizations that did the packing. Many of the carloads had to be sold in Moldavia, so as to save the good fruit from spoiling during the long journey to Moscow. But the Moldavian market did not need plums, since Moldavia itself is the largest supplier of plums for Moscow and other urban areas. This time the Moldavian trade organizations were responding in brotherly spirit to our Bulgarian requests for help in saving our organizations from losses.

"The quality of apples imported from Bulgaria has declined in the last two years. In the crates there are often many apples not meeting the required standard. Whom do our producers—the collective farms—think they are cheating when they add to their export shipments small, poor quality apples which they hide under a 'cover' of nice apples?"

Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), December 28, 1959

or to only some of them. The final report of the Central Statistical Board gave no percentage for the increase in total agricultural production, leaving the reader to suppose that the true figure must have been less than 26 percent. The statisticians even found that in one respect the "big leap" had gone backward: the number of cattle, instead of increasing, had declined by five percent. Bulgaria now has fewer cattle and sheep than it had 25 years ago (see *Current Developments*).

A Freedom to Maneuver

The Party leadership was obviously prepared for these disillusioning results. Reports throughout the year had shown that agriculture was not making a "leap forward." Food shortages in the cities, a drought in late summer, chaos in the management of collective farms—these were not the materials of success. Early in December the Central Committee met and announced, nevertheless, that "great successes" had been achieved. In mid-December the CC issued a proclamation asserting that "the correct, wise and mature policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party" had been vindicated in practice:

"When the Party Central Committee advanced the slogan for an accelerated economic development, some [foreign] bourgeois papers and radio stations hurried to qualify this task as utopian, a fantasy, and Communist propaganda. Unaware of the possibilities of the Socialist regime and its hidden reserves, they hastened to make gloomy forecasts about the future of our country and people, prophesying the failure of Socialism in Bulgaria."

But these lusty back-pats in Sofia were only a cover for a tactical retreat. The successes Zhivkov claimed were quite different from those envisaged in his original prospectus for the "big leap forward," and the phrase itself had quietly been abandoned. On December 25 he addressed the National Assembly and argued that "we have moved our economy considerably forward. We have attained new and higher rates in its development; therefore our pattern and our policy for accelerated economic development is correct." (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 26). The text of his speech made no reference to the targets that had been laid down a year earlier; instead, he compared the results of 1959 with the progress of earlier years, and with the original targets of the Third Five Year Plan.

"How does the matter stand in regard to the average annual rate of growth of public output in our country? During the Second Five Year Plan this growth averaged about nine percent. The directives of the Third Five Year Plan called for an average annual growth in gross national product of about 8.4 percent. The expected result for 1959 is 16.7 percent. A growth of about 19 percent is envisaged in the plan for next year. Thus . . . it can be seen that the rate of growth in gross national product has more than doubled in comparison with the rate set forth in the Third Five Year Plan. . . .

"During the period of the Second Five Year Plan our national income grew at an average annual rate of eight per cent. The Third Five Year Plan envisaged a growth of 8.5 percent. The expected fulfillment for this year is 17.3

percent. According to the 1960 draft plan, 21.5 percent is envisaged. Therefore . . . it can be seen that the rate of growth of national income has increased to about 2.5 times that envisaged in the directives [of the Third Five Year Plan]. . . .

"What does all this mean? This means that we will realize in 1959—and we expect also in 1960—more than a doubling of the rates of growth of national product, national income, capital investment and the income of the population in comparison with what was envisaged in the directives for the Third Five Year Plan."

Thus Zhivkov had shifted his frame of reference from a doubling of production to a doubling of the rate of growth of production, and while the latter is not a small aim, it is only a fraction of the former. The new formula has the advantage of being vaguer and more flexible than the old one, making future retreats all the easier. The plan for 1960 (see *Current Developments*) is modest in comparison with last year's, although its percentage increases seem wildly ambitious when compared with the plans of other countries in the Soviet bloc:

	1959 Plan	1959 Actual	1960 Plan
Industrial production	27.8	24.9	15.2
Agricultural production	73.9	...	32.0
National income	34.0	17.3	21.5
Gross national product	31.8	16.7	19.0

Meanwhile, before 1959 had ended, Party organizers were at work spurring the people on toward the goals of 1960. The proclamation of mid-December asked for renewed effort, reminding the people that "we are still at the beginning of the struggle for the acceleration of our economic development." But the efficacy of such appeals declines the more often they are used, and in January the press was full of editorials scolding the peasantry for not turning out in force. On January 5, according to one account, only 85,000 people were at work on irrigation and other reclamation activity as compared with several times that number a year before.

"This slackening in work is not accidental. The mass explanatory work among collective farm members was much better and more efficient last year. Now this work is at a much lower level. The organizational activity of the [local] people's councils and collective farm managers is much weaker now. They are all aware that only an insignificant number of able-bodied people are at work, but they fail to take the necessary measures. . . ." (*Zemelsko Zname* [Sofia], January 12.)

Whatever the outcome of this year's campaign—and Zhivkov has already remarked that the targets are "not easy"—the Bulgarian leader seems to be in firm control of his Party and his country. In addition, he seems to have won the freedom to maneuver without regard to "plans" and "directives"; to mobilize thousands of people for special projects whenever the need arises; to build factories or not to build them; and, above all, to follow the wind of opportunity without being hobbled by mere planners and bureaucrats.

Current Developments

INTERNATIONAL

Warsaw Pact members issue a foreign policy declaration in Moscow stressing peaceful coexistence but threatening a separate treaty with East Germany, on February 4 (p. 36).

Party and government leaders of the Soviet bloc hold a meeting in Moscow devoted to agricultural policies, February 2-3 (p. 36).

A Balkan and Adriatic Youth Congress meets in Bucharest, January 30-February 4 (p. 46).

POLITICAL

Czechoslovak Party Central Committee announces a decision to reorganize the country's territorial administration, January 14 (p. 41).

Bulgarian Party chief Zhivkov calls for closer contact with the masses, January 12 (p. 47).

ECONOMIC

Hungarian Party Central Committee announces the successful completion of this winter's collectivization drive in agriculture, February 15 (p. 42).

Polish Party Central Committee holds an open forum on technical problems in industry, January 20-23 (p. 40).

AREAWIDE

Moscow Conference

Party and government leaders of the Soviet bloc nations gathered in Moscow for a two-day conference on agriculture, February 2-3, followed by a one-day conference of the political-consultative committee of the Warsaw Pact powers. The agriculture meeting ended with a short communique hailing the achievements of "Socialist agriculture," more noteworthy for what it did not say than for its actual contents. Production achievements—present and future—were stressed, whereas the touchy question of collectivization was glossed over:

"The conference noted unanimously that the working people of the Socialist countries of Europe, led by the Communist and Workers' Parties, have carried out large-scale work for the Socialist reorganization of the countryside, the development of agricultural production, and have achieved considerable success in raising . . . the output of livestock products. As a result of the advancement of Socialist agriculture, the supply of the population with food and of industry with raw materials is improving constantly in these countries. The working peasantry is coming increasingly to realize from experience all the advantages of the collective form of agriculture."

The conference participants also stressed their "growing

cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance" for "peaceful economic competition with capitalism." The prime aim of the Communist nations is to provide the working people "in the shortest possible time" with the "highest living standards in the world." Political decisions made by the Parties will be implemented in future formal conferences of Comecon (Soviet bloc economic organization). (Radio Moscow, February 3.)


Warsaw Pact Statement

The familiar tenets of Khrushchev's foreign policy emerged in the Warsaw Pact Declaration. The West was warned once again that if the "summit conference" this spring does not resolve the Berlin question to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union (and its East European satellites), the Warsaw Pact powers will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany which would undoubtedly give Communist Germany complete control over the air and land routes now used by the Western "Big Three" to supply their garrisons in West Berlin.

Although some brick-bats were hurled at NATO, much of the declaration expressed reserved praise for the West's efforts to dissipate tension. West Germany alone was condemned in the strongest terms for its "revanchist" and "militarist" tendencies. Nevertheless, a new era was envisaged in the struggle between the East and the West:

"For the first time in the many years of the 'cold war,' normal peacetime relations are beginning to be established

Current Developments — Areawide



Empty shops. Left, a Hungarian cartoon: The signs in the shop say, "We always have fresh bread" and "Excellent bakers' products." But the shopkeeper's reply to the unhappy customer is: "Man does not live by bread alone." Right, a Romanian cartoon. The customer asks for some frankfurters and is told, "We have only these you see on display." When the customer replies, "I'll take them," the butcher says: "All right, come back in ten days when we change the display."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), January 14, 1960, and *Urzica* (Bucharest), January 15, 1960

between the States belonging to the antagonistic alignments, tension has been markedly reduced, and prospects are opening up for a strengthening of mutual confidence. The world has now entered into a period of negotiations concerning a settlement of the principal international disputed issues with the object of establishing a lasting peace, and 'cold war' supporters are sustaining a defeat. . . . The opinion is increasingly sinking roots in the minds of the peoples, in the minds of many political leaders and statesmen, including those in the West that . . . the only feasible way to build relations between States is on the basis of peaceful coexistence. . . .

"The historic visit to the United States by [Soviet leader] Nikita Khrushchev . . . and his talks with [President Eisenhower] have played an outstanding role in this respect. As a result of this visit the 'cold war' ice was broken in relations between the mightiest powers in the world—the USA and the USSR—and a new stage was opened in the development of international relations as a whole."

The Soviet solution to the "world's greatest problem" was also reiterated: "The interests of mankind require that rocket-nuclear weapons, with their tremendous destructive potential, should never be allowed to be used. And the surest way to achieve this is the destruction of all types of arms, of all weapons of war, i.e., the total and universal disarmament of all States."

The declaration concluded with a Soviet analysis of why West Germany "resists so stubbornly the signing of a peace treaty." In brief, Bonn's reluctance stems from a desire "to alter the frontiers established in Europe as a result of the rout of Nazi Germany." From this assumption the Soviet bloc proceeded to castigate the present West German regime as one close to "the regime which plunged the world into a murderous war and led the German people to an unparalleled national outrage." The result of such intransigence will be the signing of a separate peace treaty by the Warsaw Pact nations and East Germany." (Radio Mos-

cow, February 5.) (See Texts and Documents for the full Declaration.)

Communist Chinese Reaction

Also present at the Moscow meeting were observers from Communist China, and it was the reaction of the Chinese representative which produced the real news of the meeting. Addressing the conference, Kang Sheng, an alternate member of the Chinese Party Politburo, spared no words in deprecating the chances for a successful Soviet-US detente at the forthcoming summit meeting:

"The unswerving struggle carried out by the powerful world forces of peace has made the US imperialist policies of position-of-strength and brink-of-war suffer repeated setbacks. The United States is not only increasingly isolated day by day politically and militarily, and its forces are widely dispersed and new weapons are lagging behind, but also economically it is in an ever more difficult situation. Under these circumstances . . . the US ruling circles had to make some peace gestures. Of course it is better to talk about peace than to talk about war. Nevertheless, the US ruling circles did not try to hide the fact that their change in the way of doing things was aimed at numbing the fighting spirit of the people of the world by means of the 'strategy of winning victory by peace,' wrecking the unity of the peace forces of the world, dismembering the Socialist camp—and they are even dreaming of a 'peaceful evolution' in the Socialist countries. . . .

"The actions of the United States clearly prove that its imperialist nature cannot be changed. American imperialism is still the enemy of world peace. All those in the world sincerely working for peace must maintain vigilance against US double-dealing."

Referring to the question of disarmament the Chinese Communist declared that American "imperialism" does not dare oppose disarmament "verbally," but it has in fact "always undermined general disarmament." For these reasons,

"the struggle for general disarmament is a long-term and complicated struggle between us and imperialism."

Kang Sheng also took the opportunity to vilify "the Yugoslav revisionists," although relations between Belgrade and the rest of the Soviet bloc have grown noticeably warmer of late. Communist China, he said, has always considered the "modern revisionists of Yugoslavia" as the "renegades of the Communist movement," and that "revisionism is the main danger to the present Communist movement, and that it is necessary to wage a resolute struggle against revisionism." (Radio Peiping, February 5.) This speech was suppressed in the USSR and in Satellite countries. (For full text, see Texts and Documents.)

Yugoslavs React

Yugoslavia seized on the Chinese Communist's words as a contradiction of the Soviet declaration of "peaceful coexistence," particularly when "Yugoslavia has contributed most in affirming the policy of coexistence." The Yugoslav Communist radio also underlined the divergence between the Communist Chinese and the Soviet points of view and the "expression of distrust" evinced by the Chinese representative vis-a-vis Soviet diplomatic activity. (Radio Zagreb, February 5.) (For other Yugoslav-Soviet bloc developments, see below.)

Yugoslav Coexistence

The new *modus vivendi* between Belgrade and the East European bloc grows more firm. The basis of this compromise parallels the Soviet attitude towards the West: peaceful coexistence — yes; "ideological coexistence" — no. In a broadcast in Bulgarian, Radio Belgrade, January 17, was all sweetness and light when discussing relations with the former bitter enemy Bulgaria:

"Dear listeners. . . . Relations between our two countries have evidently been improving, and we, the Yugoslavs, welcome this improvement with satisfaction and hope that this cooperation will grow. . . . This year's plan provides much greater cooperation than before. There will be exchanges of delegations from cultural and scientific institutions. . . . This year our trade union organization will be hosts to Bulgarian workers who will spend their vacation at our seaside resorts. In the meantime, Yugoslav workers will have their annual leave on the Black Sea resorts. . . . This year's commodity exchange is to be 20 percent higher than last year's. . . . Finally, we want to remind everyone that the border populations have once again had their traditional and friendly meetings."

Further indications that relations with the Soviet bloc can improve without ideological concession occurred during the visit of Yugoslav trade union boss, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, who spent 20 days in Moscow in January. He was quoted by Radio Moscow, January 26, as saying: "I was magnificently received in the Soviet Union. . . . The Soviet people received me with cordiality, and they were sincere in explaining their achievements and future plans. I gained the conviction from my talks with the Soviet people and especially with Comrade Khrushchev

A Sea of Troubles

A NEW FEATURE in which readers are invited to tell what irritates them most in daily living has been started by the Warsaw daily *Zycie Warszawy*. In the January 21 issue a woman wrote that she is most irritated by: "holes in constantly re-patched shoes, standing in line for the simplest and most necessary products, inadequate store supplies of fish, apple juice, etc., ill-mannered men on trolleys, frequent traffic accidents, administrative red tape, etc., etc."

In the January 22 issue a male reader writes: "I consider the following as most irritating: administrative and official indifference to the complaints of tenants, disrespectful and interminable bureaucratic procedures: people wait for hours before they can have anything taken care of." He is also irritated by such names as "TV Emergency Service," which makes an appearance 7 days after it has been called. Other *Zycie* readers are irritated by such things as wide-spread and noticeable vulgarity and the decline of the Polish cuisine.

that there exist conditions for further improvement of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia."

Satellite Agriculture Criticized

Ideologically, the Belgrade Communists continued to defend their own program of agricultural non-collectivization by vaunting the superiority of their production. Comparing the wheat yields of Yugoslavia with those of Hungary and Romania for 1957 and 1959, the official Party review *Kommunist* came up with the following set of figures. In 1957, Hungary harvested 196,000 and in 1959, 190,000 carloads of wheat, Romania in both years 410,000 carloads. For Yugoslavia, the respective numbers were 310,000 and 403,000 carloads, i.e., in 1959 nearly one-third more, thanks to "different measures and the general progress of agriculture in Yugoslavia."

Albania Still Hostile

Albanian sniping continued during January, though on an extremely low pitch. The most violent outburst concerned Belgrade's alleged violation of the water resources agreement between the two countries. (Radio Tirana, January 31.) There were also sporadic references to "Yugoslav revisionism" in speeches by Albanian leaders. Compared to the usual Albanian virulence, however, their words seemed almost in good taste. An agreement was also signed between Belgrade and Tirana, providing for mutual cooperation in fighting contagious diseases in the border areas. (Radio Tirana, January 21.)

Other Accords

A protocol on trade between Yugoslavia and Romania in 1960 was signed in Belgrade, January 28. It envisaged 12 million dollars worth of trade in both directions, about a

Current Developments — Areawide, Poland

20 percent increase over last year's. (Radio Belgrade, January 28.) A cultural accord was signed the day before, according to Radio Bucharest. An agreement for scientific and technical cooperation was concluded between Poland and Yugoslavia, January 30, according to Radio Belgrade of the same day. (For Yugoslav reaction to the Moscow Conference, see above.)

Bloc Radio-TV Directors Meet

The board of directors of OIRT, a Communist-bloc organization of radio and television networks, met in Budapest, January 28. At this session, an international television network was set up under the name of "Intervizio," which appears to be an East European counterpart of Western Europe's Eurovision. Under present conditions, the television networks of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and East Germany can be directly linked. Soon, TV centers of the USSR, Bulgaria and Romania will join the organization, and later, networks outside the European zone of OIRT will be included.

POLAND

Anniversary of Polish Liberation

On the 15th anniversary of the liberation of Poland from Nazi oppression, the Bonn government was attacked vehemently by Party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka and Premier Josef Cyrankiewicz. On January 19, speaking at Lodz, Gomulka opposed present unification of Germany while urging a settlement of the Berlin problem: "Under the present circumstances . . . as long as forces hostile to peace continue to exist in West Germany, the unification of Germany is impossible. On the other hand, a peace treaty with Germany and the solution to the Berlin problem are urgently needed to help relax international tension."

The Polish leader praised the Soviet Union and Red Army, "more than half a million of whom sacrificed their lives for the liberation of Poland." Poland owed its liberation and independence to the Soviet Union, he said, "because the Red Army, motivated by the honorable goal—'for your freedom and ours'—saved the Polish people from annihilation and servitude." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], January 20.)

Oswiecim Commemorated

A huge anti-Nazi manifestation was organized in Oswiecim, former Nazi death camp of Auschwitz, on January 24, the 15th anniversary of the inmates' liberation by the Red Army. Approximately 25,000 persons attended, including delegations from 14 European countries. The main speaker was a former camp prisoner, Premier Josef Cyrankiewicz. He strongly attacked West German Chancellor Adenauer for his alleged statement to the Pope: "God has entrusted the German nation with the special mission of guarding the West against the powerful influence of the East." A resolution ratified at the meeting condemned the "reawakening of fascism and militarism in West Germany, the rearming of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, the Bonn regime's attempt to sabotage efforts which might reduce world tensions." (*Trybuna Ludu*, January 25.)



A prize-winning photo from the International Photographic Exhibition in Bucharest.

Orszag Vilag (Budapest), January 6, 1960

Similar meetings were organized throughout the country under the slogan—"Oswiecim, Never Again." The executive committee of the International Oswiecim Committee, meeting in Cracow at the end of January, addressed a letter to "world opinion" which concluded with the following warning:

"The history of mankind has never known atrocities equal to those which have been committed under the sign of the swastika. Oswiecim has become their horrible symbol. This cannot happen again. The profound warning of Oswiecim, directed against inhumanity and appealing for humanism, attaches a posthumous significance to the death of millions in gas chambers." (*Trybuna Ludu*, January 27.)

Stalinists In, Liberals Out

More "liberal Communists" have been purged from the staff of the country's leading literary weekly *Nowa Kultura*. Andrzej Braun, A. Miedzyrzecki, K. Pomian, Jan Strzelecki and K. T. Toplitz were dismissed as editors. At the same time, Kazimierz Brandys, one of Poland's most gifted writers and the author of several anti-Stalinist works, resigned. Communists who reputedly support a "hard line" on cultural policy joined the staff: D. Horodyski, Z. Kaluzynski, L. Kruczkowski, A. Lisiecka, J. Putrament and S. Wygodzki.

Certain changes have also occurred in the editorial of-

Look to Your Geese

ANONYMOUS QUESTION: "Just before the holidays we sent a member of our large family to a distant town to purchase geese . . . from the peasants in order to get them more cheaply. Was it lawful for the militia to confiscate the goods and to write it down in their notebooks? For all we know, we may be dragged into court."

Editors' reply: "There is no detailed regulation as to how many geese one can buy without being accused of illegal trading. Such trading is well known, and the militia is instructed to apprehend people who not only compete with the proper [State] institutions but also run up prices. However, if in the case described by you there was no question of black marketeering, you can approach the district attorney's office about rescinding the action. This office will take care of it or else, if it has not received the files from the militia, it will contact the appropriate branch of the militia."

Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), January 7, 1960

ofices of the cultural weekly *Przegląd Kulturalny*. A new "editorial committee" has been added to the staff, including two regime stalwarts, Putrament and Adam Schaff. Other members: Cz. Bobrowski, H. Jablonski, E. Osmanczyk and W. Sokorski. (*Słowo Powszechne* [Warsaw], February 3.)

Western News Again Available

Western newspapers (with the exception of *The New York Times*) are again on sale in Poland after a three-week interval, according to Western correspondents. (See *East Europe*, February, p. 49.)

Party Membership Declines

During last year, 86,377 persons became candidate-members of the Party. The class origin of the new recruits: 50 percent—workers; 14 percent—peasants; 34 percent—white-collar workers. During the same period of time, the party lost about 90,000 full-fledged members. As of December 31, 1959, the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party totalled 1,018,409 members. (Radio Warsaw, January 26.)

Fourth Plenum Discusses Technology

A three-day plenary session of the Party Central Committee, January 20-23, discussed technical shortcomings in the Polish economy. The session was unusual in that the views of a group of "outside" scientists and technical experts were solicited.

State planning chief Jedrychowski told the Plenum that the country's productivity and industrial growth were lagging behind those of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and that growth was uneven in the various sectors of industry. Agriculture, he said, was the most critical sector: output had dropped 1.2 percent during 1959. The speakers cited numerous examples of technological lag. Deputy

Premier Julian Tokarski said that the Zeran automobile factory used 270 man-hours for the production of each car while only 60 man-hours were required by the Renault firm in France. He also noted that the construction of a chemical plant in Poland took from three to six years as against a maximum of two years in the West. The causes given by the speakers for low productivity ranged from antiquated machinery, ill-trained technicians and managers, and faulty distribution, to excessive bureaucracy and inadequate production norms.

Among the prominent non-Party speakers was Dr. Wojciech Swietoslowski, Minister of Education in pre-war Poland, who concentrated on the training of technicians. According to a *New York Times* report on January 22, the Professor said that Poland was in a particularly difficult situation because for the last 150 years the country had been deprived of its best people through deportation and mass emigration.

There was mild controversy on the question of whether the moving force behind technical progress is material or moral. The opening report presented to the Plenum by Jedrychowski stressed monetary incentives. But, adding a moral note, it said: "Technological progress must be one of the fundamental elements of professional ethics." Party boss Gomulka argued against the views of those who urged a greater use of monetary incentives. "Technological progress," he said, "cannot be bought with money. . . . The decisive factor is to be found in Socialism." Drawing his proof from the Soviet experience, Gomulka spoke of devo-



"Be prepared."

Polityka (Warsaw), January 9, 1960

The Heroic Life

Some of the hazards besetting Czechoslovak frontier guardsmen were described in the following passage from a Slovak youth newspaper.

THE BAVARIAN BROOK is a meeting place of [West German] girls. Pretty girls. They remove their light clothing piece by piece, slowly uncovering their bodies until they are in nothing but their swim suits. But they do not go right into the water. No. They walk toward the barbed wire where the guardsmen in uniform are at their posts. They walk in such a way as to show off their half-naked breasts. While they know only a few words of our language, they manage to say the rest with their bodies. They are paid for this sort of conversation. The most persistent of them all was a girl by the name of Andula, who tempted the men for years with her body. This year she has not appeared. She lost her patience.

"Lieutenant Kopal of Trnava spoke for all of his men when he said, 'This doesn't bother us one bit'."

Smena (Bratislava), January 1, 1960

tion to the concept of "Socialism" as the means of arousing the nation to self-sacrificing efforts in the economic sphere.

Time was needed, said Gomulka, for study of the contributions of the various speakers, but he assured them that their recommendations would be given detailed consideration. Consequently, the resolutions adopted by the Plenum were of a general character dealing with closer coordination between science and industry and the need to revise wage and production norms.

Morawski Resignation Confirmed

The Fourth Plenum accepted the resignation of Jerzy Morawski, "moderate" lieutenant of Gomulka, from the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat, according to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), January 23. It was not stated whether Morawski, whose resignation was reportedly made in protest to the proceedings of the Third Plenum last fall (see *East Europe*, December, 1959, p. 43), would remain a member of the Central Committee.

The Plenum also elected officially two new members of the Secretariat: Edward Ochab, former Minister of Agriculture; and Ryszard Strzelecki, present Minister of Transportation. Mieczyslaw Marzec was moved up from deputy to full member of the Central Committee.

Films Banned

Three Polish films have been banned within the country: "Canal," a realistic story about the activities of the Polish Underground during the Warsaw Uprising; "Ashes and Diamonds," based on Jerzy Andrzejewski's novel of the same name published in 1956; and "Cock-eyed Luck," a film whose hero is always too late in professing his loyalties to the different regimes in Poland. (*France-Soir* [Paris], January 29.)

Slow Progress in the Agricultural Circles

The pace in the development of agricultural circles, the rural organizations through which the regime hopes to "guide" the countryside into Socialism, has slowed down considerably. Since mid-1959, when the Party endorsed what had previously been a spontaneous cooperative movement among the peasantry, the circles seem to have lost their attraction. Radio Warsaw (January 22) reported that 5,000 circles encompassing 110,000 members were formed during 1959, but that only 2,100 were created in the second half of the year. (There are now over 21,000 such circles with 560,000 members.) The average membership of each circle, moreover, has declined in those circles formed after the Party pushed off its campaign. At the end of 1959 the circles existed in 52 percent of the villages, but included only 17 percent of the peasant farmers, the report said.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Territorial Reform Finally Announced

The exact nature of the much-discussed reorganization was made public after a meeting of the Party Central Committee, January 13-14. The existing 19 regions (*kraj*) will be reduced to 10; approximately 200 districts (*okres*) will be reduced to 108. This will necessitate a corresponding reshuffling and reduction of regime officials administering them. (See *East Europe*, January, p. 4; February, pp. 50-51.) By this decision the lower Party organizations were confronted with a *fait accompli*. District and regional conferences are to be held March 19-20, 26-27, at which time new district and regional Party committees will be elected. The impending reorganization should not be interpreted as primarily a purge of Party officials, although many functionaries will be transferred and those with poor Party records will lose their political and administrative posts.

The Central Committee also decided that a National Conference of the Czechoslovak Party would be called for July 5. Approval of the Third Five Year plan and the new "Socialist Constitution of the Republic" will be on the agenda. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], January 16.)

Collectivization Gains

Less than 16 percent of the total agricultural land in Czechoslovakia remains in private hands. Last year the "Socialist sector" in agriculture grew another 7.4 percent, bringing its holdings to 84.4 percent of the total agricultural area. (*Lidova Demokracie* [Prague], January 22.) Although the pace during 1959 was somewhat slower than in the three previous years, 420 new collectives were created. At the year's end, 64.8 percent of the country's 7,389,000 hectares of agricultural land belonged to collective farms as compared with 58 percent at the end of 1958. The remaining land in the "Socialist sector" belongs to the government. *Rude Pravo* (Prague), January 22, claimed that collective farms now exist in 83.3 percent of the communities.

Current Developments — Czechoslovakia, Hungary

The drive for "Socialization" of agriculture, which has cut private holdings in half since 1956, is to continue. According to an article in the January issue of *Nova Mysl*, theoretical organ of the Party, the major efforts are aimed at the small and medium peasants whose land forms the main body still outside the "Socialist sector." One of the announced objectives in "winning over" these owners of from 2 to 15 hectares (one hectare equals 2.47 acres) is to free manpower for the rapidly expanding industrial sector; the article added that the average land area tilled by a collective farm member is 5.29 hectares as compared with 2.73 for the private peasant. Attention is also to be given to the smallest private owners (under 2 hectares) for whom "agricultural production is only a sideline." Despite the emphasis placed on releasing labor from agriculture, the *Nova Mysl* article insisted that land within the collectives must be used more intensively.

Output Drops

The successful collectivization of the countryside during 1959 was not matched by increases in production. Instead, production fell 1.4 percent below the 1958 level. Although in mid-1959 the Party slashed the targets for agriculture during the Second Five Year Plan (1956-1960) from a 30 percent increase in production to a 16.5 percent increase, the record at the end of 1959 showed a growth of only about 6 percent during the last four years. This leaves a considerable task for the current year if even the revised goal is to be achieved.

Culture Committee

Old Stalinists Jiri Hendrych and Ladislav Stoll—Party Central Committee members—were chosen to hold the cultural line against any encroachments on "Socialist realism." Their latest move in this direction was to form a "Socialist Culture Committee." Party ideologist Hendrych in outlining the goals of the committee heralded "peaceful coexistence" as a new opportunity for the Czechoslovaks to demonstrate to the West "the advantages of the Socialist system." He also stated that the tax now levied on artistic performances will be annulled, and that cultural activities will be greatly expanded in the near future. Chairman of the new committee: cultural commissar and head of the Social Sciences' Institute Stoll.

HUNGARY

Into the Collectives

This winter's collectivization drive was called to a halt at a Party Central Committee meeting in Budapest, February 12. All efforts will now be turned to "consolidation" and an increase in "agricultural productivity." Ending about a month before last winter's drive, this year's action has increased the "Socialist sector" from approximately 50 percent to 70 percent of all arable land (5,200,000 holds), encompassing a total of 879,000 peasants (an increase of about 380,000), six "fully collectivized" counties, 76 cooperative districts and more than 2,300 cooperative vil-

lages. (Radio Budapest, February 14.) Judging by these figures, the pace of the campaign has outrun regime expectations.

One reason why Kadar is succeeding where Rakosi failed is to be found in the subtle forms of brutality employed to bring the peasants around. Supposedly, the peasants join "voluntarily"—but only after a grueling round of "persuasion" which resembles the methods used by Stalin's old NKVD to extort confessions from political prisoners. "If only they had not invented voluntariness!" lamented one peasant. "Why don't they simply decree that one must join and that's that? But instead they make us join by ourselves—voluntarily!" (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], December 23.) The village-by-village campaign is carefully plotted. All the local Party, trade union and municipal functionaries are mobilized, together with officials of county enterprises and the directors of neighboring collective farms. A three- or four-member propaganda brigade is assigned to each house. Loudspeakers are set up in the village square to broadcast the names of those who have already joined. When the number reaches 50 percent of the village farmsteads, a sign is set up announcing that the place has become a Cooperative Village. Thenceforth the land of recalcitrant peasants can be taken away for the purpose of consolidating the area of the collective, giving the holdouts other land in exchange—usually less desirable. If a family has a relative working in a factory or an office, he will be threatened with the loss of his job unless he prevails upon the folks at home to join the collective farm. For debt-ridden peasants there is an even more direct inducement: join up and your debts will be cancelled. Peasants who cannot be convinced by these methods are summoned to the local council house and given another round of "persuasion" in the presence of the police and investigators from the AVH.

"A Time of Trial"

The apprehension of the peasants in the face of this invasion of their villages can be found even in the cheerful glosses of the Communist press. In a January 19 report on the progress of the collectivization campaign, *Nepszabadsag* published the following description:

"In the farmyard, three dogs greet us with ferocious barking. Hearing it, the farmer himself comes out of the kitchen. He is wearing a brown corduroy suit; his general appearance is shabby. He motions us inside. As yet he hasn't joined the collective, and doesn't know what to do. Now his wife starts talking. She wishes they would leave her husband alone.

"Her bitterness visibly affects the farmer, and he explodes: 'That's right. All my work up to now was in vain. I've lost my beautiful, independent life'."

The squads of official recruiters are swollen by the peasants themselves: those who have joined the new collective often go and tell their neighbors to join too, on the principle that in numbers there is strength. The provincial newspaper *Hevesi Nepujsag*, December 4, gave this account of what happened in the village of Bukkszek:

"People still come to the council hall, following upon each other's heels. The majority of the villagers have



A collector of Chinese curios in one of Warsaw's antique shops. Private buyers, with their meager funds, are only one type of customer. Sometimes State enterprises buy antiques in order to use up their budget appropriations. "That is why," says the accompanying article, "we have in Poland so many beautifully furnished directors' offices and sumptuous conference halls."

Swiat (Warsaw), February 7, 1960

signed the entrance form; others are still arriving. They have changed their minds. Everything happened within a week. . . . Communists were among the first to sign, followed by the Council members. . . . Other inhabitants followed them. . . . In recent days, not only the agitators but the inhabitants of the village and even the new collective farmers themselves took steps to accelerate the process. . . . Some peasants, after signing the entrance form, visited one house after another."

A Yugoslav correspondent in Hungary sent the following description back to his newspaper:

"When members of the persuasion committee called on a Vas County peasant family, the head of the family wavered. After a short conversation, however, he signed the entrance form. He hesitated after he got the pencil in his hand and even asked for a glass of wine, which he drank. Then he signed his family name. He stopped, smoked a cigarette, and finally wrote down his Christian name." (*Magyar Szó* [Novi-Sad, Yugoslavia], December 24.)

And a letter from Hungary, passing through the censorship, added this note of tragedy:

"God has sent a time of trial upon us. The pleasant, smiling village is dead. There are weeping old people, clenched fists, young people staring desperately into the future. The siege lasted two weeks, and it was hard. Four or five agitators, sometimes more, came to each house every night. It has been going on for two months in other villages around us, but our stubborn village held out to the last. In vain. Now there is nothing left anymore. However tired we are, life goes on."

Executions Denied

Reports appearing in the British press that 150 young people and 50 adults were recently executed in Hungary for their role in the 1956 Revolt have been repudiated in the Hungarian National Assembly. Of special annoyance to the Communists were the further reports that the young people had been kept in prison until they attained the age of 18, at which time they could "legally" be executed. (*The Observer* [London], January 31.) The Budapest reaction came from Gyula Ortutay, a member of the Hungarian parliament, who declared: "No person under age is in prison in Hungary for political crimes, and in our country no one is engaged in executing young people." (Radio Budapest, January 30.)

"Socialist" Literature Threatened

"Bourgeois influences" still infiltrate the works of Communist writers. The reasons why were discussed with unaccustomed frankness by the famed populist writer Peter Veres, a member of the Presidium of the Hungarian Writers' Union. Writing in the Budapest literary periodical *Elet és Irodalom*, January 1, he declared:

"The Socialists' snobbery is even more illogical than that of the bourgeoisie [because] when the Socialists get into power their taste and intellectual interests change." This is not a revolutionary transformation, he said, but "a simple change in point of view." They do not have to be convinced "for they have triumphed and are not interested in what they already know, but in what they do not yet know."

He concluded by expressing belief in the necessity of

artistic freedom:

"The true writer speaks the truth regardless of his ideology. If his ideology becomes too apparent, as ours usually does, its effect on us is lessened. We may deny the truth of what he is saying; sometimes we wave our hand and say that it is utter nonsense. We might even throw his book away. But if a writer with a different ideology depicts reality—life and spiritual truths—then this is the power and glory of realism and poetry. If he discovers something so far unseen by us, or exposes something which we saw in a different light, then we fall under his influence. In this case, our newspapers and critics can say whatever they like. We read that book; perhaps we grow to like its author, and we will continue to look for his works in the bookshops and libraries."

Veres Criticized

Peter Veres' courage is particularly significant, since he came under fire in the Communist review *Valóság* (Budapest), December 1959, for his "deviations" from the Party line. He was castigated specifically for his incorrect interpretation of the events of 1956 and 1957, accused of believing that the 1956 uprising was caused "by the total failure of proletarian leadership and Marxism in our country."

Border Guards Increased

To augment the regular complement of border guards along Hungary's western frontier, "voluntary" border guards have been recruited. These will be empowered to check the identities of "suspicious persons" and to arrest them. The "voluntary" guards will perform their duties after working hours. (*Kisalföld* [Gyor], November 29.)

1959 Plan Fulfillment

The Hungarian economy has completed its most successful year since the 1956 Revolt, according to the 1959 plan fulfillment report of the Central Statistical Office. The major provisions of the Three Year Plan (1958-1960) had, it said, been fulfilled in only two years. (*Nepszabadság* [Budapest], January 17). This had been the announced objective of the Party's economic speed-up launched in early March of 1959.

The report stated that industrial production overshot its target of a 9 percent increase during 1959 by 2 percent. Heavy industry was in the lead with a 16 percent growth over the 1958 level, as compared with a 7 percent increase for light industry. Agricultural output, scheduled to increase by 5.2 percent (the target in the original plan), was also said to have overfulfilled the goal. The progress in agriculture was helped along not only by favorable weather conditions but also by heavy investment, including a 62 percent increase in the use of artificial fertilizer. Grain yields, the report said, were up significantly over 1958. Livestock, on the other hand, was below the slated increase; and the number of cattle actually declined from 2,005,000 to 2,002,000 head.

Despite these successes, a number of perennial difficulties persisted. First, the growth in industry resulted mainly from an increase in the labor force rather than from higher productivity. While productivity rose less than 5 percent

Problems of Newlyweds

"WALKING THROUGH the town together, we saw an exhibition of glass. 'Isn't this vase lovely,' she said. 'So modern. It would really brighten the apartment.'"

"'You shall have it,' I said sweetly. I really did want to buy it, for I know what is right and proper. But this was not to be. Official lips pronounced: 'That is only on exhibition at present.'"

"At another exhibition we saw some modern lighting fixtures and lamps. 'Oh,' she said, 'that one would be just right for the apartment.' It was not. It was only an exhibit."

"At another place we saw a clock that she liked. That was an exhibit too."

"I suggested we visit still another exhibition, this time of furniture. We went, and she liked one of the suites. A modern one. I spoke to the salesman about it, while Mary encouraged me with her eyes, and he accepted my order. She smiled happily. I gave him a deposit of 2,500 *koruny*. Now Mary caressed me with her eyes. He promised that the furniture would be delivered within two weeks. She kissed me. That was our last kiss for the time being, because then came a period of telephone calls and personal visits to see why they didn't deliver the furniture. No furniture came. Mary does not talk to me. Our home is very quiet."

"At last I managed to get her something. A picture. One of the modern kind, full of dots and blurs. It was the only one you could buy at the exhibition."

"To make Mary feel better I said: 'Know what? Tomorrow we'll go and see an exhibition of modern cookers. Perhaps. . . .'"

"And then she let me have it. Boy, all hell broke loose."

"Is it my fault that these things are not produced?"

Pruboj (Usti nad Labem, Czechoslovakia),
November 21, 1959

and production costs dropped by only 2 percent, the labor force increased about 7 percent, or by 67,400 workers as against the 23,000 planned. The foreign trade balance was strained by heavy imports of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and raw materials for industry. Imports jumped 23 percent above the 1958 level while exports increased only 12 percent. Moreover, the output of power and fuel—critical for the Hungarian economy—rose more slowly than the general level of industrial production. Only crude oil made a notable advance, and its production was still one-third less than in 1955.

Chemicals and building materials were the most dynamic industries in the economy, each of them rising 18-19 percent over 1958. The report gave specific figures for 1959 output as follows (percentage increases over 1958 in parentheses): coal, 25.3 million tons (5); electric power, 7.1 billion kwh (9); crude oil, 1,036,000 tons (25); bauxite,

Current Developments — Hungary

957,000 tons (minus 9); steel, 1,759,000 tons (8); rolled steel, 1,139,000 tons (6); aluminum, 45,700 tons (16); buses, 1,575 (11); trucks, 3,381 (minus 8); center lathes, 2,256 (21); motorbikes, 66,800 (20); refrigerators, 8,479 (1,000); television sets, 88,100 (138); sulfuric acid, 148,000 tons (13); nitrogenous fertilizer, 237,000 tons (55); bricks, 1,659 million (17); cement, 1,433,000 tons (10); bedroom furniture, 46,800 sets (25); combined wardrobes, 21,900 (41); cotton textile material, 227 million sq. meters (4); wool material, 24.5 million sq. meters (minus 3); knitwear, 6,918 tons (1); leather shoes, 17.7 million pairs (11); butter, 16,500 tons (minus 2); meat, 180,000 tons (13); beer, 3,319,000 hectoliters (8); cigarettes, 14.9 million (0).

No figure was given for the growth of national income, which was slated to increase 8.3 percent during 1959. Although average money income was said to have increased by 9 percent, there were no data on real incomes. Retail trade expanded by 11 percent. The report said that according to preliminary data 45,000 apartments had been built during 1959, or 7,000 more than planned.

1960 Economic Targets Raised

Encouraged by the results of 1959, the regime has raised its economic sights. Speeches before the National Assembly, which met January 28-30 to approve the new budget, reaffirmed earlier reports that targets had again been revised upwards. National income is slated to grow 9 percent over 1959 (12 percent above the original goal set for 1960), industrial production 8 percent and agricultural output 4.9 percent. Deputy Premier Antal Apro compared the goals of the original Three Year Plan with the new targets for 1960 as follows (1957 level equals 100):

	Original Targets	Revised Targets
National income	113	125
Industry	122	135
Agriculture	112	114
Internal trade turnover	114	123
Productivity in industry	115	119
Per-capita real earnings of wage and salary earners	106	110
Per-capita real income of wage and salary earners	108	115
State investment (three-year total in billion forint)		
At old prices	32	40.6
At new prices	57	75

Three basic objectives for the economy in 1960 were stressed in the speeches to the Assembly: increased productivity, a favorable balance of trade and a more rational allocation of investments. A balance between exports and imports was said to be of increasing importance in view of the large loan repayments which will begin to fall heavily on the economy in 1961. These loans—mainly from the USSR—refloated the economy after the 1956 Revolt. The balance of trade is to be achieved despite huge imports of farm machinery and fertilizers for use in the new collective farms. Investments—78 percent of which will go to the productive sectors—are to be con-

Any Other Questions?

THE HUNGARIAN MONTHLY *Valóság*, devoted to the social sciences, wrinkled its craggy brow in the January issue over a mistake of Professor Oveges. The good professor had droned through a Marxist lecture on productivity and leisure under Socialism without paying enough attention to Marxist logic. His mistake became evident when "one of the students asked: if the increase in productive forces, greater productivity, and a higher production standard are the equivalent of happiness, then there must be more happy people in America than in the Socialist countries, because at present the standard of productivity is higher there. Professor Oveges was caught unaware, and for a moment could not extract himself from this contradiction. How could he have created such confusion?"

The trouble was, said *Valóság*, that he had confused shorter working hours with happiness. He should have pointed out that "only work done for exploiters is a burden, creating suffering and unhappiness, while physical and mental work done to raise our living standard or that of our fellow creatures, our family, our fatherland and our community, is an indispensable source of real happiness. . . ."

centrated "totally" upon projects already in progress, the Assembly was told. Sztalinvaros, the large steel plant on the Danube which was started before the Revolt, and which Deputy Premier Apro ranked "among the awkward questions," is to be completed in 1960.

1960 Budget

The new Finance Minister, Rezso Nyers, presented the 1960 budget to the National Assembly on January 28. Although sparse in detail, the balance sheet plainly reflects the regime's ambitious sights for the new year. Revenues are to increase by 29.4 percent, while outgo will expand 27.9 percent over the planned level for 1959. Investment in the national economy—the true indicator of the economic speed-up—is to exceed last year's realized investment by 43.9 percent. The data given by the Finance Minister compare with last year's planned and realized figures as follows (in billion forint):

	1959 Planned	1959 Realized	1960 Planned
Revenue	52.9	56.5	67.7
National economy	36.0	39.6	54.8
Expenditure	52.1	—	67.4
National economy	28.9	—	39.3
Investment	14.7	14.3	20.5
Social and cultural	16.3	—	19.4
National defense	4.9	—	3.1
Administration	2.0	—	2.3
Surplus	0.8	—	0.3

An increased proportion of the revenue will be derived

Current Developments — Romania

from the economy, 80.9 percent in 1960 as against 70 percent last year. Taxes on the private peasantry, which were steeply increased in 1959, will yield about the same revenue as last year, Nyers said. In view of the large number of independent peasants absorbed into collectives during the winter this means an even greater tax burden on those remaining outside. Of the 20.5 billion *forint* to be expended for investment, 7 billion is slated for agriculture, or 27 percent more than in 1959 when outlay in this sector doubled.

ROMANIA

Youth Congress

Communist youth congresses tend to be drearily repetitious, and the Balkan and Adriatic Youth Congress, held in Bucharest, January 30-February 4, was no exception. Over 250 delegates from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Romania as well as observers from Cyprus attended. In the main address, Virgil Trofin, secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Working Youth Union, spoke of "the contribution of the youth and students in the Balkan and Adriatic region to the transformation of this region into a zone of peace, a denuclearized zone, and to the extension of cooperation and development of friendly relations among youth and students in this part of the world."

One novelty was the announcement that the delegates would participate in a "voluntary labor" project at one of the construction enterprises in the Romanian capital. (Radio Bucharest, January 28.)

A discordant note was sounded by the Yugoslavs, who claimed that the leaders of the youth organizations of Bulgaria, Albania and Romania unjustifiably attacked the Yugoslav delegates for pointing out the "lack of cooperation between the youth groups of neighboring Socialist countries and Yugoslavia." (Radio Belgrade, February 3.)

1959 Plan Fulfillment

The economy scored an over-all increase in industrial production of 11.1 percent in 1959, along with smaller increases in agricultural output. (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], January 29.) Within the Soviet bloc, only Bulgaria recorded a higher industrial growth last year. Industry overfulfilled the plan by 2.3 percent, due largely to the 14.6 percent rise in output of the capital goods industries over 1958. The growth, according to the government's report, was made possible primarily through a 7 percent rise in labor productivity—which contributed 70 percent of the whole increase in industrial production, the report said—and an estimated 4 percent drop in production costs. Investments were up 17 percent over 1958, corresponding approximately to the 17.6 billion *lei* set in the plan. The gains in production were the result of investment in new facilities over the past few years, along with a more intensive use of existing capacity. Steel production grew by 52 percent in 1959 as against an increase of only 7.8 percent the previous year. Huge strides were also registered in the electrical equipment, oil equipment and chemical

industries where Soviet credits have been invested. New capacity commissioned in 1958—three steel furnaces, two rolling mills, three chemical plants, etc.—was increased last year by the installation of two more rolling mills, two semi-coking furnaces, new oil-refinery facilities and several new chemical installations. Progress was slower in the fuel and power industries which have received a decreasing share of total investment in the past few years. The extraction of crude oil, the country's most abundant and highly developed fuel resource, increased only one percent during 1959, the report said.

In agriculture, the greatest successes were claimed in the growth of the "Socialist sector," which now embraces 72 percent of the agricultural land and 73 percent of the arable land of the country. In 1959, a total of 765,000 families were brought into the sector, leaving only 26.5 percent of the peasant families outside of the "Socialist sector." Production in agriculture was said to have overfulfilled the plan by 2.3 percent. Wheat and corn crops increased over 1958 by 40 and 50 percent respectively (although the output of these grains was not much above 1957). The indices for other produce generally made more modest increases.

The following production figures were given in the report (percentage increases over 1958 in parentheses): pig iron, 846,000 tons (15); steel, 1,419,000 tons (52); finished rolled products, 755,000 tons (20); steel pipes, 274,000 tons (88); metallurgical coke, 609,000 tons (8); iron ore, 1,064,000 tons (43); coal, 7,977,000 tons (8); crude oil, 11,438,000 tons (1); mineral oils, 271,000 tons (28); methane gas, 5,782,000 cubic meters (14); electric power, 6.8 billion kwh (10); lathes, 1,207 (11); internal combustion motors, 330,000 H.P. (37); electric motors, 467,000 kwh. (25); electric transformers, 1,258,000 kilo-

The Good Soldier Schweik

From a column in Pruboj (Usti nad Labem), a regional organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, December 3, 1959

I AM SURE you all know Lada's picture of The Good Soldier Schweik, prosperous-looking, walking with his pipe in his mouth toward Budejovice in his imperturbable way. Perhaps you also know that reproductions of this happy picture are multiplying like rabbits and have appeared in workshops, offices, shops, consulting rooms, State betting offices and everywhere else, accompanied by the title: 'Don't Rush Me.'

"I venture to say that this picture with its dubious title is not only misplaced but definitely harmful in places of work, where it may lead to a couldn't-care-less attitude. It also shows a complete lack of understanding of Jaroslav Hasek's work; after all, his Schweik fought, by his indolent calm, against the hated Austrian monarchy, against the enemy of our nation and against the war. Dear admirers of Schweik, against whom do you want to fight today with your damaging calm?"

volt-amperes (60); iron and steel industry equipment, 15,765 tons, (3); complete oil drilling installations, 72 (47); crude oil processing equipment, 5,349 tons (111); chemical industry equipment, 11,627 tons (25); standard gauge steam locomotives, 79 (65); railroad cars, 4,390 (26); motor trucks, 7,405 (34); tractors, 11,000 (57); motor plows, 9,396 (64); bearings, 3,533,000 (24); calcined soda, 106,000 tons (27); caustic soda, 64,000 tons (57); sulfuric acid, 199,000 (39); chemical fertilizers, 52,000 tons (80); organic dyes, 3,750 tons (22); tires, 321,000 (19); paper, 127,000 tons (8); cement, 2,850,000 tons (11); plate glass, 13,132,000 sq. meters (13); lumber, 3,632,000 cubic meters (3); pressed board, 17,083 tons (first production); furniture, 757 million *lei* (16); cotton fabrics, 218 million sq. meters (5); woolen fabrics, 28,120,000 sq. meters (2); silk fabrics, 22,437,000 sq. meters (6); knitwear, 94,102,000 pieces (0); readymade garments, 2,736 million *lei* (1); footwear, 28,161,000 pairs (17); radio sets, 167,000 (20); bicycles, 157,000 (57); electric washing machines, 26,905 (98); meat (excluding bacon), 242,000 tons (7); meat products, 50,000 tons (8); milk (for consumption), 1,136,000 hectoliters (3); butter, 10,951 tons (8); cheese, 36,829 tons (0); edible oil, 76,944 tons (20); sugar, 242,000 tons (29).

National income grew 13 percent according to the report. Average wages of workers and technical and administrative staffs increased by 11 percent; peasant income also grew, especially among members of collective farms. Retail trade volume rose by 5 percent, falling short of the 11 percent set in the plan.

BULGARIA

Zhivkov Instructs Party Workers

Faced with faltering agricultural production and shaky Party discipline, Party chief Todor Zhivkov exhorted district and local leaders to win the confidence of the masses. At a conference of Party officials in Sofia, January 12, the First Secretary pointed out that with last year's reorganization of administrative units in 30 districts (thus abolishing the counties), local Party organizations have the prime responsibility for establishing contact between the Party and the people. "Comrades' courts"—where workers are tried by their peers for minor infractions of work discipline—are to be established, but, above all, Party officials are to watch for criticisms and complaints made by the population.

"Letters of complaint and new proposals by the citizenry," said Zhivkov, "constitute one of the forms of Socialist democracy. We must learn not only from the criticism but also from the experience of the masses. In some places, the private plots in [collective farms] were eliminated but no one reported this to the Party Central Committee. In other cases, some complaints in connection with low pensions were received; and again there were no official reports about this."

Turning to theory rather than practice, Zhivkov underlined the necessity for the Party to combat "revisionism." Referring to the Yugoslav thesis (without mentioning the



"A Raisin in the Sun," the American play about Negro life, recently opened in Ostrava, Czechoslovakia.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), February 6, 1960

Yugoslavs by name) of "the withering away of the State," Zhivkov labeled this view "anti-Marxist" and warned that such "revisionist ideas" would lead to a "weakening of the Socialist State, and, in essence, to a betrayal of the workers' cause."

He concluded with the current Communist interpretation of "peaceful coexistence":

"On the basis of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, we will continue in the future to develop political, State and trade relations with the capitalist countries. Of course, in this field certain compromises are permitted and necessary—mutual concessions in the interest of . . . peace—but in the field of ideology it should not be forgotten even for a moment that we have not made, are not making, and will not make compromises of any kind with bourgeois ideology. . . . We will continue to conduct an active, offensive struggle against bourgeois ideology. We will increase our political vigilance. . . . Comrades, our strength is our unity." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], January 19.)

1959 Plan Fulfillment

The Central Statistical Board, in its report on the fulfillment of the 1959 economic plan (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], January 26) had to steer a tactful course between the optimistic statements of Party leaders and the cold facts of the record. Total industrial output was said to have fulfilled the plan by 102.4 percent, and to have risen by 24.9 percent over the previous year (although the planned increase had been 27.8 percent). In agriculture, where production was to have risen by 73.9 percent, the report gave no comparable percentage; it stated that "despite the unfavorable weather conditions over most of the country, considerable successes were achieved in agriculture."

The plan for capital investment was fulfilled by 96.5 percent, with the volume of net investment rising by 49.4 percent. Foreign trade increased by 42 percent. Industrial productivity (output per worker) rose by 5.9 percent, although the target had been 8.3 percent. National income rose by more than 20 percent, according to preliminary

Current Developments — Bulgaria

data, as against the target of 34 percent, and the real wages of nonagricultural workers by 4.1 percent. Retail sales rose by 18.5 percent as against a planned increase of 23.2 percent.

The output of specific products in industry and agriculture was as follows (with increases over 1958 shown in parentheses and planned increases, where available, in brackets): electric power, 3,869 million kwh (28)[23]; coal and lignite, 15.3 million tons (21)[18]; iron ore, 376,000 tons (29); pig iron, 117,000 tons (46)[46]; steel 230,000 tons (9)[7]; rolled steel, 167,000 tons (20)[7]; copper concentrate, 55,000 tons (37); lead concentrate, 115,000 tons (14); zinc concentrate, 107,000 tons (11); pyrite concentrate, 114,000 tons (36); lead, 33,000 tons (26)[38]; zinc, 9,000 tons (10)[9]; internal combustion engines, 9,201 (164)[122]; electric motors, 176,000 (33); power transformers, 5,429 (90); wire and cable, 87.3 million meters (54); tractor cultivators, 2,460 (734)[720]; tractor plows, 4,788 (77); tractor seed drills, 1,843 (177); freight cars, 2,004 (55)[69]; nitrogenous fertilizer, 185,000 tons (39); phosphorous fertilizer, 153,000 tons (129); calcined soda, 120,000 tons (15); sulfuric acid, 91,000 tons (42); caustic soda, 17,000 tons (13); cement, 1.4 million tons (53)[48]; bricks, 758 million (33)[55]; tiles, 232 million (16)[32]; timber and sawn lumber, 3.4 million cubic meters (14); plywood, 58,000 cubic meters (21); veneer, 4.6 million square meters (13); cellulose, 19,000 tons (11); paper, 51,000 tons (9); plate glass, 6.8 million square meters (67); cotton fabrics, 209 million meters (23)[22]; woolen fabrics, 19 million meters (31)[20]; silk fabrics, 10 million meters (39); sole leather, 6,000 tons (24); upper leather, 198 million square decimeters (23); soft leather, 128 million square decimeters (27); shoes, 7.8 million pairs (22)[14]; canned vegetables, 106,000 tons (34)[79]; canned

fruit, 144,000 tons (58)[32]; cheese, 35,000 tons (29); hard cheese, 8,000 tons (108); butter fat, 8,000 tons (38); vegetable fat, 95,000 tons (29); flour products, 11,000 tons (14); tobacco products, 15,000 tons (27).

Wheat (4); barley (24.8); corn (69.2); sunflower seeds (26.4) [69]; raw cotton (11.3) [81]; oriental tobacco (22.2) [35]; sugar beets (65.1)[92]; tomatoes (1.2)[56]; potatoes (66.6); alfalfa hay (32); apples (minus 3.4); strawberries (50.9); grapes (minus 21.6)[25].

The irrigated area under basic crops increased from 3.9 million decars to 5.5 million decars. Agriculture was supplied with twice as much chemical fertilizer as in the preceding year.

Decline in Cattle

The report made the startling disclosure that the number of cattle had declined by five percent in the year of the "great leap forward." It listed the total number of livestock as follows, showing in the third column the number in 1960 as a percentage of the number in 1959 (figures in thousands):

	Jan. 1 1959	Jan. 1 1960	1960 1959
Cattle	1,356	1,284	94.7
Cows	534	509	95.3
Buffalo	216	174	80.6
Sheep	8,619	8,769	101.7
Pigs	2,052	2,265	110.4
Poultry	15,236	21,669	142.2

New Regulations for Cattle Breeding

The figures given above show only the latest phase of a decline in Bulgarian cattle breeding which began after the collectivization of agriculture. The picture may be extended with the following figures for earlier years (in thousands):

	Jan. 1 1935	Jan. 1 1953	Jan. 1 1958
Cattle	1,498	1,638	1,442
Cows	533	592	547
Sheep	8,839	7,759	7,742

In an effort to stop the decline, a government decree of January 18 provided that the Ministry of Agriculture must take steps to encourage the fattening of cattle before slaughter. It also prohibited the slaughtering of cows and young bulls, and raised the purchase price of beef by 20 percent. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, January 26.) The excessive slaughtering of cattle has often been complained of in the Bulgarian press, with the blame usually being put on the management of the collective farms for not encouraging the peasants to raise cattle on their private plots. Some farms, it was said, have even deprived their members of the private plots to which they are entitled, and where they can raise cattle in their spare time.

"This is not the way to mobilize manpower for the national economy, because privately-owned cattle are taken care of incidentally, among other tasks. The care of this cattle is primarily given to . . . old people and children, whose labor is not utilized in any other way. The collective farmers have many empty buildings in their

Stiff Sentences for Thieves

THE ENDLESS WAR against those who steal from the People's State sometimes brings the death sentence for those found guilty. The Hungarian newspaper *Esti Hirlap* (Budapest) reported on November 21 that the Borsod County Court had sentenced two men to death and 19 others to terms of imprisonment extending to 15 years for theft of public property. The paper said that most of the men had already spent terms in prison, but it did not say on what charges.

In Bulgaria last November, Nikolas Grudev, a financial adviser to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, was sentenced to be shot and his six codefendants were given terms ranging from 6 to 20 years. They were charged with the illegal production and sale of candles. (*Arbeiter Zeitung* [Vienna], November 21.)

Last December a court in the Polish city of Opole sentenced Zdzislaw Riedler to life imprisonment, a fine of 100 thousand *zloty* and the confiscation of all his property. Riedler, a former director of the Orbis tourist agency, was found guilty of embezzling more than 190,000 *zloty* and attempting to escape to Italy.

Current Developments — Bulgaria



"Hey Joe, wake up—you've been elected to the auditing committee!"

Dikobraz (Prague), February 4, 1960

private plots. And this is why it would be right . . . to help collective farmers in raising their own cattle. . . ."
(*Rabotnichesko Delo*, January 5.)

1960 Plan

A lowering of sights is the most outstanding characteristic of the economic plan for 1960. The gross national product is to grow by only 19 percent—a high figure, but low in comparison with the 31.8 percent scheduled last year. Industrial production is to expand 15.2 percent as against the 27.8 percent increase planned for last year. The scheduled growth for agriculture, 32 percent, is less than half of the 73.9 percent growth called for in 1959.

The targets for industry in 1960 show the usual preference for heavy industry, which is to grow 18 percent while light industry is to increase by 13 percent. The production of specific items planned for 1960 was given in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), December 26, 1959, as follows: electric power, 4.5 billion kwh; coal and lignite, 17.4 million tons; pig iron, 146,400 tons; steel, 305,000 tons; rolled ferrous metals, 242,000 tons; lead, 44,000 tons; zinc, 18,000 tons; phosphorous fertilizer, 275,000 tons; nitrogenous fertilizer, 247,000 tons; cement, 1,770,000 tons; tractor plows, 5,680; electric motors, 192,500; motorcycles, 7,500; bicycles, 85,000; cotton fabrics, 212 million meters; wool fabrics, 18.4 million meters; shoes (except rubber), 7,560,000 pairs; meat, 166,200 tons; canned vegetables, 173,100 tons; canned fruit, 120,100 tons; sugar, 267,600 tons; processed fermented tobacco, 70,400 tons. The expected output of key agricultural products is as follows: bread grains, 2,818,000 tons; fodder grains, 3,138,000 tons; corn, 2,160,000 tons; sunflower seed, 360,000 tons; oriental tobacco, 90,000 tons; unginned cotton, 92,000 tons; sugar

beets, 1,900,000 tons; tomatoes, 975,000 tons; grapes, 1,006,000 tons; meat, 547,000 tons; pigs, 300,000 tons; wool, 20,400 tons; milk, 1,196 million litres; eggs, 1,390 million. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 22)

Net capital investment is to increase by 22.9 percent, totalling 7,650.5 million *leva*. The shares of industry, transportation and communication, and cultural-social building in total investment will decline slightly in 1960, being respectively 57, 10.5, and 11.8 percent. Agriculture is to receive 15.8 percent of total investment as compared with 13.4 percent in 1959. Targets for labor productivity are also less ambitious than last year: productivity in industry is to grow by 5.7 percent, in construction by 4.9 percent, in railroad transport by 4.0, and in retail trade by 7.2. Production cost in construction and outfitting work is to decline by 5.7 percent.

National income is slated to grow by 21.5 percent as against last year's target of 34 percent. Retail trade is to expand by 14.2 percent. A growth of 18 percent is scheduled in trade with the "Socialist" countries, while trade with the "capitalist" nations will expand only 9 percent. According to *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), January 31, the economy is faced with a special problem in recruiting manpower. While 100,000 new workers will be needed to carry out the plan, the natural increase is expected to be only 27,000. The gap is to be closed by training workers to fill positions calling for higher skill.

Social Insurance Reorganized

At a session of the National Assembly, February 1, Premier Anton Yugov announced that social insurance programs incorporating old-age and disability pensions will be administered by the Central Council of Trade Unions. Previously, the Ministry of National Health and Welfare was charged with this task.

Prosecuting Magistracy Centralized

Two bills changing the status of public prosecutors were also approved. In the future, Bulgarian public prosecutors will be appointed and dismissed by the Attorney-General and will be fully independent of the local authorities. A second bill provided that certain judges be given tours of duty in the supreme court in order to improve their qualifications. (Radio Sofia, February 2.)

Party School Reclassified

The upper-level Party school of the Party Central Committee has been named as the equivalent to an institute of higher education. Any graduate of this school from its inception in 1949 will be qualified as a high school teacher. (*Izvestia* [Sofia], December 25, 1959.)

Texts and Documents

WARSAW TREATY CONFERENCE

While the Western powers were preparing for the Summit Conference in May, the Soviet bloc closed ranks at a meeting in Moscow on February 3. The "Warsaw Treaty States"—the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania—issued a declaration stating their position on the main points of the Summit agenda: disarmament, atomic tests and the German question. The complete text is given below, in the official English translation broadcast from Moscow by radioteletype on February 5.

Communist China, though not a member of the Warsaw Treaty group, sent an official observer to the meeting. His speech, differing markedly in tone from the declaration of the member States, is given on pp. 54-56. It is the official English text, with one short elision, as broadcast by the Peiping radio on February 5.

DECLARATION OF THE MEMBER STATES

THE MEMBER STATES of the Warsaw Treaty note with satisfaction that a definite change for the better has become noticeable in the international situation since the last conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in May 1958.

For the first time in the many years of the "cold war," normal peacetime relations are beginning to be established between the States belonging to the antagonistic alignments, tension has been markedly reduced, and prospects are opening up for a strengthening of mutual confidence. The world has now entered into a period of negotiations concerning a settlement of the principal international disputed issues with the object of establishing a lasting peace, and the "cold war" supporters are sustaining a defeat.

The important changes that have taken place in recent years in the correlation of forces in the world arena underlie this improvement of the international situation. These were years of rapid expansion of the economic power of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the other Socialist countries, and their further rallying within the framework of a single Socialist camp.

These were years marked by the greatest achievements of the Soviet Union in science and technology. The orbiting of the first artificial earth satellite, the launching of a rocket to the surface of the moon, and the fathoming of the mystery of the reverse side of the moon which is never seen from the earth—such are the

magnificent results of these achievements of the world's first Socialist State which have raised man to a new level in his struggle for understanding and conquering the forces of nature.

And finally, the past years were marked by another upsurge in the activity of all countries of the Socialist camp aimed at consolidating peace, and also by the further enhancement of the international role of the peace-loving countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which have liberated themselves from colonial and semicolonial dependence.

Steps to Peace

As a result, the correlation of forces in the world is changing more and more in favor of those who are coming out for the discontinuance of the race in nuclear rockets and other arms, for the liquidation of the "cold war," and for peaceful coexistence between all States irrespective of their social order and ideology. A situation has taken shape in which any attempt by any aggressive State to use arms to solve international disputes, to take the road of war, would lead to the immediate and complete routing of the violator of peace.

The opinion is increasingly sinking roots in the minds of the peoples, in the minds of many political leaders and statesmen, including those in the West, that, given the present level of weapons of mass annihilation and means for their immediate delivery to any point on earth, war in general can no longer be a means of solving international disputes, that the only feasible way is to build relations between States on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

The participants in the conference note

with profound satisfaction the increasing importance of the type of contacts between States such as meetings and discussions between the leading statesmen of various countries of East and West. These contacts, the development of which the member States of the Warsaw Treaty have always advocated, are, as experience shows, of great, positive importance.

The historic visit to the United States by Nikita Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and his talks with Dwight D. Eisenhower, the President of the United States, have played an outstanding role in this respect. As a result of this visit the "cold war" ice was broken in relations between the mightiest powers in the world—the USSR and the United States—and a new stage was opened in the development of international relations as a whole. An important contribution to the improvement in the international climate was also made, as is known, by the discussions between the leaders of the Soviet and British governments that were held at the time of the visit to Moscow by Harold Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

The participants in the conference expressed the hope that Nikita Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to France and the trip to the USSR by Gronchi, the President of the Italian Republic, will lead to a further strengthening of mutual relations between States, above all, between States of Europe, and will promote consolidation of world peace.

It is the common and wholehearted desire of the participants in the conference that President Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union next summer should lead to a further development of the relations between the USSR and the United States toward friendship and cooperation which would be an important guarantee of the inviolability of peace throughout the world.

The exchanges of visits between statesmen, which have been stepped up in recent years, have become a stable factor making for a rapprochement between the States of the Socialist camp and the peace-loving, independent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The friendly meetings and talks of the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Romanian People's Republic, and other member States of the Warsaw Treaty with the leaders of such countries as India, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Afghanistan, the UAR, Ethiopia, Guinea, and others promote concrete and success-

ful development of peaceful coexistence in vast regions of the world.

All participants in the conference express their determination to continue strengthening and developing friendship with the peace-loving States of Asia, Africa, and Latin America on the basis of equality and mutual respect, in the interests of peace.

The improvement in the international situation is already bearing fruit in many spheres of international relations. Late in 1959 an important agreement was concluded between 12 States, including the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, on peaceful use of the Antarctic under which a vast, though still uninhabited, continent is completely removed from the sphere of war preparations in any form, including the staging of nuclear tests, and has been endorsed as a zone of peaceful exploration and scientific cooperation between States.

A useful step in the right direction is also the decision adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in December 1959 to set up a permanent U.N. committee for the peaceful exploration of outer space, among the members of which are seven Warsaw Treaty States—Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

"Cold War Ice"

At the same time, the participants in the meeting note that the consolidation of peace is still being stubbornly resisted by influential forces in the Western countries. These are either circles which do not see behind the profits they receive from the manufacture of arms the mortal danger that would threaten them in the event of war, or they are politicians so stuck in the ice of the cold war that they cannot conceive of normal peaceful relations between States.

The NATO countries not only continue to maintain inflated armies, but actually increase their numerical strength, paying particular attention to the West German Bundeswehr, which is commanded by former Nazi generals and officers. The Bundeswehr has been equipped with rocket weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany has been enabled to start the manufacture of these weapons. More measures are being taken toward equipping the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons.

It is a fact that the session of the NATO Council held in December 1959 discussed plans for the further accretion of the armed forces of the States belonging to that military bloc.

Parallel with the strengthening of West

German militarism, there has been a marked revival of the militarist forces in Japan, and the further involvement of that country in military preparations, as seen by the signing recently of a new military treaty between Japan and the United States.

The continuation of the arms race by the members of NATO, and also by SEATO, CENTO, and their allies, can in no way be justified by considerations of defense. It shows that the opponents of peaceful coexistence have not laid down arms. This is also borne out by the systematic propaganda of mistrust and hatred between States with differing social systems which is still being conducted by influential political and military leaders in the West and by a section of the press.

The opponents of the consolidation of peace do not desire talks on adjustment of international disputes, and seek to prevent the attainment of agreement even where possibilities for it have become apparent. But no efforts by the champions of the cold war can alter the fact that awareness of the need for peaceful coexistence is becoming the decisive factor in the development of international relations in our time. The balance of forces in the world is in favor of the peaceable States, and the forces of peace are greatly superior to the forces of war.

All this provides favorable conditions for the attainment of the goals for which the Warsaw Treaty States have been fighting consistently all along: Relaxation of international tension and development of friendly cooperation among all countries.

Disarmament

Naturally, the greatest importance surrounds the problem of disarmament. This is the main problem of international life in our time. The question of whether it will be possible to prevent a new war, which in the present conditions would lead to the death of hundreds of millions of people and the annihilation of whole States, depends on its solution.

The interests of mankind require that rocket-nuclear weapons, with their tremendous destructive potential, should never be allowed to be used. And the surest way to achieve this is the destruction of all type of arms, of all weapons of war, i.e., the total and universal disarmament of all States. This is why the proposal for such disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union in the United Nations conforms to the most vital interests of mankind. Therein stems the great in-

fluence which this proposal of the USSR exerts on the peoples.

Highly significant is the unanimity with which the United Nations approved the idea of total and universal disarmament at the past, the 14th, session of the General Assembly. Also gratifying is the fact that this decision was adopted in a draft resolution jointly prepared by two such powers as the USSR and the United States. To make a disarmament agreement a reality for the first time in history it is necessary, above all, to proceed from words to practical deeds. This is the most important historic task of the present generation.

The Warsaw Treaty countries, having exchanged opinions at the present meeting concerning the prospects for the impending disarmament talks, have arrived at the conclusion that the situation now is more favorable than ever before for fruitful disarmament talks between countries of the East and the West. The disarmament proposal submitted by the Soviet Government in the United Nations reflects the common position of the Warsaw Treaty countries, of all the Socialist States. All the countries belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization declare their desire to become parties to the future agreement on total and universal disarmament.

Army Reductions

The States represented at this meeting feel satisfaction that the first country to take practical steps toward the realization of the aforesaid U.N. resolution was a country belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Soviet Union, which unilaterally decided to reduce its armed forces by 1.2 million men. The strength of the Soviet armed forces will now be below the level which the Western powers themselves suggested in 1956 for the Soviet Union and the United States, and also below the actual strength of the American armed forces, even though the United States has a much smaller territory and much shorter frontiers than the USSR.

Reduction of the Soviet armed forces by one-third at a time when the Western military blocs continue the arms race is an act of good will which should impel the other States to take reciprocal steps in the sphere of disarmament, to reply to trust by trust.

Some people in the West are always ready to misconstrue, to misrepresent, any good deed, any good initiative in international relations. This is what the

opponents of disarmament are doing now when they allege that the new reduction of the Soviet armed forces is not a step toward disarmament, but rearmament. Only deliberate bad faith can explain such irresponsible contentions in the face of practical steps in the sphere of disarmament. Who does not realize that only States which have no aggressive intentions can unilaterally reduce their armed forces?

Under present conditions there is no need for big armies and military bases on foreign soil for the defense of a country. Would a State harboring predatory plans voluntarily effect a reduction of its armed forces; it is clear that even if these armed forces are reorganized with the object of increasing their combat power it would not be in its interests to cut their numerical strength.

The States represented at the conference regard the Soviet Union's decision on another major reduction in its armed forces, taken in concord with the other countries of the Socialist camp, as a common contribution by the Warsaw Treaty Organization to the cause of disarmament, as an initiative facilitating agreement between States of the East and the West on general and complete disarmament.

The States united in the Warsaw Treaty Organization consistently and undeviatingly carry through a line aimed at ending the arms race. Since its inception, the Warsaw Treaty Organization has cut the total strength of the armed forces of its member States by 2,596,500 men and the present unilateral reduction of the strength of the Soviet Army will bring this figure up to 3,796,500 men.

Can the NATO States claim credit for similar measures whose importance for the strengthening of peace is obvious to all? Unfortunately NATO measures to date are directed toward stepping up preparations and accumulating armed forces and armaments.

The Warsaw Treaty member States deem it necessary to emphasize the positive example set by the GDR which voluntarily reduced the strength of its armed forces to 90,000 men and refrained from introducing compulsory military service. Such a position by the GDR, prompted by the desire to do its utmost to facilitate a relaxation of tension, has the full support of all States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Of great importance for the cause of peace and the national future of Germany is the fact that the GDR proves by its policy that Germany, if it renounces nuclear arming, the policy of revenge and revision of frontiers, and

militarism, can live in peace and prosperity and hold a worthy place in the family of peoples.

The States represented at the conference call on NATO member States, especially on those of them which have the greatest military power, to respond to the unilateral reduction of the armed forces of the USSR by a reduction of their armed forces, to follow example set by the Soviet Union.

The participants in the conference proceed from the assumption that the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals should be thoroughly examined in the 10-nation committee which is to begin its proceedings on Mar. 15, this year. In this context they agreed that the governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, i.e., the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization which belong to the committee of 10, will instruct their representatives at the committee to facilitate in every way a fruitful activity of the committee and to press for the early drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Of course, a successful and rapid solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament calls for efforts not only on the part of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Such efforts are also called for on the part of the Western powers. The participants in the conference express the hope that the Western powers will also make their contribution to the early solution of the disarmament problem. A mutual honest desire for agreement will make it possible to avoid the repetition of a situation wherein efforts to agree on disarmament are flooded in streams of speeches and resolutions.

International Controls

An effective system of international control over complete and general disarmament is necessary for the successful implementation of such disarmament. Control divorced from practical steps in the field of disarmament could be used in the present situation for purposes diametrically opposed to disarmament: to search for a breach in the defense systems of other countries and to collect information facilitating the drawing up of plans for an attack on one country or another. That is why the States that have no aggressive intentions show a natural concern that the degree of international control must correspond to the real extent of disarmament by the States. Under conditions of general and complete disarmament, the States will have no reasons

to fear each other. All possibilities will be there for any check, for any inspection. If disarmament is general and complete, control will also be all-embracing and complete.

The States represented at the conference deem it necessary to reemphasize their interests in an agreement on disarmament which would establish complete confidence that no side would violate disarmament commitments or have the possibility of rearming in secret.

The member States of the Warsaw Treaty note as a positive fact that for a long time not a single atomic or hydrogen bomb has been exploded in any part of the world. However, though nuclear explosions are not being staged for the time being, there is no international agreement banning them. The peoples do not want just a truce on the nuclear tests front; they believe that such tests should be discontinued once and for all. Anxiety is also created by certain attempts to retreat from the positive, practical achievements on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

If the tests were really resumed by one of the sides, this might set off a kind of chain reaction as a result of which our planet would become again an arena for competition in staging nuclear weapon tests with all hazardous consequences arising therefrom. It would also be difficult to equate this with the resolution of the United Nations which unanimously urged the parties to the Geneva talks—the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom—not to resume nuclear weapon tests and to expedite the conclusion of an international agreement on this question.

The Soviet Government's decision not to resume nuclear tests as long as the Western powers do not resume such test explosions provides favorable conditions for the conclusion of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. The States represented at this conference express the hope that all parties to the Geneva talks will exert maximum efforts to secure in the near future the cessation of all kinds of nuclear weapons tests—in the atmosphere, on the surface, underground, and under water.

A German Peace Treaty

The participants in the conference had a thorough exchange of opinion on the German question. The States represented in the Warsaw Treaty Organization have experienced more than once what German aggression brings to the peoples. It is the common concern of all these States that German militarism should never again imperil the security of Germany's

neighbors and world peace, and this makes them determined to move out for the signing of a peace treaty with Germany. The liquidation of the remnants of World War II and the conclusion of a peace treaty are imperative for the peaceful development of all Germany and for making the peoples confident that firm barriers have been set up against the outbreak of another war in Europe.

At a time when the GDR expresses its complete readiness to enter into negotiations and conclude a peace treaty at any moment, the other German State, the Federal German Republic, opposes the conclusion of such a treaty. An abnormal, unprecedented situation has emerged when the conclusion of a peace treaty is refused by a State which is a successor of the defeated side, the aggressor which surrendered unconditionally 15 years ago.

The policy of the Federal German Republic is designed to obstruct successful talks between the powers and an adjustment of outstanding international problems. Attempts are also made to cancel results which were already achieved during the negotiations—for instance, the narrowing of the gap in the views of the sides on the questions which was achieved by the parties to the Geneva foreign ministers conference in 1959.

Why does the Government of the Federal German Republic resist so stubbornly the conclusion of a peace treaty; it is above all because the peace treaty is called upon to consolidate the situation that has arisen as a result of the war, including the German State frontiers, and the Government of the Federal German Republic is against this. Only one conclusion is possible: The Government of the Federal German Republic expects that an opportune moment may arise for altering the frontiers established in Europe as a result of the rout of Nazi Germany.

In the present conditions, however, this message means a policy of preparing a new war, for none of the States on whom the Federal German Republic is attempting to make territorial claims will ever surrender its lands, as the Government of the Federal German Republic should realize. All sober-minded people understand that these frontiers are inviolable.

The Warsaw Treaty States declare with the utmost resolution that these calculations of the West German Government are doomed to failure. The GDR, like an impregnable bastion of peace, bars the road to new, aggressive gambles by German militarists. The Warsaw Treaty States declare that they support the measures taken by the GDR Government

to safeguard peace against the revanchist policy of the Adenauer government. The joint right of the Socialist camp is a firm guarantee against encroachment on the independence of the GDR, on a new seizure of Poland's western lands, or a violation of the integrity of the Czechoslovak frontiers. The conference participants express confidence that the plans of the West German revanchists will not be supported by the present allies of the Federal German Republic either.

It is the deep conviction of the conference participants that the people of the Federal German Republic, too, thirsting as they do for peace, cannot and will not support the plans of the West German revanchists. The conference participants are convinced that the West German people deserve a better fate than being a tool in the hands of the violators of peace. In the past the Germans were pushed repeatedly to this by the greedy imperialist policy of their rulers, and the German people had to pay heavily time and again.

Conclusion of a peace treaty, renunciation of all ideas of revenge or revision of the frontiers, renunciation of the policy of Germany's remilitarization and atomic arming—such is the best road to insure the security of all European nations and the peaceful future of the German nation. This road is consistently followed by the GDR. If the Federal German Republic also took to this road it would be its most convincing contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and facilitating total and universal disarmament.

The West German "Menace"

The Government of the Federal German Republic turns down the proposal for a peace treaty because it does not want to allow the question of West Berlin to be settled on the basis of its conversion into a free city. It goes so far as to demand that West Berlin, which lies within the territory of the GDR, be incorporated into West Germany, and since this cannot be done, it prefers to preserve the occupation regime there which enables it to use West Berlin as seat of unrest and military danger.

The Government of the Federal German Republic is an opponent of the peaceful settlement with Germany because it does not want the question of German unity to be settled peacefully through talks between the two German States and the conclusion of a peace treaty. Against all common sense, it does not want to see that for over 10 years there have existed two German States which have chosen different

roads of development. Disregarding the vital interests of the German people, the Government of the Federal German Republic rejects the only possible way to the country's reunification, that of talks with the GDR, which has been repeatedly offered by the GDR Government. The Government of the Federal German Republic does not want to hear of a peace treaty because it is afraid that its conclusion would eliminate the present situation in West Germany which enables it to try people merely for having the courage to stand by their progressive convictions and come out in defense of the national rights of the German people and the interests of peace.

All the actions of the Government of the Federal German Republic show that step by step it is clearing the way for the establishment in West Germany of a regime which would appear to be a democratic regime but which is in effect close to the regime which plunged the world into a murderous war and led the German people to an unparalleled national catastrophe. Could the brazen Nazi and anti-Semitic outrages of the fascist elements in West Germany, which the world has witnessed lately, have occurred if conditions were different? The Government of the Federal German Republic recently did not scruple to take under its wing the organizers of these disgraceful demonstrations, and some West German officials, in the best Nazi tradition, have tried to lay the blame for them on the Communists.

All this can only increase the people's mistrust of the policy of the Federal German Republic. Under these circumstances an even more active struggle for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany becomes a necessity.

The countries represented at the present conference stand for peaceful cooperation and neighborly relations with all States, including the Federal German Republic, and they spare no effort to achieve such cooperation in practice. The Warsaw Treaty States are striving for a peaceful settlement with Germany, together with the other allied and associated powers which took part in the war against Germany. This means the conclusion of a peace treaty which, under the present conditions, can only be signed by both German States.

At the same time they cannot agree that the solution of these questions be postponed indefinitely, which can only encourage the militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany. If the efforts toward the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German States do not meet

with support and if the solution of this question comes up against attempts at procrastination, the States represented at the present conference will have no alternative but to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, together with the other States ready for this, and to solve the question of West Berlin on this basis as well.

East-West Contacts

The States represented at the present conference reaffirm their inflexible striving for the improvement of relations between countries of the East and the West, the strengthening of confidence between them, and the development of all forms of international cooperation. They continue to stand for the unhampered development of international trade; for the strengthening of contacts between statesmen, public leaders, and organizations; for exchanges of achievements in the fields of culture, science, and technology, which enrich the peoples of all countries. Cessation of propaganda for war, calls for sedition, and attempts to threaten by the use of force would be of great importance for improving the international climate and eliminating suspicion in international relations. As far as the Warsaw Treaty countries are concerned, propaganda for war has been outlawed in them, and they are ready, for their part, to take further measures to have the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and sharp polemics in relations between States be superseded by good will and trust.

With the present noticeable relaxation of international tension, the proposal for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the two groups of States, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, which still has not met a positive solution, acquires an even greater importance than in past years.

Convinced that the task of concluding a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization, far from losing its validity, is becoming steadily more important, the conference participants deem it necessary to declare that this offer still stands and that they are ready at any time to sign a nonaggression pact with the NATO States. The conclusion of bilateral nonaggression pact between States belonging to different military alignments and the establishment in Europe of zones free of atomic and nuclear weapons could also play a not inconsiderable part in improving the international situation.

The conference participants welcome with great satisfaction the agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France to hold

a summit meeting in Paris in May of this year. The governments of the Warsaw Treaty countries have long pressed for the holding of such a meeting, regarding it—as pointed out in their declaration of May 24, 1958—as “the most important means under present circumstances of safeguarding mankind against a military calamity and turning the course of international development toward the consolidation of peace.”

The Warsaw Treaty States consider that the forthcoming meeting of the heads of government should discuss such important and urgent questions as: The problem of total and universal disarmament; the question of a German peace treaty, including the establishment of a free city of West Berlin; the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests; and East-West relations. Proceeding from the conviction that any international problem, however complex it may seem, can be settled, given reasonable consideration for the interests of the sides and a general striving for peace, the conference participants express the hope that the heads of government will succeed in finding the correct ways to a successful solution of the aforesaid questions in the interest of strengthening universal peace, and that the forthcoming summit meeting will be a turning point in East-West relations.

Now, on the eve of crucial talks between statesmen of the East and the West, on the eve of a meeting at the summit, it is especially important in the opinion of the Warsaw Treaty countries that all States should do everything within their power to create a situation facilitating the success of the coming talks. The States represented at the present conference declare that they will act precisely in this direction, and they urge all other countries to promote the success of East-West talks and to refrain from any steps capable of complicating these negotiations.

The governments of Warsaw Treaty countries note with satisfaction that their unflagging efforts toward the termination of the arms race, the elimination of dangerous seats of international conflicts, and liquidation of the cold war are meeting with increasingly wide support from the peoples of the world and are yielding positive results. They are unanimous in believing that in our times the States do not and cannot have a greater and nobler task than that of contributing to the establishment of stable peace on earth.

SPEECH OF THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE

COMRADE CHAIRMAN, dear comrades: In the capacity of an observer of the People's Republic of China, I have the honor to attend the regular conference of the political consultative committee of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty.

We are convinced that the convening of the conference will make new contributions to further relaxing the international situation, and to encouraging the people of the world in their struggle against arms expansion and war preparations and for a lasting peace. We wish the conference success.

The current international situation is continuing to develop in a direction favorable to peace. There have appeared certain tendencies toward relaxation in the international tension created by imperialism. Comrade Nikita Khrushchev made a successful visit to the United States. Prompted by the Soviet Union's foreign policy of peace and the peace-loving people and countries of the world, an East-West summit conference will soon be convened.

As to the disarmament question, certain procedural agreements have been reached. The Chinese people and peace-loving people and countries the world over all rejoice over this. The emergence of such a situation is not accidental. This is the result of repeated struggles by the Socialist forces, the national revolutionary forces, and the forces of peace and democracy against the imperialist war forces, the result of the east wind prevailing over the west wind.

The incomparable strength and the strong unity of the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and its distinguished and effective efforts in the cause of peace are the decisive factors for the tendency toward relaxation in the international situation. We are happy to see that the tempo of construction in all the Socialist countries is accelerating and material strength is greatly increasing. Particularly in carrying out its enormous seven-year plan, the Soviet Union has scored brilliant achievements.

The Soviet success in repeated launching of man-made earth satellites and cos-

mic rockets marks the fact that in the most important fields of science and technology, the Soviet Union has left the United States far behind. The balance of forces internationally has undergone a further, huge change favorable to peace and Socialism which greatly strengthens the will to struggle and confidence in victory of people throughout the world.

The unswerving struggle carried out by the powerful world forces of peace has made the U.S. imperialist policies of position of strength and brink of war suffer repeated setbacks. The United States is not only increasingly isolated day by day politically and militarily, and its forces are widely dispersed and new weapons are lagging behind, but also economically it is in an ever more difficult situation. Under this circumstance, particularly under the pressure of the strong desire for peace of the peoples of various countries the world over, the U.S. ruling circles had to make some peace gestures. Of course it is better to talk about peace than to talk about war.

U.S. "Tricks"

Nevertheless, even the U.S. ruling circles did not try to hide the fact that their change in the way of doing things was aimed at numbing the fighting spirit of the people of the world by means of the "strategy to win victory by peace," wrecking the unity of the peace forces of the world, dismembering the Socialist camp—and they are even dreaming of a "peaceful evolution" in the Socialist countries. Such wild attempts by the U.S. ruling circles certainly cannot be realized. While being compelled to make certain peace gestures, the U.S. ruling circles are still intensively carrying out arms expansion and war preparations, expanding vigorously their intercontinental missiles program, setting up and expanding missile bases in various places, claiming to be ready at any time to resume nuclear weapons tests, and actively trying to patch up and strengthen military blocs in an attempt to gain time to improve their inferior military position.

Recently, U.S. President Eisenhower's State of the Union message gave the clearest indication that the new U.S. tricks are aimed at gaining precisely what it failed to obtain by its old tricks. The actions of the United States fully prove that its imperialist nature cannot be changed. American imperialism is still the principal enemy of world peace. All those in the world sincerely working for peace must maintain vigilance against U.S. double-dealing. If our Socialist

camp and the people of all countries in the world continue to strengthen unity, continue to unify our strength, and thoroughly crush all the intrigues and schemes of the enemy of peace, the U.S. war plan can be pushed even further back and even be checked, and the cause in defense of peace will win greater victory. . . .

Although U.S. imperialism dares not oppose disarmament verbally, it has always in fact undermined general disarmament. Whenever certain U.S. proposals were accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States always found new pretexts to retreat from its original position, creating all kinds of difficulties and in every way preventing the reaching of agreement on the disarmament question. U.S. moves prove that it will not give up the policy of the arms race. Therefore the struggle for general disarmament is a long-term and complicated struggle between us and imperialism.

The Chinese Government and the Chinese people have always advocated general disarmament, and actively supported the proposals concerning disarmament by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. Since 1951, the Chinese Government has on its own initiative reduced its armed forces again and again. The present Chinese armed forces are less than half their original size. We shall continue to work ceaselessly for general disarmament together with the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries. We hope that the countries concerned will reach agreement on the question of general disarmament. The Chinese Government has never hesitated to carry all the international obligations which it assumes. But U.S. imperialism, hostile to the Chinese people, has always adopted a discriminatory attitude against our country in international relations. Therefore, the Chinese Government has to declare to the world that a general international disarmament agreement and all other international agreements which are arrived at without the formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic and the signature of its delegates cannot, of course, have any binding force on China.

Germany, Japan, Korea

The German question has a particularly important place among outstanding international issues. Its solution has a bearing not only on the security of Europe but also on the peace of the world. Perpetual division of Germany and accelerated revival of West German militarism are important components of the U.S.

imperialist policy of war and aggression. The recent frenzied war clamors by Adenauer and the rampant anti-semitic activities started by the West German fascist forces are the outcome of U.S. instigation and support.

The governments of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic have time and again put forward reasonable proposals for settlement of the German issue, but all the proposals have been rejected by the United States and West Germany. In its efforts to come to agreement with the Western powers on the conclusion of a German peace treaty and on ending the occupation regime in West Berlin, the Soviet Union has made many concessions, whereas the Western powers have made no appropriate response. The Chinese Government and people will steadfastly support the basic stand taken by the Soviet Union and the GDR on the solution of the German question, and the struggle of the German people for their national reunification on the basis of peace and democracy.

While making intensified efforts to re-arm West Germany, U.S. imperialism is reviving Japanese militarism in the east, and has signed a Japanese-U.S. military alliance treaty with the Kishi government, its close follower. The Chinese Government has made a statement strongly condemning this action of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries which threatens the peace and security of Asia.

The Soviet Government, too, has sent a memorandum to the Japanese Government, pointing out that the treaty seriously endangers the interests of the Soviet Union, China, and many other countries in the Asian and Pacific region. The people of all lands, including the Japanese people, stand unanimously against this further step of military collusion between the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries.

The Chinese Government and people hold that West Germany and Japan, which are supported energetically by U.S. imperialism, have become two sources of serious war danger. All peace-loving peoples and countries of the world must maintain high vigilance against this, and, by making every kind of effort, hold in check the militarism of these two countries as the saboteur of peace.

In other parts of Asia, U.S. imperialism is also continuing to create international tension. The Chinese People's volunteers withdrew voluntarily from Korea long ago, but the U.S. forces are still insisting on remaining in South

Korea and are trying hard to obstruct Korea's peaceful reunification. The United States supported the reactionary forces in Laos, undermined the Geneva agreements and the Vientiane agreements, and provoked civil war in Laos. At the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, China has been persistently advocating the principle of settling the disputes between China and the United States by means of peaceful negotiations and not resorting to force or threat of force. But the United States has all along refused to reach agreement with China in accordance with this principle and has been occupying until now our territory of Taiwan. The U.S. navy and air force have been constantly making military provocations against our country despite repeated warnings. Therefore, the Chinese people and the people of the world must unite still more closely and resolutely smash the U.S. scheme for new war and aggression in Asia.

The foreign policy of our Socialist countries has adhered to the principle of peaceful coexistence among countries of different social systems. We Socialist countries will never encroach upon others, but neither will we tolerate encroachment by others. Lenin said that to achieve peaceful coexistence no obstacle would come from the Soviet side. Obstacles could come only from imperialism, from the side of American as well as any other capitalists. We will continue to adhere to Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence. Our efforts to carry out this principle have won the support of increasing numbers of people. But if the imperialist reactionaries mistake this for an expression of our weakness and dare to impose war on us, then they will only be inviting their own destruction.

The Chinese people sympathize with and support the national democratic movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and strive to have long-term friendly relations with the nationalist countries in Asia and Africa on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence initiated by our country together with India and Burma. The imperialists, in order to achieve their ulterior motives, have tried by every means to undermine our unity with these countries. One of their major tactics to undermine this unity is to use the border issue or the overseas Chinese issue, which are legacies of history, to sow discord and create anti-China schemes in an attempt to isolate China.

Reactionary forces of certain Asian countries also make use of these issues to try to undermine the friendship between the people of these countries and Chinese people, in an attempt to use the anti-China campaign to divert the attention of the peoples of these countries from domestic questions and to create pretexts for suppressing the democratic, progressive forces in their own countries. In our relations with certain nationalist countries, there may appear a small patch of dark clouds, but the sun cannot be overshadowed for long, and friendship between our people and the people of these countries will be maintained and developed.

Recently, the Indonesian and Chinese governments exchanged instruments of ratification of the treaty concerning the question of dual nationality, set up a joint committee to implement the treaty, and started talks on questions concerning the return of overseas Chinese to their country. Overall settlement of the overseas Chinese question still needs a certain period of time and may still go through some ups and downs. But if both sides value their friendship, persist in peaceful consultation, and seriously carry out the agreements already reached, the overseas Chinese question can be solved justly and reasonably.

Burma

China and Burma have always had friendly relations. Recently, Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win visited China and signed with the Chinese premier the Sino-Burmese treaty of friendship and mutual nonaggression and an agreement between the two governments on the boundary question. This not only signifies that friendly relations of the two countries have entered a new stage, but also sets a new example for the friendly solidarity of Afro-Asian countries.

The Sino-Burmese border question is a complicated one left by history. The imperialist reactionaries used this question to sow dissension and cause division. But the governments of China and Burma both sincerely desire peace and friendship. Therefore, the two parties were able to reach agreement in principle speedily and pave the way for overall, thorough settlement of this question.

The Sino-Burmese treaty of friendship and mutual nonaggression is striking proof that the five principles of peaceful coexistence not only are not "outdated" or "dead," as certain reactionary elements

and war instigators in the world alleged, but, on the contrary, are showing to an ever greater extent their great vitality.

These facts thoroughly give the lie to the slanders of the imperialists and all reactionaries about China's "aggression." They amply prove that China's sincerity in abiding by the five principles of peaceful coexistence stands the test of time and history. Those people who attempt to isolate China not only have failed to do so but, on the contrary, have isolated themselves.

Strengthening the unity of the countries in the Socialist camp is of extremely great importance. Our unity is built on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism and on the basis of proletarian internationalism. The Moscow meeting of the Communist and workers' parties of the Socialist countries held in 1957 ushered in a new historic period in our unity. The declaration adopted at this meeting is the charter of solidarity of our Socialist camp. The imperialists, the modern revisionists, and the reactionaries in all countries have always been dreaming that changes in their favor would occur within our ranks and breaches in our unity would occur. The greater the difficulties they come up against, the more they hope to save themselves from their doom by disrupting the relations within our ranks and undermining unity among us.

However, in face of our great unity, their futile calculations can never be realized. The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people have always taken as their sacred international obligation the safeguarding of the unity of the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. They always regard an attack against any Socialist country by the imperialists and reactionaries as an attack against China. They have always considered that the modern revisionists of Yugoslavia are renegades to the Communist movement, that revisionism is the main danger in the present Communist movement, and that it is necessary to wage a resolute struggle against revisionism. This stand of ours is firm and unshakable. In the cause of working for peace and Socialism, we Socialist countries will surely extend more support and help to each other. As long as the Socialist camp is united, the unity of the peoples of the world has a firm nucleus and the victory of our cause is reliably guaranteed.

The present situation is extremely favorable to us. Let us hold aloft the banner of peace, the banner of Socialism and Communism, and march victoriously toward our great goal!

Recent and Related

Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union, by Arnold Kramish (California: Stanford University Press, 1959, 232 pp., \$4.75). A nuclear physicist employed by the Rand Corporation, Dr. Kramish has written a nontechnical book about the history, present scope and future possibilities of Soviet nuclear research and development. Based on material assembled from a systematic scanning of thousands of Soviet newspapers and technical journals, it analyzes the politics and technology of the Soviet atomic energy program, both military and civil. Dr. Kramish relates that during the war the Russians brought their scientific endeavor almost to a halt, concentrating solely on the war effort. After the war, however, their progress in atomic energy research assumed an astonishing pace. He discusses raw material sources, testing centers, personnel, and organizational matters. The book concludes with a description of the thermonuclear power program, which may bring the Soviets new advances of political and technical significance. Bibliography, index.

The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941, by Raymond H. Dawson (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959, 315 pp., \$6.00). This is a study of how the US began to assist Soviet Russia in its war against Nazi Germany. The opening pages are devoted to a brief description of the Lend-Lease Act and the complex of national goals and interests which it was designed to protect and promote. The executive formulation of Lend-Lease and the legislative debates on the bill are then examined with specific reference to US relations with the Soviet Union. Thereafter the development of US policy toward the USSR is traced down to the German invasion of June 22. The remainder of the book examines the process of policy determination from June 22 to November 7, and describes the climate of opinion within which the policy decisions were reached. By September 30, 1945, the value of US shipments to Russia reached the prodigious total of \$9.5 billion. Bibliography, index.

Peace with Russia? by Averell Harriman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959, 175 pp., \$3.00). Mr. Harriman first visited the Soviet Union in 1926 as a businessman, and was in and out of the

USSR several times on special missions for President Roosevelt before going to Moscow as US Ambassador in 1943. He stayed there until 1946. In 1959 he visited Russia again with the subject of his present book in mind. He traveled about 18 thousand miles, from the Ukraine to Siberia and Central Asia, talking at length with Khrushchev, local officials and party leaders, inspecting factories, collective farms, irrigation works and dams, trying to explore every aspect of Soviet life. He reached conclusions that will encourage those hoping for a limited rapprochement between East and West. Peaceful coexistence is possible, he says. He recommends increased Soviet-American contacts, a greater two-way tourist traffic, and more collaboration in the scientific and cultural fields.

The High Tower of Refuge, by Edgar H. S. Chandler (New York: Praeger, 1960, 264 pp., \$6.75). This is the story of world refugee relief. Dr. Chandler, who is Director of Refugee Service of the World Council of Churches and the President of the Standing Conference of Voluntary Agencies Working for Refugees, bases his book on the many reports, conversations and visits which have brought him first-hand information about the refugee situation as it exists today. In an era when millions of human beings have been forcibly uprooted there is still much apathy and lack of understanding of this problem, he says. An incredible total of forty million refugees in Asia and Europe are in desperate need of help. "The High Tower of Refuge" describes a tragic chapter in the history of mankind. But its main purpose is to relate in detail what is being done by one of the world's largest voluntary relief organizations to improve this situation. Illustrations, bibliography, index.

Publishing in the U.S.S.R., by Boris I. Garokhoff (Indiana University Publications, Slavic and East European Series, Volume 19, 1959, 306 pp., \$3.00). A survey of book, periodical and newspaper publishing in the Soviet Union. Emphasis is given to publications in science and technology, especially those issued by the All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information. The data given is based chiefly on an analysis of Soviet sources. Bibliography, index.

Soviet Influence in Latin America: the Role of Economic Relations, by Robert Loring Allen (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959, 108 pp.). Despite the small volume of trade, economic relations with Latin America have been, the author says, the subject of a great deal of Soviet-bloc attention since 1954. A number of factors help to explain the Communists' lack of success. Three of the most important are: "a fundamental ideological and political antagonism between the thinking of the people as well as of the economic and political leadership of the two areas; the inability of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to implement satisfactory commercial policies in their relations with Latin American countries; and the absence of a significant economic basis for large-scale trade between the two areas in terms of complementary export and import capabilities and requirements." Mr. Allen, an associate professor of economics at the University of Virginia, presents a comprehensive summary of the economic relations between the two areas, accompanied by an examination of the present posture and motives of the trading partners.

Beria's Gardens: A Slave Laborer's Experiences in the Soviet Utopia, by Unto Parvilahti. Translated by Alan Blair from the Finnish "Berijan Tarhat" (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1960, 286 pp., \$5.00). Author Parvilahti's report on his ten-year journey through Soviet jails, labor camps and exile is revealing and dispassionately written. Arrested in 1944 in his native Finland for "counterrevolutionary activities," this former army officer came to know two prisons in Moscow, several large forced-labor camps in Central Russia and the Arctic (he learned how important a part prison-camp labor played in the Soviet economy), and existence under normal conditions of Soviet life after being exiled to Siberia. The picture of the USSR drawn by the author is extremely depressing: fear, hatred and bitterness; crime, alcoholism and widespread theft of State property; wretched living conditions for all but Party members; and exploitation of farmers and workers. He believes that, contrary to the spreading optimism about recent improvements in Soviet Russia, no political progress can be expected.

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